Auditing looks ahead: Proceedings of the Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by University of Kansas, School of Business & Stettler, Howard
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium
on Auditing Problems Deloitte Collection
1972
Auditing looks ahead: Proceedings of the Touche
Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on
Auditing Problems
University of Kansas, School of Business
Howard Stettler
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings
Part of the Accounting Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
University of Kansas, School of Business and Stettler, Howard, "Auditing looks ahead: Proceedings of the Touche Ross/University of
Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems" (1972). Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems. 1.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings/1
auditing 
looks 
ahead 
Proceedings of the 
1972 Touche Ross 
University of Kansas 
Symposium on 
Auditing Problems 
HOWARD STETTLER, EDITOR 
Auditing Looks Ahead 
Proceedings of the 1972 
Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on 
Auditing Problems 
Edited by 
H o w a r d F . S t e t t l e r 
May 11 and 12, 1972 
School of Business 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 66044 
These contents have not been copyrighted, and permission is hereby granted to 
reproduce or quote from material included herein in whole or in part, provided 
that full credit is given to 1) the author of the material and 2) this source: 
AUDITING L O O K S AHEAD; Proceedings of the 1972 Touche Ross/University 
of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems. 
PRINTED BY T H E 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS PRINTING SERVICE 
Additional copies may be ordered at a price of $4.00 from: 
STUDENT UNION BOOKSTORE 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 66044 
Preface 
Two decades of overwhelming concern for the pressing problems of ac-
counting principles have rather effectively obscured the fact that such concern 
is but a natural concomitant of the basic professional responsibility of auditing: 
adding credibility to financial information. In a very real sense, auditing is the 
parent and accounting principles but the child (and an adopted one at that!), 
whose needs and demands have grossly overshadowed those of the parent. 
For the evidence that this is actually the state of affairs, one need but con-
sider the spartan attention and support devoted to the Committee on Auditing 
Procedure in contrast to that lavished on the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board and its predecessors, the Accounting Principles Board and before that the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure. An obvious cause for this disparity is the 
fact that auditing standards are largely an internal matter, whereas the public 
interest and concern for accounting principles has placed the workers in that 
particular vineyard under time pressures to hurry the work along, while at the 
same time being forced to work in the constant glare of the public spotlight. 
The original proposal to Touche Ross Foundation to sponsor a symposium 
on auditing problems was presented as a means to help restore some semblance 
of balance and proportion between auditing and accounting. The plan, reflected 
in the following pages, was to obtain a series of papers on matters of current con-
cern in auditing, with a roughly equal distribution between practitioners and 
educators invited to prepare the papers. A member of the alternate group was 
then invited to serve as formal discussant of the paper, thereby leading into a 
general discussion of the paper by all who were present for the symposium. 
More than forty persons participated in the symposium, again about equally 
divided between practitioners and educators, and with representatives included 
from the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure and the A A A Committee 
on Basic Auditing Concepts. The papers and discussants' remarks are arranged 
in these Proceedings in the order in which they were presented, with the ex-
ception that Marvin L. Stone's remarks in Chapter 8 were delivered at the 
dinner held at the close of the first day of the two-day event. 
The papers and discussants' remarks generated lively but penetrating dis-
cussions, sometimes with practitioners and educators holding different views, 
but most frequently with relative agreement between the two groups that was 
perhaps unanticipated by many. There has been no attempt to summarize the 
discussions, but both the preparers of the papers and the formal discussants have 
had an opportunity to modify their papers and remarks as originally presented 
to reflect matters that arose during the discussion periods. 
As chairman of the symposium, I take full responsibility for the selection 
of the topics for the invited papers, but the views expressed in the papers are 
those of the preparers, and, of course, not necessarily those of the organizations 
with which they are affiliated. Although there was no chosen theme for the 
symposium as a whole, it is of more than passing interest to note the frequency 
with which references to auditor independence occur throughout the papers. 
The references generally involve questions of preserving and strengthening 
independence or of the influence of independence as a factor to be considered 
with respect to a given problem or decision. The fact that these references evolved 
naturally in the development of the various topics suggests the mature considera-
tion that those associated with the auditing profession give to the unique obliga-
tion of independence that the profession has assumed. 
The Touche Ross Foundation sponsorship of the symposium has likewise 
made possible the printing of this volume, thereby affording wider distribution to 
the significant ideas and views generated in the course of the symposium. I espe-
cially wish to acknowledge the unstinting efforts of Donald J . Bevis in helping to 
bring to fruition the proposal that such a symposium be held. 
HOWARD F. STETTLER 
June, 1972 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence 
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Some Historical Auditing Milestones; An Epistemology of an 
Inexact Art 
R. Gene Brown 
Syntex Corporation (formerly of Stanford University) 
and 
Roger H. Salquist 
Zoecon Corporation 
To accept an assignment to write of history is in many ways more foolish 
than to attempt to be a soothsayer. When one forecasts, the reasonableness of his 
assertions can be debated but only substantiated by the passage of time, at which 
point one can blow the dust off the forecasts (if they proved reasonably accurate) 
and point with pride to such clairvoyance. If the forecasts missed the mark, one 
can let the earlier assertions rest forgotten unless reminded thereof, at which point 
a cloudy crystal ball can be argued to have been expected given the vagaries of 
such a changing, dynamic environment. 
On the other hand, a cloudy crystal ball is difficult to explain when one 
examines events of years past, for there are records, memories, and earlier 
expressed opinions as to history. It is not possible to wait for the passage of 
time hoping to receive plaudits for reasonable assertions, or brick-bats, if observa-
tions are different than those subject to historical "verification" or at variance 
from those of the reader's perceptions. 
The historian hopes to make his contribution in one of three ways. Of 
greatest reward is the uncovering of some new artifact or information which 
will not only add to the store of knowledge, but help in explaining some facet 
of our heritage which heretofore had remained unknown and as frustrating as 
a missing piece from a jigsaw puzzle. A lesser, but nonetheless satisfying en-
deavor, is to start with the known historical body of knowledge and successfully 
structure some new theory permitting a greater understanding of one's heritage 
or present behavior. Of least satisfaction is to attempt to order given knowledge 
in a fashion in which it has not previously been ordered, hoping to enhance the 
understanding of the past and permit greater perspective of today's moment in 
history, and hopefully, a better basis for speculations as to the future. It is this 
latter contribution that we hope to make in this paper, an epistemological ap-
proach, that is, the study of the nature and substance of audit history with the 
objective of better understanding the evolutionary process which shaped the 
present state of the art and may influence future occurrences. 
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Difficulties with an Epistemological Approach to Auditing History 
Three identifiable steps must occur to successfully carry out an epistemologi-
cal study: first, the important, influential events must be identified and segregated 
from trivial events. This first step is critical, yet difficult, for it is easy to make 
an error of commission and include some event which in others' judgment should 
not be considered, or to make an error of omission and fail to include in one's 
consideration some important influential factor of history. 
The second step to perform is to order the identified important historical 
variables in some manner which can lead to the necessary third step, an in-
terpretation of the events and their ordering. This second step is also difficult, 
for the historian is plagued with uncertainties as to the cause or motivation under-
lying the occurrence of a specific event, the actual importance of the event at 
the time it occurred, as well as the true influence of the event on the evolution 
of the art. It must also be recognized that the ordering process itself structures 
the analysis and interpretation of historical events. These difficulties are not 
unique to the study of auditing history, but plague the student of the history of 
any art or science. Certain other difficulties seem more uniquely associated with 
the study of auditing history, especially in viewing the so-called auditing 
"milestones." 
We first encountered the milestone in France (milleborne), where it is used 
as in other principally European countries to mark orderly, measurable steps to 
a predetermined goal (mileage traveled from a given city and remaining to an-
other specified city). It stretches our imagination to argue that there have been 
orderly and measurable happenstances in audit history which can be stated to 
have occurred with some specific goal in mind. Auditing evolution has been 
irregular, responding to pressures from within the profession and the environ-
ment, with no specific goal or goals which have been historically consistent or 
even well articulated, and with a distinct lack of specified hurdles against which 
progress can be measured. Perhaps this is understandable, since auditing is truly 
a service function, responding to demands for its service by adjusting its "theory" 
and tools of practice as needed to satisfy the changing needs of its customers. 
The service nature of auditing and the audit process are what encourage us to 
describe the practice of auditing as an "inexact art." 
Art has been defined as a skill in performance acquired by experience, study, 
or observation. It is also defined in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dic-
tionary as (a) an occupation requiring knowledge or skill, (b) a system of rules 
or methods of performing certain actions, and (c) systematic application of 
knowledge or skill in effecting a desired result. Certainly, these definitions 
describe the auditing process even though the auditor may use the scientific 
method of reasoning from an hypothesis and collecting and interpreting data 
in order to affirm, deny, or modify the hypothesis. The use of such a "scientific" 
tool as probability sampling does not change the fundamental nature of the 
auditing process; a process which cannot but be described as an art, and an 
inexact one, at that. This inexact nature of the audit process, the evolution of 
the art in response to internal and external influences, and the lack of a con-
sistent and articulated set of goals, render difficult any epistemological study. 
Nonetheless, the major factors influencing audit evolution and the important 
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events that could be identified made possible some structure and ordering of 
auditing "milestones." 
Choosing a Structure for Ordering Historical Audit Events 
One possible approach, and the one which we first attempted, was to make 
an extensive review of the literature and prepare a chronological inventory of 
important events in the history of auditing. Since the purpose of this paper is 
to make some observations about the milestones in the development of the pro-
fession in the United States, and since earlier audit history is reasonably well 
chronicled, we began our survey with the literature which could be reasonably 
argued to be representative of, or contributory to, the profession in this country. 
Once completed, however, we found that a sequential inventory of important 
publications and events was less than satisfactory, not only because of the 
uncertainties arising from fears of possible errors of omission and commission, 
but because of the lack of any apparent order or logic to the listing. A second 
problem is that any such list ignores cause and effect relationship, tending to 
concentrate on the "effect" side of the equation, while the "cause" is the most 
interesting if one is seeking to rationalize the occurrence of events or to use 
history in a predictive fashion. 
A more exciting approach to ordering audit history would be to focus on 
the giants of the profession and their contributions. This has partially been 
accomplished in the form of several publications devoted to the lives of both 
academicians and practitioners. It is much more interesting to study people than 
events, but such an approach can only result in a disjointed survey since many 
of the important factors which shaped the profession were unrelated to individuals, 
being of economic, social and technological origin. 
An interesting "macro" approach is to attempt to identify the major socio-
econo-technological environmental influences on the evolution of the auditing 
profession along with the identification of the response of the profession to those 
influences. Such an approach is quite a chore, for two reasons: first, cause and 
effect relationships such as these are difficult to establish in an ex-paste manner, 
especially when one realizes that these relationships were often not understood 
or documented at the time, much less decades later, and second, because there is 
not always a clear cause which can be associated within a given time period 
with an important event which occurred. 
Another method of ordering historical milestones is through a characteriza-
tion of the profession by looking at the major "eras" through which it passed in 
its development. Such an era classification is also difficult, since many events 
are not subject to placement into neat little boxes of time or character, in the 
sense that they are evolutionary in nature. A significant lead-lag problem also 
exists, since certain environmental influences do not make their presence known 
in the professional literature or practice until long after the cause for the evolu-
tionary change has vanished or diminished in importance. 
In reviewing the chronological inventory of events which we prepared, and 
in stepping back to reason therefrom, we decided that the last two approaches 
mentioned above would be most interesting and most useful in attempting to 
generalize about our professional heritage. The next two sections of the paper 
present these two orderings of auditing milestones, with the era classification 
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provided first and the socio-econo-technological environmental (in a cause and 
effect relationship) presented second. In a sense, this provides two different ways 
of viewing the same history. Since any ordering is a matter of choice, the use 
of two alternative methods of classification permits us to test how important the 
choice itself is in making generalizations of relevance as to the current status of 
the profession and/or assertions as to the future. 
Auditing Milestones Classified by Era 
Since we are dealing with the epistemology of a profession, it makes sense 
to view its evolution in terms of the major periods of professional change or 
growth. We have selected the following five classifications as being a useful 
description of the eras of auditing evolution: "Emergence," "Consolidation," 
"Technology," "Professionalism," and "Conflict and Uncertainty." 
The various eras can be described generally as follows: 
Emergence 
Consolidation 
Technology 
Professionalism 
Conflict and 
Uncertainty 
The birth and early development of the auditing profession in 
the United States. 
The move toward combination, uniformity and strength. 
The interest in and sometimes preoccupation with audit tools 
and techniques, especially the so-called "scientific" tools. 
The assumption of responsibility for shaping the destiny of the 
profession rather than responding to outside pressures for 
change; organizing and bonding together for influence. 
Serious questions about the nature and scope of audit content 
and responsibility create internal conflict within the profession. 
The specific important audit milestones which we would attribute to each 
of the five eras which we isolated are shown in the table following. 
AUDIT MILESTONES CLASSIFIED BY ERA 
Era Audit Milestones 
Emergence: • The expansion of business enterprises and the great influx 
Late 19th Century of foreign capital into the United States in the late 1800's 
to 1920 created the need for a body of trained accountants. 
• The American Association of Public Accountants was 
formed in 1887. 
• The State of New York passed the first public accounting 
law in the United States in 1896. 
• Mounting credit problems in the early 1900's caused 
bankers to pressure corporations to have their balance 
sheets "certified." 
• The literature of auditing began to mature. The Journal 
of Accountancy commenced publication in 1905. In 1914 
Robert Montgomery published the first United States 
auditing textbook, an adaptation of Dicksee's 1892 
English text. 
• In 1916 the American Association of Public Accountants 
was re-organized and became the American Institute of 
Accountants. The change reflected the movement of the 
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Audit Milestones 
profession from a very regionalized apparatus to a truly 
national organization, promoting uniform goals and 
standards. 
The adoption of the Corporate Income Tax in 1917-1918 
caused the demand for accountants' services to soar. 
The growth of external pressures caused by the growing 
number of business failures and the extreme lack of 
uniformity of financial statements led to the publication of 
"Uniform Accounting: A Tentative Proposal Submitted 
by the Federal Reserve Board" in 1917. 
In 1929 a special committee of the AIA undertook a major 
revision of the 1917 Federal Reserve Board audit guide-
lines to reflect the growing importance of profit and loss 
statements, include evaluation of internal control as an 
integral part of the audit, and remove many of the in-
consistencies in recommended audit procedure. 
Public reaction to the stock market crash and the depres-
sion led to expanded governmental and other regulatory 
control over securities transactions and financial reporting. 
The SEC became a powerful entity with the passage of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The New York Stock Exchange required audits 
for all listed companies in 1933. 
In 1930 the AIA appointed the first committee on coopera-
tion with the stock exchange. 
In 1931 the Ultramares case established the limited liability 
of auditors to third parties not "in privity." 
The McKesson-Robbins scandal in 1939 revealed the in-
adequacies of accepted methods of auditing inventories 
and receivables, and led to the formation of the special 
AIA committee on auditing procedure, which published 
"Extensions of Auditing Procedure" in May of that year. 
The committee was made a standing committee, and it 
soon commenced regular promulgation of the "State-
ments on Auditing Procedure." 
This era was primarily occupied with the development of 
more sophisticated tools by which the audit process could 
be improved: 
—The introduction of computers and the steady conver-
sion of business data management to Electronic Data 
Processing modes led to the development of specialized 
methods for auditing the computer and using the com-
puter to increase audit efficiency. 
—The refinement of statistical techniques led to increas-
ing usage of statistical sampling. 
—Formal, quantitative evaluation of internal control was 
proposed as a means of determining the extent of de-
tailed testing that was required. 
The recognition of the applicability of the specialized 
abilities of accounting professionals to all areas of business 
management led to the emergence of management services. 
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Era 
Consolidation: 
1929 to Early 
1940's 
Technology: 
1950's 
Era 
Professionalism: 
1960's 
Conflict and 
Uncertainty: 
1970's 
Audit Milestones 
• The Committee on Auditing Procedure continued to gain 
influence by further clarifying the auditor's responsibili-
ties and the scope of his examination. 
• The profession assumed increasing responsibility for shap-
ing its own destiny by interacting with external profes-
sional and regulatory agencies in attempting to improve 
the uniformity and information potential of "generally 
accepted accounting principles." 
• The Accounting Principles Board emerged as a powerful 
policy body. 
• The concepts of management auditing were developed. 
• The techniques of analytic review and of continuous audit-
ing were refined and put to increased use. 
• Public criticism of accounting principles and of the 
limited extent of disclosure in certain instances is made 
effective through class action suits and stockholder pres-
sure for expanded board representation and greater public 
disclosure. 
• The judicial concepts of legal liability expand and the 
auditor's responsibility for fraud and deception becomes 
cloudy. 
• The further development, standardization, and uniformity 
of techniques leads to questions re: "professionalism," in 
the sense that professionalism equals the ability to set one's 
own parameters for audit plans, procedures, and tests. 
• Increased interest in the issuance of financial forecasts and 
the growing importance of interim reports raise questions 
about the need to assure the accuracy of those reports, 
thereby creating new responsibilities for the profession. 
• The need to develop new audit techniques arises as the 
trend toward reporting current values develops. 
Socio-Econo-Technological Influences on Auditing Evolution 
Generalization of development by era is less than a totally satisfactory 
approach to history since it tends to obscure important cause-effect relationships. 
We can identify important events but we cannot say why the events occurred or 
measure their relative significance. By identifying the relevant social, economic 
and technological movements that have occurred during the last century it is 
possible to hypothesize a cause-effect relationship for these past developments and 
to improve our acumen at predicting future developments. 
The Industrial Revolution. Certainly a dominant socio-economic movement 
in the last 200 years was the industrial revolution. The discovery of various 
means to create and harness mechanical power and the recognition of 
efficiencies possible from specialization of labor and consolidation of effort led 
to the modern industrial state. The revolution resulted in successively larger 
corporate entities and increasingly complex organizational structural forms, cul-
minating in the existence of multi-national giants such as General Motors and 
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ITT, whose annual sales exceed the gross national product of all but a few of 
the larger nations of the world. 
The aspect of the industrial revolution which had the greatest impact on 
the accounting profession was the growth in size of the business entity. Ex-
panding corporations relied heavily on external credit, creating a vital need for 
expert independent professional attestation as to their financial condition. Ex-
panding size meant also that all operations could not be under the direct control 
of a single manager, creating the need for a system of internal controls. Profes-
sional review of the adequacy of the controls fell to the independent auditor. 
Finally, as growth in size continued, the practical bounds of detailed checking 
were reached, and sampling procedures became the only realistic method of 
audit examination. The very genesis of the auditing profession and the source 
of two of the major audit "tools" (review of internal control and sampling) can 
be traced to the industrial revolution. 
Public Ownership. A major consequence of the growth in size of companies 
was widespread public ownership of corporations. Expanding public investment 
in business in the early 1900's resulted in the separation of ownership and man-
agement and created the need for means of measuring the stewardship of manage-
ment and providing large numbers of potential investors with information upon 
which investment decisions could be rationally based. The lack of uniformity 
and consistency in reporting methods and the need for independent certification 
of management's representations became a pressing issue as the large base of 
investors sought to evaluate the information being presented to them. 
This new public voice and the persistent supplications of bankers caused 
increasing numbers of corporations to elect auditors and to have their statements 
certified in the years prior to 1929. However, there was little uniform agreement 
on just what audit objectives and procedures were or just what was being 
certified in a "certified statement." Many corporations simply stated that their 
records had been examined by certain auditors and neglected to mention the 
results of that examination. The efforts of the profession to develop uniform 
standards for reporting and for audit examination were drowned in the euphoria 
of investor speculation. 
Regulatory Influence. The crash of 1929 brought into sharp focus the report-
ing abuses that had existed all along, but which had been tolerated or ignored. 
The influence of the stock exchanges, the emergence of the SEC and other 
regulatory agencies, and pressure from the investing public, encouraged the 
accounting profession to work in earnest to codify and enforce uniform rules of 
financial reporting and audit examination. 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are, 
of course, the foundation of the legislative structure that has been erected to 
establish the basic requirements of standardization of disclosure and mandatory 
audits. The SEC has steadily widened the extent of regulation through the 
periodic issuance of Accounting Series Releases, SEC Regulations, and the 
opinions of the Chief Accountant. The stock exchanges have amended their 
regulations to specify more rigorous requirements, and the courts have consistently 
expanded the scope and applicability of the original regulations. Thus, today's 
growing public pressure for more disclosure and greater uniformity in financial 
reporting is all the more effective because of this broader range of "tools" at 
its disposal. 
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Legal Environment It was in the aftermath of the depression that the 
broader judicial view of individual and professional liability, which is continuing 
to develop, had its roots. The courts assumed a progressively more activist role 
toward all phases of society; they also reoriented their posture toward the 
business world from an attitude of "caveat emptor" to one of staunch defense 
of the rights of the public consumer of products and financial information. The 
courts progressively translated the ethical considerations of the past into the 
legal duties of today. 
The reasons for this shift in judicial perspective can be traced in part to 
the increasing power and remoteness of business vis-a-vis private investors, and 
the desire to place the responsibility for the consequences of unfavorable events 
upon those who have the authority and ability to directly influence the events. 
The impact of this judicial evolution has, of course, been a drastically ex-
panded definition of the common-law liability of public accountants for injury 
to third parties. The concepts of limited liability established by Justice Cardozo 
in the Ultramares case in 1931 have been steadily broadened until the doctrines 
of privity, foreseeability and scienter were obscured. The BarChris decision 
in 1968 established the liability of auditors to third parties not "in privity" and 
the Continental Vending case (U.S. vs. Simon, 1969) punctured the shield of 
"generally accepted accounting principles" by requiring adherence to higher 
standards of fair presentation and informativeness. 
Not only have the courts expanded the common law liability of accountants, 
but they have broadened and more rigorously enforced the existing regulations 
of the SEC and the stock exchanges. Of greatest impact have been the cases 
decided under SEC Rule 10b-5, which was originally intended to protect against 
fraud in the purchase as well as the sale of securities. Accountants' liability under 
this regulation was broadened by Fisher vs. Kelty in 1967, where defenses of 
"absence of privity" and "lack of personal gain" were overruled and a require-
ment for more complete disclosure was established. The Texas Gulf case, also 
prosecuted under Rule 10b-5, expanded the spectre of liability by establishing that 
evidence of "wrongful purpose" was not a requirement of a 10b-5 violation. 
The impact of this legal onslaught upon the sanctity of the auditor has been 
reflected in standardization and codification of audit procedures. Two cases in 
point were the promulgation of "Extensions of Auditing Procedures," which 
established the requirements for more rigorous receivables and inventories testing 
in 1939 following the McKesson-Robbins case, and the adoption of Statement 
on Auditing Procedure Number 41 which detailed the accountant's responsi-
bility to report the discovery of facts subsequent to the completion of the audit, 
as the direct result of the Fisher vs. Kelty decision. 
Broader Social Changes. One can reasonably hypothesize that the legal trend 
described above is merely a reflection of the broader shift in the attitudes of 
society as a whole. One impact of an affluent society is to see a subordination of 
the drives for basic needs to the drives for love, acceptance, and self-actualization. 
The business world has lost its "mystique" and more and more people are 
concerned with the quality of life versus the quantity of goods, with the social 
cost of public goods, and with the social responsibility of business. Certainly 
the greater awareness and higher educational levels of the public have created 
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the demand for disclosure of matters previously considered to be privileged 
information and for greater professional responsibility. 
One aspect of this greater social and public awareness is reflected in the 
accounting profession's desires to improve the quality of the financial representa-
tions produced for the public as well as the underlying audit support of that 
product. Liaison committees with the stock exchanges, the SEC and other 
regulatory agencies have been re-emphasized. The APB was formed to establish 
an authoritative professional doctrine that would serve to clarify and standardize 
corporate financial reporting so as to make it more meaningful for the public and 
more relevant for investment decision making. This increasing degree of pro-
fessionalism (the assumption of responsibility for shaping one's own destiny and 
for responding to social needs) has been characteristic of the accounting profes-
sion recently. 
Technological Change. Though the socio-economic trends have been the 
prime determinants of audit development, there is one technological influence 
that cannot be overlooked. The development of computers has drastically altered 
methods for data manipulation and allowed accomplishment of tasks of a 
magnitude previously unimagined, as well as accomplishment of routine tasks 
of previously infinite duration in a relatively short period of time. Since Univac 
I was introduced in 1951 we have progressed through three generations of com-
puter sophistication and reached the stage where business simply cannot function 
without computer processing. 
The transfer of much of business accounting data manipulation to computers 
may have improved the accuracy and speed of performance of simple clerical 
tasks, but it has added another dimension of the internal control problem: the 
computer programmer/operator complex; and it has in many cases made the 
audit trail much more difficult to follow. These factors have caused auditors 
to accelerate the development of corroborative and generalized evaluative tech-
niques of auditing. The development of and increased reliance upon analytic 
review, statistical sampling, quantitative internal control evaluation, and com-
prehensive overall audit systems have been greatly accelerated by the computer-
ization of business. 
Summary 
Our attempts to develop some reasonable structure for viewing audit mile-
stones have tended to reinforce the assertions made earlier in the paper about the 
lack of orderly development of the profession. Auditing has not been character-
ized by a systematic and orderly development. It has not progressed down a 
well-defined path toward some predetermined goal. It has not, until recently, 
taken a. strong professional responsibility for shaping change rather than respond-
ing to change. Much of the progress which can be identified has resulted from 
strong environmental influences, not the least of which has been the evolving 
regulatory and legal climate. 
Unfortunately, many of these observations of the past seem to be still with 
us when assertions as to the future are made. Perhaps, due to the service nature 
of auditing, one cannot but expect a somewhat chaotic development, since the 
demand for and nature of work to be done is itself chaotic. Certain highly 
probable events on the horizon will tend to be professionally disruptive should 
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they occur. Three of the most prominent of these are (1) the trend toward 
"current value" measurements in financial reporting, (2) steps being taken 
toward increased publication of financial forecasts, and (3) increasing internal 
and external questioning of the scope and nature of traditional audit field work. 
Current value reporting, in the sense of reporting valuations based upon 
existing market prices, replacement costs, or net realizable values, presents unique 
auditing problems of verifiability and testing. To the extent that many members 
of the accounting profession and investment community are advocating using 
current values for financial reporting, and to the extent that some progress has 
already been made in this direction, the auditing profession will face new re-
quirements in planning and implementing the attest process. 
With regard to publishing financial forecasts, a great deal of study is taking 
place within the professional societies in the accounting and financial commu-
nities, and many individuals are advocating formalization of such reporting. 
The SEC has already held hearings on publishing forecasts, and forecasts are 
now published in a variety of ways in the United States. In Great Britain and 
Holland financial forecasts are required to be published in some circumstances 
and certain audit responsibilities have been defined with respect to these fore-
casts. This attest responsibility has thus far been limited to an expression of an 
opinion with respect to whether or not the forecasts are consistent with the under-
lying assumptions used by management (and published with the forecasts) in 
making the forecasts themselves. Even if audit responsibility were so limited 
in the United States, new questions of liability and audit relationships between 
the various parties at interest would arise. In fact, it seems that tremendous 
conflict could occur if the auditor found that the rather mechanical forecasting 
calculations were in fact in accordance with the underlying assumptions, but 
that one or more of the assumptions themselves were questionable or fallacious. 
A more subtle, and debatable, difficulty which we foresee arises more from 
a feeling and from conversations than from a discernible trend in the literature 
or in professional meetings. It seems to us that there is little basis for believing 
that the rather extensive audit testing that still occurs (even though the amount 
of detailed testing has been reduced) is justified when one looks at the types 
of difficulties which require a qualified opinion, a disclaimer, or extensive con-
versation between auditor and client prior to issuance of a clean opinion. Most 
reporting issues are exactly that, issues, arising from a measurement choice made 
by management from the alternative reporting possibilities available to them. 
In fact, most of these issues are known to both client and auditor and are not 
disclosed by "testing," in the usual sense. Other than for establishing precise 
cutoffs, audit testing tends to be defensive, wherein many tests performed cannot 
possibly lead to evidence that would cause the auditor to alter his opinion; in-
deed, many of the tests are apt to disclose internal control weaknesses or routine 
processing errors of concern to the management of a company but not to the 
shareholders. A possible exception would be disclosure of fraudulent transactions 
or events, where it is officially argued that the normal audit is not designed to, 
nor can it be relied upon, to disclose defalcations that do not materially affect 
the financial statements. As clients, outside investors, and auditors themselves 
push for higher quality work and better financial reporting, we feel that the 
entire audit process will be re-thought, including audit objectives and techniques. 
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Despite the rather critical evaluation which we have made of the manner 
in which audit progress has taken place, and the causation for that progress, we 
do have confidence that the profession will become an ever more constructive 
influence in the broad arena of financial reporting. However, such progress will 
not come in as orderly a manner as one would like, nor will the profession 
achieve its potential until it assumes an even more aggressive posture toward 
structuring its environment and itself, and until it does a more rigorous job of 
defining its goals and mapping the road to travel to attain those goals, including 
the measurable milestones. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Some Historical Auditing Milestones; 
An Epistemology of an Inexact Art 
Horace G. Barden 
Ernst & Ernst, Retired 
My initial invitation to participate in this symposium asked if I would under-
take to discuss a paper entitled, "Some Historical Auditing Milestones—How 
They Got There, What They Portend for the Future." (The authors of the paper 
subsequently proposed the revised title as it appears herein.) I wondered somewhat 
about how they happened to extend the invitation to me. I finally concluded 
they must believe that I am one of the few old practitioners still tottering around 
who was actually on hand as the profession encountered many of the events in 
the last forty-five years that are now considered milestones. The organizers of the 
symposium probably figured that if I had been there at the time these events 
occurred, I should at least be able to pass on the first part of the question, namely, 
"How They Got There," and if so, they would take a chance on my viewpoint 
when it came to distilling what the events portend for the future. 
My active interest in accounting began in 1924, and it has been my principal 
interest since 1927. Accordingly, I was on hand and watching most of the 
events that Gene Brown and Roger Salquist have listed as historical auditing 
milestones. I think I can answer some of their questions as to whether they 
have omitted any important events. I should also be able to clear up some of 
their uncertainties as to causes underlying certain of the milestone events, their 
importance at the time, and the resultant influences on the profession. 
I don't believe the combined efforts of the authors and myself are going to 
uncover any hitherto unknown facet of our heritage, or structure any new theory 
leading to a greater understanding of our present state of affairs. I do believe that 
our combined efforts might enhance understanding of the past, and give a wider 
perspective of today's moment in auditing history. 
The Problem 
I really doubt that I would have undertaken the authors' task by attempting 
the route of "an epistemological study." I shall admit that I quietly stalked 
that word "epistemology" for two or three days after my initial shock of finding 
it in the subtitle of their paper. I finally got up the courage to sneak into the 
library and pounce on it in an unabridged dictionary. According to the knowl-
edge so recently obtained, I shall attempt to keep my discussion of their paper 
within a framework of interpreting the milestones in terms of the knowledge 
to be gained therefrom, its limits, and its validity. 
I turn first to the question of whether we are, in fact, dealing with an inexact 
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art, irregular in its evolution, without articulated goals, but developed principally 
within a framework of pressures from within and from its external environment. 
I believe there is little argument about the notion that auditing is an art in the 
sense that it involves the systematic application of knowledge in performing 
certain actions to accomplish a desired result. It is definitely a service function, 
performed for business enterprises, with its indirect benefits flowing to manage-
ment and other users of financial reporting. Like accounting itself, it is prag-
matic in nature and its evolution has been shaped and modified to meet the 
needs of the various interests which it serves. Auditing theory has not been 
developed from a precise set of postulates which have been tested conceptually 
to deduce principles. 
Drawing generalizations from detailed observations is inherent in the method-
ology of auditing. The same is true of the manner in which most theory of 
auditing has been established. This process has, nevertheless, developed a rather 
rigorous applied discipline, with a reasonably good organization of its underly-
ing knowledge. Because of the pragmatic nature of auditing, its evolution has 
obviously taken place without very many specifically articulated goals which can 
be identified by milestones of planned accomplishments. Instead, we might 
better look at the historical events in its evolution as landmarks, from which new 
courses have been plotted in the development of auditing. 
Auditing Theory and Practice vs. Accounting Principles 
Some of the real milestones and landmarks in auditing history have been 
obscured somewhat because many people fail to distinguish auditing theory and 
practice from the development of accounting principles. The accounting profes-
sion has carried the primary responsibility for the latter for many years. It has 
found its attempts to develop authoritative pronouncements on accounting prin-
ciples fraught with many pitfalls and with much unfavorable criticism from 
many directions. This has overshadowed much of the steady development of 
sound auditing theory and practice which has been taking place on a truly pro-
fessional basis. I hope my discussion of the Brown-Salquist paper will demonstrate 
this more clearly. Much of the development has taken place quietly and dis-
creetly within the profession in the same type of atmosphere in which the auditor 
exercises judgments in the confidential work required in carrying on his services. 
The Ordering of the Events 
The authors state they are fearful of committing errors of commission or 
omission by basing their observations on a sequential inventory of important 
publications and events which seems to them to lack order and logic. I can see 
how this approach might seem tenuous without some first-hand knowledge of 
the cause and effect relationships which would help rationalize the occurrence 
of the events. 
In the final analysis, they select two approaches to their study of events, the 
"era" ordering of events, and the "macro" approach of ordering things in terms 
of the "major socio-econo-technological environmental influences." The two 
methods are used to test the validity of their selections to some extent. Review-
ing these two orderings, I find myself relating more closely to the "macro" ap-
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proach. I have some difficulty with their classification of audit history milestones 
by eras, as to the timing and the descriptions of some of the eras. 
I shall comment on the milestones selected under both means of ordering 
which the authors use, but I find it easier to take them up in about the order of 
time in which I observed them. I think that most of the milestone events were 
well understood as to cause and effect relationships by leaders in the profession 
at the time they occurred, even though the documentation of their understandings 
appears principally in the form of internal professional development rather than 
in published writings. I find that I need very little hypothesizing to recognize a 
few clear-cut landmarks that have had continuing monumental effects on the 
development of the profession. 
The Industrial Revolution and Expansion of Public Ownership of Business 
Auditing was a matter of relatively little concern until the time of the in-
dustrial expansion that occurred in the nineteenth century. Auditing for internal 
purposes might have expanded somewhat as business enterprises grew in size 
so as to assure management of proper accountability for liquid assets and the 
adequacy of internal controls, but the significant effect of the industrial revolu-
tion was the expanding public ownership of business enterprises which began 
in the early 1900's. This, combined with the expanding use of credit, brought 
about the concept of general financial reporting as the essential route through 
which to monitor the stewardship of management. These developments caused 
the auditor to expand his primary objective from that of providing assurances on 
internal accounting controls, to that of monitoring management's external re-
portings for the benefit of creditors, shareholders, and other outside users of 
financial information. 
The environmental influences of the period of expanding size of business 
enterprises and public ownership induced what was truly an era of emergence, 
as the authors have designated in their ordering of the milestones by era. The 
growth and recognition of the auditing profession during this period was not 
particularly exciting. Historical milestones such as the first CPA laws, formations 
of professional accounting organizations, and the early attempts to formulate 
authoritative pronouncements on general financial reporting and auditing, all 
reflect orderly progress in meeting the need of the financial community of that 
time. The advent of income taxation added to the professional stature of the 
auditor. His knowledge of income taxation was necessary for auditing company 
liabilities, and his knowledge about the determination of income as the basis for 
the new tax naturally caused his clients to turn to him for his professional advice 
in this area. The authors might have noted this event as the beginning of a 
fifty year controversy between the budding accounting profession and the legal 
profession. The history of that controversy, incidentally, is replete with evidence 
of just how persevering accountants can be when they set their mind to achieving 
well-articulated goals. 
I find it difficult to obtain much of a reading prior to 1929 on the "new 
public voice" of the "large base of investors" whose supplications, together with 
those of corporate creditors, were causing increasing numbers of corporations to 
elect auditors. It seems to me that the Accounting Objectives Study Group, 
which was formed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
14 
some forty years later, is still seeking to get readings on that same old public 
voice of the large base of public shareholders. 
The State of the Art at the 1929 Crash 
I would extend the era of emergence through 1929. The crash of the whole 
economy certainly was the landmark ending the first period of expanding public 
ownership in business. As to the state of the auditing art, I find a pretty clear 
picture in the booklet "Verification of Financial Statements" published in May 
of 1929, some six months before the crash. (As an aside, the booklet was avail-
able for 10ft per copy.) This booklet was the American Institute's revision of the 
original publication by the Federal Reserve Board in 1917. The sub-title described 
the booklet as a method of procedure for the consideration of bankers, merchants, 
manufacturers, auditors, and accountants. The booklet contained some twenty 
pages describing the audit procedures considered appropriate at the time for 
"verification of assets and liabilities at a given date, verification of the profit and 
loss account for the period under review, and (incidentally) an examination of 
the accounting system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of internal 
check." The booklet concluded that, "If the auditor is convinced that his ex-
amination has been adequate and in conformity with these general instructions, 
that the balance sheet and profit and loss statement are correct, and that any 
minor qualifications are stated, he may issue a certificate," to the effect that he 
has examined the statements and that he certifies that in his opinion they set 
forth the financial position and results of operations. The audit instructions are 
evidence that a considerable amount of detailed checking was considered necessary 
at that time, but that it was not mandatory to confirm receivables and have con-
tact with physical inventory-taking. 
Many of the large firms still hired "temporary help" for their "busy sea-
sons" in order to handle the large volume of detailed auditing work being done 
at that time. The rank and file of their staff organizations contained relatively 
limited numbers of university graduates. About twenty universities in the United 
States offered courses for a major in accounting, and there was considerable 
difference of opinion between professional accountants and the academic field as 
to what the content of the courses should be. 
Beginning of a New Era: Foundations of Modern Auditing Concepts 
Brown and Salquist set 1929 as the beginning of an era of "consolidation" 
which lasted through the early 1940's. They mention the public reaction to the 
stock market crash as bringing on the federal regulation of securities beginning 
in 1932-1933, and the Ultramares decision as two outstanding milestones in both 
their era and their macro approaches to auditing history. Considerably later, 
under their listing of broad social changes influencing the evolution of auditing, 
the authors classify the formation of the APB as evidence of the profession's in-
creasing assumption of responsibility for the shaping of their own destinies and 
responding to social needs. 
I combine the state of the art in 1929 with Ultramares and the SEC to place 
a different interpretation on the importance of these events and the extent of 
their influence on the profession. These events combined to cause the develop-
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ment of modern concepts of auditing and the profession's initial assumption of 
responsibility for shaping its own destinies, all back in those troubled days of 
the 1930's. Within the framework of this new era of professional development, 
I can see several landmarks that I believe should be given greater recognition 
than that accorded by the authors. 
A Theoretical Base for Auditing. The need for improved general financial 
reporting which was highlighted by the 1929 crash of the securities markets and 
the deep economic depression which it triggered, gave rise to the beginning of 
cooperative efforts between the accounting profession, as represented by the then 
American Institute of Accountants, the investment community, as represented 
by the stock exchanges, and industry, as represented by the Controllers Institute. 
These groups were later joined by representatives of the newly-organized Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. Agreements reached in a series of cor-
respondence between the New York Stock Exchange and the AIA during the 
period of 1932 through 1934, gave birth to the first generally accepted concepts 
of accounting principles and auditing theory. These concepts were embodied in 
the agreed form of short-form auditor's report which is used today with very 
much the same substance. 
The theoretical base for auditing as we see it today is reflected in these fea-
tures of the short-form auditor's report: 
1. Financial statements are basic representations of management, and 
management has primary responsibility for them and for maintain-
ing an adequate system of internal controls. 
2. There is a body of generally accepted accounting principles which, 
if applied consistently, produces accounting information from which 
to prepare financial reports fairly presenting financial positions and 
results of operations. 
3. The auditor operates in an environment of examining management's 
financial statements and rendering his professional opinion thereon, 
after carrying out such auditing procedures as he considers necessary 
and in conformance with generally accepted standards of performance. 
These basic concepts of financial reporting and auditing were agreed upon in 
1934, as a foundation for improvement in the format and quality of general 
financial reporting even though the agreements reached at that time did not 
attempt to document the generally accepted accounting principles and the gen-
erally accepted auditing standards. 
I believe that this landmark of the middle 1930's was the point at which 
the profession really accepted the full responsibility for shaping its own destinies. 
The Chief Accountant of the SEC had been issued an order by the Commission 
at that point to establish the meaning of the term, "generally accepted accounting 
principles," and to issue an authoritative pronouncement on them. He had 
received the Commission's approval, however, to withhold any such action on 
his part, with the understanding that the AIA would set up the needed machinery 
to proceed with the issuance of authoritative pronouncements on both generally 
accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards. 
The Institute did begin work on these two projects through its Committee 
on Accounting Procedure. Progress was slow and many of the proposals for 
developing accounting principles and auditing standards met with delays and 
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controversial actions by the Institute's governing body and its membership. 
Little had been accomplished when, late in 1938, the infamous McKesson & 
Robbins case came to light. The entire financial community, and particularly 
the stock exchanges and SEC were shocked to realize that, in almost ten years 
since the 1929 crash, relatively little progress had been made in improving the 
reliability of financial reporting. The immediate action prompted by this event 
was the Institute membership's approval in 1939, of "Extensions of Auditing 
Procedure," which made mandatory the confirmations of receivables and physical 
contact with inventory-taking. 
Restructuring the Accounting Profession 
Brown and Salquist recognize the McKesson & Robbins milestone in their 
"consolidation era," and in their listing of regulatory and legal influences on 
auditing evolution. I accord a great deal more significance to the event. To me, 
it was the beginning of an era of consolidation for the profession rather than the 
end. It could be designated better as the end of a period of "conflict and un-
certainty" rather than designating that era as beginning in the 1970's as the 
authors do. I consider the lasting consequences of the McKesson & Robbins 
landmark to include the restructuring of the profession and the laying of the 
groundwork for the extensive internal educational and professional development 
programs of the Institute. 
Separating the Development of Auditing Standards from the Establishment 
of Accounting Principles. The real shock of McKesson & Robbins to the leader-
ship of the Institute was the realization that if they were really going to shape 
their own destinies, they would have to restructure the organization to overcome 
the cumbersome procedures which had caused them to bog down in attempting 
to carry out responsibilities they had undertaken some five years earlier. The 
result was a revision in their charter to enable establishment of "senior technical 
committees" which could speak authoritatively for the Institute without going 
through the lengthy processes of approvals by its governing body and member-
ship. The Committee on Auditing Procedure was formed to deal with matters 
relating to auditing standards and procedures. The Committee on Accounting 
Procedure was designated to deal with accounting principles and their imple-
mentation. They were each charged initially with the respective responsibilities 
to develop authoritative pronouncements on auditing standards and generally 
accepted accounting principles. 
You are all familiar with how the Committee on Accounting Procedure has 
fared since that time, eventually being replaced by the expanded concept of the 
Accounting Principles Board in 1959, and now about to be replaced with a new 
entity which is expected to relieve the Institute of some of the basic responsibility 
for the development of principles which they accepted, somewhat by default, in 
the 1930's. As I noted earlier in these comments, the attention that has been 
focussed on the difficulties of establishing principles has overshadowed a great 
deal of the progress that has been made in the field of auditing. The formation 
of the APB is designated by Brown and Salquist as a milestone in their era of 
professionalism and in meeting some of the broader social challenges of the 
times. The event really has had very little cause and effect relationship on the 
profession's auditing standards or procedures. 
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The restructuring of the early 1940's went beyond acceptance for developing 
auditing standards and accounting principles. The foundations were laid at that 
time for expanding the recognition of three basic functional areas in which ac-
countants render professional service: auditing, tax consultation, and manage-
ment advisory services. The Institute began formulating goals toward refining 
its organization so as to expand its services to members and to the profession 
generally in areas of, (1) examining and qualifying those seeking to enter the 
profession, (2) furnishing continuing educational and professional development 
programs in all three branches of accounting services, and (3) improving the 
quality of professional services by maintaining an appropriate code of ethics 
governing the professional behavior of its members. These are the hallmarks 
that have come to distinguish accounting as a profession rather than as a trade 
or an art. 
Auditing Standards. World War II slowed progress, but the first big payoff 
of the restructured Institute's programs went on display in 1948 with the pub-
lishing of the tentative statement, "Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, Their 
Significance and Scope." I class this as a monumental milestone—marking the 
achievement of a carefully planned goal. It is a true landmark in auditing his-
tory in the sense that it provides a point from which to guide the course of action 
for those engaged in the most professional of the services rendered by profes-
sional accountants. 
Perhaps I am more impressed by this event than many others because I was 
there and witnessed it. The initial exposure of this important document took 
place at the Institute's annual meeting in 1947. At a technical session presided 
over by Paul Grady, the then chairman of the Committee on Auditing Procedure, 
three committee members, Edward Kracke, Alvin Jennings, and John Lindquist 
presented, respectively, the general or personal standards of the auditor, the 
standards of field work, and the standards of reporting. To this day, I still con-
sider that afternoon session as one of the most impressive technical presentations 
I have ever witnessed. 
The Committee on Auditing Procedure restudied this document in 1954, 
for the purpose of adding one reporting standard to require the auditor to provide 
a clear-cut indication of the character of his examination and the degree of 
responsibility he is taking whenever his name is associated with financial state-
ments. Hardly another word was changed except to take the term "tentative" 
out of the title. Practically the identical wording of the standards was carried 
over into the codification of auditing standards and procedures—issued as State-
ment on Auditing Procedure 33, in 1963. 
Thus, I view the consequences of those milestone events of the late 1930's 
and early 1940's as providing the financial community today with a set of stand-
ards for measuring the quality of the professional auditing services upon which 
it relies. These same standards provide the auditor with a gospel by which to 
measure and challenge the truthfulness of his statement on the scope of his ex-
amination and his resulting opinion on the financial statements. 
In addition to a continuing monitoring of performance standards and their 
adequacy, the Committee on Auditing Procedure has issued some fifty state-
ments on auditing procedure, to provide guidance in new techniques required 
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by current developments in accounting and auditing. They have issued numerous 
booklets on special auditing problems of particular industries. 
Educational and Professional Development Programs 
Brown and Salquist find it difficult in searching for an ordering of historical 
milestones, to identify any part of auditing evolution as having resulted from the 
establishment of articulated goals against which to measure progress. I have very 
little difficulty in this respect. I can find the goals and the orderly progress not 
only in the development of auditing standards, but even more evident in the 
area of education and professional development of the auditor. 
The outstanding milestone and landmark events in this area also go back 
to the restructuring that took place in the early 1940's, when the Institute began 
shaping its own destinies. Concentrating on the problems of developing an ac-
ceptable set of standards with which to measure the training and proficiency of 
the auditor focussed attention on educational requirements and professional 
developments. 
The milestones that do exist as measuring progress in reaching the goals of 
well articulated programs have been recognized by many within the profession, 
but not particularly so by those outside. For example, a truly significant mile-
stone occurred in the early 1950's when the goal was reached of having every 
state CPA law implemented through the Institute's uniform CPA examination. 
Today, the same examination is not only used in all fifty states, but all are ac-
corded the Institute's uniform grading services. No other recognized profession 
can equal this degree of control over its admittance requirements. 
Educational developments within the profession in the last twenty years have 
been sensational. Last year, over 10,000 accountants attended some twenty-five 
basic training programs, workshops, and courses in special accounting and tax 
subjects that were offered by the Institute in conjunction with state CPA associa-
tions. More than 15,000 accountants attended forty seminars and lecture programs 
on specialized subjects. Many state CPA associations offer additional programs. 
Most of the larger firms operate extensive in-house training and professional de-
velopment programs. On the basis of my own firm's recent experience, I estimate 
roughly that partners and staff employees of the so-called big eight firms are 
currently spending in excess of 2,000,000 hours annually in attendance at in-house 
educational programs, and at least that amount in advance preparation and study 
for these programs. Several larger firms operate separate school facilities to con-
duct these training programs. Two states have adopted compulsory continuing 
educational requirements for maintaining a right to engage in practice as a CPA 
from year to year, and the Institute Council has recommended adoption of such 
requirements. 
Another milestone in the profession's educational development programs is 
the publication in 1967 of Horizons for a Profession, by Robert H . Roy, and 
James H . MacNeill. This publication culminated an extensive study by a dis-
tinguished commission under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Foundation and 
the Institute, with an objective of delineating the common body of knowledge 
which should be possessed by those about to begin careers as CPAs. This study 
will have continuing effects on refining and coordinating the academic and pro-
fessional training of future programs. 
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The Legal Environment 
The following session of this symposium will discuss the subject of what the 
courts are saying to professional accountants in recent cases. The Brown-
Salquist paper mentions the milestone cases which have had significant effects 
on the auditing environment. These are matters of deep concern to all profes-
sional accountants. Leaders in the profession and technical bodies in professional 
accounting organizations are concentrating on programs to alleviate some of the 
burdensome liability problems facing the profession. 
Summary 
In summarizing, I refer back to the final era selected by Brown and 
Salquist—the one they label, "Conflict and Uncertainty," beginning in the 
1970's. They cite public criticism of accounting principles, current judicial con-
cepts of auditors' legal liabilities, loss of professionalism in auditing through 
increasing standardization and uniformity of techniques, and challenges regard-
ing forecasting, interim reporting, and current value reporting—all as the sources 
of the profession's conflict and uncertainty. Later in their summary, they mention 
these same factors as those that are bound to have a disruptive effect on the 
profession. They also restate their views that auditing has not been characterized 
by systematic and orderly development and that it has had no well defined 
path and predetermined goals. They conclude that you could expect little more 
than chaotic development from auditing since the work itself is chaotic in nature. 
I find myself in complete disagreement with these conclusions. 
Their initial listing of public criticisms of accounting principles as a source 
of conflict and uncertainty leads me to believe that the authors, together with 
many other critics of the profession, have let the APB struggles with principles 
completely overshadow a very orderly evolution and development of auditing. 
I believe that my outline of the milestones and landmarks of the last forty years 
present an entirely different picture. I trace a well defined path of development 
of auditing standards and procedures beginning in 1941. It outlines how numer-
ous hurdles were overcome in achieving predetermined goals. 
The progress in educational areas has been effective. The programs and 
courses offered today make it possible for any man in the profession to obtain 
the training needed to meet changing conditions of technological and environ-
mental nature. The advent of computers and electronic data processing, the in-
creased use of statistical sampling, extensions of audit services to banks and 
insurance companies, have all been provided for in training programs of high 
quality. These developments, together with the Institute's uniform examination 
program, have moved the profession in the United States into a position of leader-
ship of the field in the world. It is in this position that I believe we view the 
current state of affairs. 
The Nature of the Work. Professional auditing has the same characteristics 
as most other professional work. The auditor's time is not his own, it's his 
client's. The client is not interested in how busy he is. He is interested in when 
his auditor is going to apply his very best professional talent to the company's 
problems and meet their deadline in completing the work. This may seem like 
a chaotic state of affairs to some. The well qualified auditor has learned to live 
this sort of a life, just as the doctor and the lawyer have. He knows that once he 
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has accepted an engagement, he has offered himself as one having all the qualifica-
tions to perform in accordance with the gospel of generally accepted auditing 
standards. And when he sits down on the job, he knows full well that he has 
all of those responsibilities of being independent in attitude and performing with 
due professional care in planning and supervising and formulating his report on 
the engagement. There are very few cases that get into the courts where the 
auditor is flawless in performing according to those personal standards and 
standards of field work. 
I think I have seen most of the significant landmarks in auditing history 
over the last forty five years that have led us to our present position of a learned 
profession of well qualified men. If I were to choose one word to describe this 
evolution in place of the authors' word, "chaotic," it would probably be the 
word, "stolid." 
There are uncertainties and deep concern over the current court decisions 
regarding accountants' liabilities. Quite frankly, I don't know how we could 
be much better organized than we are in the profession to solve these problems. 
I believe they will be solved in a manner that will not discredit nor injure the 
profession's ability to continue performing its important services to the financial 
community, and to society as a whole. 
I see nothing chaotic or disruptive about the trends toward current value 
reporting, publishing forecasts, questioning the audit scope, and the like. They 
do involve controversial and critical issues. But I don't view each as a new crisis. 
I think we are inclined to get into the rut of assuming that a new crisis looms 
every other day. We have the energy crisis, the ecology crisis, and the current 
value reporting crisis. Secretary Connally responded to one of these new loom-
ings the other day by saying that we have vast resources of hydrocarbons and he 
doesn't think we are going to run out of a clean supply of energy for many 
hundred years. I feel much the same way about the accounting profession. We 
have vast resources of well organized talent to cope with our problems and I 
think these resources will not be exhausted before the problems are solved. 
If our client's management decides that he needs our professional opinion 
on his interim financial statements or on his annual forecast of operations, I 
think we can find a reasonable way to provide the opinion he needs. We have 
been doing this in isolated situations for as many years as I can remember. I am 
sure that many will oppose the forecast problem with arguments that we just 
cannot become soothsayers, just as they said we would have to become appraisers 
in order to have meaningful contact with physical inventories. We have the 
capacity needed to formulate the groundrules and train the people to perform, 
if we are called upon for these additional services. 
I don't believe anyone in the auditing profession should have fears about 
light being shed on the extent of their audit testing and the procedures they 
employ. There have been some tremendous changes in the last twenty years 
resulting from more extensive use of statistical sampling, and with learning how 
to audit through computers. By far the principal purpose of the auditor's tests 
of detailed transactions, however, is to establish his own opinion as to the 
adequacy of internal controls for producing reliable financial data. The auditor's 
review of the internal administrative controls is the basis of his appraisal of the 
general character of the client's organization and management. All of this bears 
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heavily on his judgment when issues arise over accounting measurement choices 
and alternative reporting procedures. 
I am glad to see the authors finally conclude with confidence that the auditing 
profession will become an even more constructive factor in the financial arena. 
I'm glad that my experience in the auditing arena has left me with more con-
fidence than they have that the profession can do a rigorous job of defining the 
necessary goals and achieving them. 
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What are the Courts Saying to Auditors? 
A. A. Sommer, Jr. 
Calfee, Halter, Calfee, Griswold & Sommer, Attorneys at Law 
The acquaintance of accountants with courts is not a new phenomenon. 
In 1954 Saul Levy, in Accountants' Legal Responsibility,1 said that in England 
cases involving accountants had been quite numerous and went back more than 
sixty years. These early cases were really part of two developments. First, they 
were part of the development of English common law concerning liability which 
might attach to spoken or written statements if they were negligently made: 
Was there an action? If so who might maintain it? What were its elements? 
Second, they were part of the development of English corporation law embodied 
largely in the English Companies Acts which progressively created stricter stand-
ards of responsibility for officers and directors of English corporations, and for 
their auditors as well. 
Common Law Developments 
Most of the earlier cases in England and in the United States arose in 
common law situations, i.e. they did not arise out of statutorily created duties. 
The cases presented a wide variety of situations in which auditors were charged 
either with falsification or recklessness or simply negligence and the courts were 
largely concerned with relating the kind and degree of fault to the situations of 
those who might have a recovery because of the fault. 
In this country Ultramares v. Touche,2 decided in 1931 by the New York 
Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York state), fairly definitively marked 
off the limits of accountants' liability under common law in this country for a 
generation. In that case, the New York court, speaking through Judge (later 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court) Benjamin Cardozo, articulated 
these principles: 
1. Fraudulent conduct, or conduct so reckless as to be tantamount to fraud, 
created liability not only to the accountant's client but to third parties as well 
who were injured as a consequence. 
2. Negligent conduct may create liability to the client because of "privity," 
but there would be liability to third parties only if the preparation and transmis-
sion of the financial statement and opinion were the "end and aim of the transac-
tion." Thus if a client engaged an auditor to prepare audited financial statements 
for the express and understood purpose of giving them to a specific bank, the 
bank might have a claim if the auditor were negligent. Other cases elaborated 
this to encompass members of a circumscribed class of persons; thus if the auditor 
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understood the client intended to seek bank financing, then any bank from which 
such financing was sought might have a claim based on negligence. But the 
use of the statements to secure the financing still had to be "the end and aim of 
the transaction" between the auditor and his client. 
Statutory Law—The Securities Acts 
These principles remained relatively intact into the 60's (and for that matter 
in many states are still apparently "good" law: recent litigation in Florida has 
expressly followed the Ultramares case). The most significant extension of po-
tential liability for accountants occurred in the United States Congress when it 
adopted the Securities Act of 1933. Under this statute accountants (included in 
the broader word "experts" used in the Act) might have liability with respect 
to the contents of financial statements used in registration statements with their 
consent unless they could show as a matter of defense they had ". . . after rea-
sonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time 
such [expertised] part of the registration statement became effective, that the 
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading..." (Section 11). 
It is difficult now, almost four decades later, to understand the impact this 
enactment had not only upon auditors, but the underwriting and business com-
munity in general. The Investment Bankers Association predicted that ". . . its 
practical results . . . will be to suspend the underwriting or distribution of many 
capital issues by responsible persons . . . ." 3 
For the first time issuers might be held liable for misstatements in a registra-
tion statement (part of which constituted the prospectus required to be given 
to purchasers and in many instances offerees of registered securities), regardless 
of conventional notions such as privity, due care, reliance, causality and the like. 
The burden and danger thrust upon others beside the issuer—its directors, certain 
officers, "experts" (including accountants), underwriters—was slightly less bur-
densome, but nonetheless a significant departure from common law standards for 
liability. An accountant might be liable to the purchaser of the registered security 
even if the purchaser had not relied in the slightest on the auditor's opinion and 
did not in fact even know of the opinion. The liability flowed simply from a 
material omission or misstatement in the audited statements, unless the accountant 
could show reasonable investigation and that he had reasonable ground to believe 
there was no misstatement or omission. 
This departure from earlier law, virtually all of which in this country had 
been judge-made, alarmed many leaders of the profession not the least of whom 
was the venerated George O. May, who said grimly, 
I cannot believe that a law is just or can long be maintained in effect 
which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a purchaser may re-
cover from a person from whom he has not bought, in respect of a state-
ment which at the time of his purchase he had not read, contained in a 
document which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not 
measured by injury resulting from falsity in such statement.4 
Despite the misgivings of Mr. May and others, the implications of the 
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Securities Act of 1933 were never explored judicially to any significant extent 
until 1968 when the United States District Court in New York rendered its 
opinion in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation5 which is discussed 
hereafter. 
In 1934 the Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which 
provided, among other things, for the filing of registration statements and periodic 
reports by listed companies including certified financial statements. Again the 
statute contained provisions for liability that could be asserted against auditors, 
but in many particulars these perils were less frightening; very little litigation 
has been prosecuted successfully against anyone under Section 18 of the 1934 Act, 
but this is no assurance that it may not be the source of such in the future. 
Effect of the Securities Acts 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, of 
course, did not repeal in any way previous common law holdings, such as the 
Ultramares case. Previous litigation had been largely in state courts and gen-
erally it was state substantive law that was determinative of liability.6 Thus the 
enactment of these federal measures did not explicitly broaden the scope of 
accountants' liabilities except when they consented to the use of their opinions 
in registration statements under the 1933 Act or in filings under the 1934 Act. 
With regard to the ordinary run of mine matters the liability of auditors still 
depended upon state law with its then fairly narrowly drawn concepts. 
A process, an event plus a process, and broader cultural and political move-
ments have combined to change this. 
The process is the subtle interaction of statutory law and judge-made law. 
This has been expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and James M . 
Landis, once dean of Harvard Law School. 
Justice Holmes wrote, 
[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes have been too slow 
to recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only particular 
cases may imply a policy different from that of the common law, and 
therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose 
of limiting their scope. 
And Landis, in the same vein, stated: 
. . . much of what is ordinarily regarded as "common" law finds its 
source in legislative enactment.7 
Thus statutory notions, literally unconcerned with more than a narrow band 
of common law, leak through the edges into other domains. As will be clear 
shortly, this has been a significant factor in the expansion of liability dangers 
for the accounting profession. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission Enacts Rule 10b-5 
Assisting in strenuous fashion this development has been the event plus a 
process. The event was the adoption by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1942 of Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act. This rule was quickly adopted by 
the Commission pursuant to a broad rule-making power under the 1934 Act 
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for the purpose of curing a peculiar hiatus in the scheme of federal securities 
regulation that provided a fulsome system of penalties for the fraudulent seller 
of securities, but was completely silent as far as fraudulent purchasers were 
concerned. 
The terms of Rule 10b-5 are extremely broad: 
Rule 10b-5 
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, 
or of any facility of a national securities exchange, 
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Notably absent in this Rule are many of the particularizations contained in 
the 1933 Act defining the conditions of liability; particularly absent is any state-
ment of a defense being available if there is a showing of reasonable investigation 
and reasonable belief. There is no specification of those to whom liability may 
run, there is no measure of damages, there is no limitation upon those who may 
be held responsible: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . . " 
Rule 10b-5 was intended purely as an enforcement tool for the Commission.8 
In 1946 an imaginative plaintiff's counsel and a creative court combined to yield 
the conclusion that Rule 10b-5 was not only available to the Commission for en-
forcement purposes but was available to private claimants as well who could 
establish they had been harmed by a violation of the Rule.9 Thus was opened 
the floodgate through which oceans of litigation have passed in the intervening 
twenty-six years, virtually to the point that other more explicit liability-creating 
provisions of the federal securities laws have been vastly overshadowed as litigants 
sought the benefits of Rule 10b-5. 
Causes of Recent Litigation 
But these somewhat technical legal developments are not sufficient to explain 
the explosion of litigation that has confronted accountants during the past ten 
years. Broad social developments have been the soil in which these seeds have 
become rooted and have yielded often bitter fruit. 
First, there has been the emergence of the consumer, so dramatic that it has 
been suggested we are entering upon the "age of the consumer." The whys of 
the broad phenomenon are too complex to narrate here, but it is clear that rest-
lessness with the impersonality of technology, political necessities, the emergence 
of a new brand of populism (Naderism is one form of it), have combined with 
legal resourcefulness to bring about an equalizing of the position before the law 
of the consumer and commercial interests (or perhaps a disequilibrium in favor 
of the consumer). The courts have joined with legislatures to expand the litiga-
tion potential of the class suit and develop other means of redress for wrongs 
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which, while existing in the past, because of inertia or legal technicalities were 
never susceptible of effective redress. Legislatures, state and federal, have tripped 
over each other providing protection for consumers. 
Much of this, of course, has familiar ring to those familiar with the de-
velopment of federal securities law. Most of the devices now urged for consumer 
protection have their counterparts in this structure dating back decades: disclosure 
("Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking 
Is Dangerous to Your Health" parallels the scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 
[as well as parts of other SEC-administered statutes]); regulation (the require-
ment that more and more products must be approved by federal authority before 
they can be sold to the public sounds surprisingly similar to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 governing mutual funds); licensing of purveyors (the 
requirement of federal licensing in many areas parallels the provisions of the 
1934 Act requiring the licensing of broker-dealers). 
As people have become alert to the possibility of redress in their many roles 
as consumers, the potentials of the federal scheme of securities regulation have 
been explored and used. 
Consequences of Professional Stature 
Also the accounting profession itself has become even more pronouncedly 
a profession. Levy in 1954 could write, "When speaking of public accountancy 
as a learned profession it must be realized that in this country, at any rate, it is 
a relatively new profession . . . ." 1 0 If question there ever was, surely it is beyond 
cavil that accounting is now a highly developed profession which has gone 
through many travails in recent years to develop principles of conduct and 
principles governing the quality of its work. As this has happened, it has not 
escaped the notice of those of the public who feel they have suffered harm as a 
consequence of shortcomings of the profession, either as a whole in failing to 
establish sufficiently high standards or because of individual members who have 
failed even to reach those which have been articulated. The possibility of this 
was foreseen: 
Thus as the legal liabilities of professional accountants in the United 
States have seemed to be extended by court decisions and legislation, 
the [American] Institute [of Certified Public Accountants] has become 
increasingly aware that pronouncements and rules which encourage 
higher standards of performance might be used against its members 
unfairly in the courts.11 
Other circumstances could be recounted which have led to the proliferation 
of litigation against accountants: the dynamics of the economy, with the 
multiplication of mergers and complicated financial transactions involving pub-
licly held companies; more and more imaginative use of accounting principles 
to achieve financial magic (e.g. the pooling concept); the participation of vast 
numbers in the market (31 million shareholders plus millions more who partici-
pate indirectly through mutual funds, pension and profit sharing trusts and other 
pooling devices); the development of more exacting standards of disclosure and 
the vastly increased importance of information in the investment process. 
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The Voice of Litigated Cases 
In our way of doing things often the situations created by social and economic 
forces are not resolved in a systematic fashion aimed to embrace in a broad, ex-
pansive manner the full range of the problem, as is sought to be done through 
such legislation as the Uniform Commercial Code, or in a different milieu, the 
civil codes that characterize continental legal systems. Rather it is the genius, 
and often the frustration, of our system that emerging broad-scale problems are 
dealt with through the medium of litigating particular fact situations and through 
this process, accompanied by skilled (and sometimes not so skilled) interpretation, 
the law is moved along. Thus no single case resolves more than the litigation 
confronting the court; no single case purports to codify an area of human conduct. 
But cases, analyzed one with the other, can often provide clues for solving other 
controversies and can be used to shape standards of conduct, lay and professional, 
to avoid future legal liability. 
What the courts are saying to auditors, then, is not an integrated set of 
precepts; they are not weaving a properly proportioned whole. They are simply 
deciding cases and in the process they are using established legal principles, they 
are modifying others, they are bringing to the surface principles that may long 
have been latent, they are producing results in particular litigation which they 
conceive to be the just, rational result—in that case. 
Five cases have been the most noted in this present period of development: 
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, noted earlier; Fischer v. Kletz;12 
U.S. v. Simon;13 Drake v. Thor Power Company;14 SEC v. Bangor Punta Cor-
poration.15 Of less direct significance, but nonetheless an important part of this 
pattern, is the case of Gamble v. Gerstle-Skogmo, Inc.16 
BarChris Construction Corporation 
The first of these (though not first in time), and in some respects the least 
singular, was the Escott case. In this case purchasers of convertible debentures 
of BarChris Construction Corporation sued the corporation (which was bankrupt 
at the time of suit), the directors, certain officers, the underwriters and the 
auditors because of alleged misstatements and omissions in the registration state-
ment for the debentures. Al l of the defendants were found liable under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, the provision governing liabilities arising out of 
registration statements. The auditors were found wanting in two areas: first, 
it was found that there were errors in the audited statements on which they 
opined and that they had not exercised due care; and second, it was found that 
they had failed to exercise due diligence in conducting the "S-1 review" covering 
developments between the audit date and the effective date of the registration 
statement. 
The case is less noteworthy for the enunciation or development of legal 
principles than it is because it was the first systematic treatment of the responsi-
bilities of auditors under the 1933 Act (an earlier case, Shonts v. Hirliman,17 the 
only previous case dealing with the responsibilities of auditors under the 1933 
Act, was almost universally believed to have been wrongly decided). The court 
did however state some significant points. It found that the standards for the 
S-1 review contained in Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33 adopted by 
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the AICPA were sufficient in outlining procedures for satisfying the due diligence 
standard and it further found that the standards established by the firm internally 
were compliant with SAP No. 33. The fault of the auditors, said the court, was 
in failing to comply with their own established standards. 
There is some reason to believe that the court was, at least in some par-
ticulars, unduly harsh on the auditors and perhaps held them to higher standards 
than it should have.18 
However, the case did remind auditors of the perils latent in Section 11 and 
undoubtedly led to stricter standards among them. 
Yale Express 
The second case of significance was Fischer v. Kletz. In this case auditors 
for Yale Express Systems, Inc. during the course of making some special studies 
for the client unrelated to their auditing function discovered that the statements 
which they had certified contained material errors. The court found fault with 
their failure to make this known other than to management when it came to 
their attention; rather they allowed the statements to continue unquestioned for 
a considerable time while those making transactions in the securities of Yale 
Express in the marketplace presumably relied upon them. The court found this 
a violation of common law principles, basing its opinion largely upon the Re-
statement of Torts, which is an authoritative effort to systematize and clarify 
common law tort principles, and left open the possibility of a violation of Rule 
10b-5. The duty found by the court to make this disclosure has been codified 
in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 41. 
Continental Vending 
The case that rocked the accounting profession far more than any of the 
others discussed herein, and with good reason, and the one that may in the long 
run do most to adjust accounting standards and practices was U.S. v. Simon. 
In this case two partners and an associate of a national firm of auditors were 
indicted for alleged violation of the Federal Mail Fraud Statute and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The charge was that a footnote in the financial statements 
of Continental Vending Machine Corporation for the year ended September 30, 
1962, was materially misleading and suffered from material omissions, and that 
this was the result of knowing conduct by the defendants. After a first trial 
ended in a hung jury, a second trial brought their conviction. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a unanimous opinion written 
by Judge Henry J. Friendly, one of the most knowledgeable federal judges in 
financial, securities and accounting matters, affirmed the convictions. 
It is clear from reading the charge of the trial judge to the jury, a charge 
which in affirming the Court of Appeals confirmed as a correct statement of the 
law, and from reading the Court of Appeals opinion, that the courts thrust com-
pliance with generally accepted accounting principles into a position subsidiary 
to fair presentation. In effect, the courts said that not only must financial state-
ments be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, 
they must also "fairly present" the financial condition of the company and what-
ever else they purport to present. In the lower court's words, 
29 
A firm of public accountants . . . engaged to perform an independent 
audit, represents that it will perform the audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles and 
that it will render an opinion, based on its audit, as to whether the 
financial statement of the company fairly presents its financial position 
and the results of its operations. 
Proof that a defendant, in conducting the 1962 audit, departed from 
such auditing standards, or participated in the preparation or approval 
of a financial statement that did not fairly present Continental's financial 
position, results of its 1962 operations in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards and accounting principles, is evidence, not 
necessarily conclusive, that the defendant did not act honestly and in 
good faith, and that statements contrary to such standards and principles 
may have been materially false or misleading. On the other hand, proof 
that the defendant did act in accordance with such generally accepted 
auditing standards and accounting principles is evidence which may be 
very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he acted in good faith, 
and that the facts as certified were not materially false or misleading. 
* * * * * 
So the auditor's responsibility in accordance with his engagement 
is, first, to render an opinion that must satisfy the auditor that the state-
ment fairly presents the results of the operations about the financial 
position of the client; and, second, to be satisfied that the statement con-
tains no misstatements of fact, or, at least, no misstatement of facts 
known to the auditor. 
The critical test, therefore, is whether the financial statement here, 
as a whole, fairly presented the financial condition of Continental as of 
September 30, 1962, and whether it accurately reported the operations 
for fiscal 1962. (emphasis supplied) 
At the Seaview Symposium on Ethics in Corporate Financial Reporting held 
in the latter part of 1971, it was clear that this notion of the primacy of fairness 
over generally accepted accounting principles is less than unanimously acceptable 
to accountants.19 This is understandable. Most accountants probably feel more 
comfortable dealing with the principles that have been warp and woof of their 
educational and professional experience than they do in placing their professional 
reputations (not to mention their finances) at the mercy of determining com-
pliance with a vaguely defined standard that is more ethical than legal or financial. 
And yet this notion is not radical. It has been suggested in the past. In the 
Associated Gas and Electric Company case decided by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in 1942, the Commission, after an extraordinarily detailed 
examination of alleged accounting improprieties in the accounts of Associated 
Gas and Electric, shifted to what it considered more basic considerations and said: 
We think, however, that too much attention to the question whether the 
financial statements formally complied with principles, practice and con-
ventions accepted at the time should not be permitted to blind us to the 
basic question whether the financial statements performed the function 
of enlightenment, which is their only reason for existence. Each of the 
accountants' certificates in question contained the opinion that, subject 
to various qualifications therein, the financial statements fairly presented 
the financial condition of the registrant, in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. If that basic representation was not ac-
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curate as to the financial statements as a whole, no weight of precedent 
or practice with respect to the minutiae of the statements could justify 
the accountants' certificates... . For the average investor [read layman?] 
the financial statements of this system contain not a hint of the rot 
hidden beneath the surface of this holding company system. 
We believe that, in addition to the question whether the individual 
items of financial statements are stated in accordance with accounting 
principles, practices and conventions, there must be considered the further 
question whether, on an overall basis, the statements are informative.20 
Liability to Third Parties 
Beginning in 1951 the carefully delineated common law restraints on the 
imposition of liability to third parties on auditors laid out in the Ultramares 
case began to erode. In a long, rather brilliant, dissenting opinion, Lord Justice 
Denning in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.21 laid out what he conceived 
should be the broad principles of liability to third parties for negligence in these 
words: 
[To] whom do these professional people owe a duty? They [ac-
countants] owe the duty, of course, to their employer or client; and 
also I think to any third person to whom they themselves show the 
accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show the 
accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take some other action 
on them . . . . In my opinion accountants owe a duty of care not only 
to their own clients, but also to all those whom they \now will rely on 
their accounts in the transactions for which these accounts are prepared. 
(emphasis supplied) 
Thirteen years later this viewpoint became the law of England in Hedley, 
Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.22 Four years later a sizable dent 
was made in the earlier doctrine in this country in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin.23 
The Court there peered into the same pit of danger that had caused Justice 
Cardozo to recoil from finding liability to third parties for simple negligence 
and said: 
The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted . . . and 
this Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be 
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional mis-
conduct? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and spread by 
imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of 
insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the 
cost onto the entire consuming public? 
The Court then added this pregnant thought: 
Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary tech-
niques of the accounting profession? 
Paralleling this expansion of liability under common law has been the de-
velopment under Rule 10b-5. In Drake v. Thor Power Company, the federal 
district court in Chicago determined that auditors could be liable under Rule 
10b-5 if they were negligent in giving their opinion. 
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These cases, of course, create significant dangers for auditors. If simple 
negligence is sufficient to establish monetary liability, and that liability runs to 
all those whose reliance "can be actually foreseen," isn't the door opened for 
appalling damages? An error in the audit of General Motors or American Tele-
phone & Telegraph or any other substantial publicly held company might result 
in catastrophic consequences. The hovering hope that such a burden may not 
be inflicted on auditors is the fact that it is not yet clear whether negligence can 
create monetary liability for a Rule 10b-5 offender who did not participate in 
the purchase or sale of securities. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,24 a case in 
which one of the charges was that the company had put out a misleading press 
release as a consequence of negligence, Judge Friendly said in his concurring 
opinion: 
The consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting of a press 
release . . . may impose civil liability on the corporations are frightening. 
Despite this uncertainty, however, it is reported that accounting firms or 
their insurance carriers have paid several millions of dollars in settling claims 
that appear to have been based upon negligence.25 
Responsibility for Adequate Disclosure 
Two other cases are of importance in analyzing the developing responsi-
bilities of accountants, though neither of them involved accountants as defendants. 
In the first, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., the District Court determined 
that a proxy statement used in soliciting approval of a merger of General Out-
door Advertising Co. with Gamble-Skogmo was misleading. The financial state-
ments of General carried certain fixed assets of the company in accordance with 
customary accounting principles: historical cost less depreciation. However, the 
court stated, without suggesting that the financial statements were incorrect, that 
in addition to that information there should have been disclosed additional in-
formation indicating a market value higher than book since there was significant 
evidence of the intention of Gamble-Skogmo after the merger to dispose of the 
assets by sale, there had been a number of sales of similar assets at prices sub-
stantially above book, and the company had received offers and appraisals for 
the remaining ones that indicated market value higher than book. 
In the next case, SEC v. Bangor Punta Corporation, the court went further 
and indicated that in the somewhat special circumstances of that case a significant 
asset, the stock of the Bangor and Aroostock Railroad, should have been written 
down on Bangor Punta's balance sheet because of indications that its value had 
become less than the carrying value. In that case, for somewhat obscure reasons, 
Bangor Punta had put the railroad on its books at $18.4 million, an amount 
based upon an appraisal; this treatment had been allowed earlier by the SEC. 
The court determined that, given the status of negotiations looking toward the 
possible sale of the stock of the railroad, it should have been written down to 
about $5 million, the amount which was being discussed with a potential buyer. 
The court remarked that its requirement of this write-down might not be re-
quired in ". . . cases where book carrying figures are in accordance with principles 
of conventional transactional accounting or where circumstances might be 
different." 
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Both of these cases, admittedly each posing somewhat unique problems, 
suggest that permissible accounting treatment may not be sufficiently reflective 
of economic reality to stand alone: either additional information must be dis-
closed or the financial statements must be modified to make fuller disclosure. 
Conclusions 
In the light of all the above, what are the courts saying to auditors? 
Obviously, the courts do not speak with a single voice, and they speak al-
ways in the context of the particular cases before them. There are, however, some 
conclusions that are suggested by this discussion. 
First, the performance of the accounting profession is going to be increasingly 
subject to judicial scrutiny. As the task of bringing class suits has been moderated, 
and as potential plaintiffs and their counsel have witnessed the ease with which 
judicial intervention may be secured, accountants increasingly may expect to have 
their work thrust into the judicial arena either by private litigants or the SEC. 
Second, for the most part the courts are willing to let the profession articulate 
accounting principles and auditing standards, but they are inclined to look beyond 
conformity to accounting principles for answers to what they consider a more 
basic concern: do the financial statements fairly and meaningfully inform the 
investor? If they do that, the court would probably be disinclined to fault heavily 
an auditor who may have erred in the application of accounting principles; if 
they don't, as is evident from the Simon case the court will not be deterred from 
penalizing the auditor because of heavy evidence of conformity with the principles. 
Third, while the courts and the SEC do not appear to be insisting that 
financial statements must be reduced to kindergarten simplicity, still they do ap-
pear to be insisting that they have intelligibility to the layman. In 1947 the 
Commission stated: 
It is not enough to say that here perhaps much . . . of the factual back-
ground was given in footnote data. . . . [E]ven if [all significant data] 
had been given there is an additional obligation to present the material 
in a way in which it will be useful to the informed but less sophisticated 
readers. (emphasis supplied) 
And a Federal District Court said: 
The purpose of the financial statements is to inform the man on the 
street, and the underlying policy of the Securities and Exchange Acts 
and of Rule 10b-5 is to assure that he can have truthful information in 
buying securities, regardless of the intended victim of the fraud. More-
over, the defendants have set themselves up to be independent certified 
public auditors. As such, they have assumed a peculiar relation with the 
investing public. As accountants, the defendant clearly cannot be im-
munized from suit. (emphasis supplied) 
It is not enough to prepare financial statements in a manner that would 
permit intelligent interpretation only by the trained accountant or the invest-
ment banker. Above everything else, they are demanding that the statements 
disclose and that this disclosure be intelligible and helpful to more than a handful 
in understanding the financial condition and the operations of the company. 
Fourth, when the profession has established standards, the courts will rely 
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heavily upon the extent to which the professional work conforms to those stand-
ards. This is not to say, however, that if a court found a standard or principle 
lacking it would not fall back on the notion found in the McKesson & Robbins 
case of the thirties decided by the SEC to the effect that the entire profession had 
been insufficiently cautious.26 
With the courts more heavily involved in monitoring the way in which ac-
countants do their work, the pressure on the profession to find means of fore-
stalling further disaster is heavy. Certainly to some extent the increased urgency 
of the effort to define accounting principles and eliminate alternatives is a fruit 
of this judicial scrutiny. Too, surely in some measure the in-depth efforts being 
made by the Wheat and Trueblood groups were undertaken in hopes that a more 
effective means of establishing accounting principles and a better definition of 
the objectives of financial statements might allay some of the hazards. 
It is sometimes said that the courts are "hostile" to the accounting profession. 
This is a doubtful proposition. The courts are concerned, as are the SEC and 
state securities authorities, as well as the self-regulatory agencies, with the main-
tenance of fairness and honesty in the securities markets. Crucial to that task is 
disclosure. And central to disclosure is financial information. As long as this is 
so the courts will scrutinize with care how those who purport to give that 
financial information a higher degree of credibility perform their role. 
After all, the accounting profession came into existence to provide to various 
parts of society assurances that could not be secured by relying upon the unverified 
assertions of preparers of financial statements. The profession had its inception 
in the notion that accountants, as members of a learned profession, would exercise 
independence, would not prostitute their skills for the venal purposes of their 
employers, would be answerable to those who employed them and those to whom 
they addressed their conclusions at the behest of those who employed them. 
In the earliest days of the profession their efforts were designed to assure honesty 
among owners in an enterprise, credibility to the owners' or managers' assertions 
to existing or potential creditors. In these roles those who relied upon them 
were very limited in number and generally the risks, though large for the time, 
were nothing as compared with those involved in present-day financial transac-
tions. The role of auditor is essentially the same. The audience, however, is 
larger and the stakes are higher. 
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Discussant's Response to 
What Are the Courts Saying to Auditors? 
Russell A. Taussig 
University of Hawaii 
Mr. Sommer, in his excellent paper, clearly and forcefully tells us that the 
courts are saying to the auditors: "the ante has been raised in the auditing game." 
Whatever else the cases he cites imply, they indicate business will be good 
for attorneys in the liability area throughout the 1970's. In my opinion, these 
cases also will result, as with McKesson-Robbins, in an extension of auditing 
standards and an improvement in financial reporting. 
Mr. Sommer summarizes the significant characteristics of the recent cases 
under three major headings. 
1. The courts are making it much easier to sue the auditors. 
2. The courts are asking auditors to establish generally accepted account-
ing principles; but where those principles are lacking, the courts are 
filling the voids. 
3. The courts are holding the profession to its announced standards, 
but where the profession has been overly restrictive in defining such 
standards the courts are interpreting them quite broadly. 
Let us consider these three characteristics concretely in terms of another 
case, that has yet to go to trial, that of National Student Marketing. 
A civil action filed February 3, 1972 by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission against National Student Marketing Corporation, its auditors and two 
law firms in U.S. District Court (Washington, D.C.) asks for injunctive and other 
relief.1 At this early stage, all we have is a complaint. The actual facts, as sub-
stantiated by the evidence and decided on by the courts, may differ from the 
allegations. Nonetheless, the legal concepts and accounting issues are of such 
immediate significance that they are worthy of discussion at this time. Let us, 
therefore, review the allegations of the SEC, bearing in mind the possibility of 
revisions before final judgment is in. 
The SEC charges the defendants with fraud and deceit. If the SEC prevails, 
this case will expand the potential liabilities of independent accountants under 
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act for audited financial statements. 
It also will enlarge the responsibilities of auditors for comfort letters beyond 
those delineated in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 48. Consistent with its 
contemporary activist policy, the SEC seeks injunctive relief not only against the 
registrant but also against others, including Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Allegations by Securities and Exchange Commission 
The complaint against the auditors contains basically two charges: 
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1) Deficiencies in the financial statements prepared between 1968 and 
1970; 
2) failure to report the contents of a 1969 comfort letter to the SEC. 
The Story of National Student Marketing. National Student Marketing 
Corporation grew in two years from $723,000 of sales to $67.9 million. Cortes 
Randell, the founder and chief executive, captured the imagination of financial 
analysts and institutional investors with merchandising schemes ranging from 
computer-matched dating to half-fare cards for American Airlines. Wall Street 
wanted to believe in Cortes Randell, in view of the $45 billion annual disposable 
income of the youth market. 
NSM was bought out at $6 in April 1968 and soared to a high of $144 by 
December 15, 1969—an increase of 2,300 per cent. The decline was equally 
dramatic. On February 1, 1972 NSM was selling at $9—an aggregate loss of 
over $450 million. 
To what extent were these losses due to the cupidity of the investors? To 
what extent, if any, should the auditors absorb the losses? For an understanding 
of these questions, let us examine the SEC allegations in further detail. 
Accounting for Unbilled Contracts. In the first place, the SEC asserts the 
1968-69 financial statements were in error because contracts in progress were 
improperly recorded as receivables. For example, the SEC claims the balance 
sheet at August 31, 1968 overstated assets approximately $1.7 million by the im-
proper recording of unbilled accounts receivable, and pre-tax earnings for 1968 
were overstated approximately $696,000 out of a total of $699,000. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the 1968 statements, management wrote-off 
unbilled accounts receivable of approximately $1,000,000. Cortes Randell stated 
the change was to put the company on a more conservative basis of accounting. 
However, the SEC claims that the write-off was in recognition of the fact that 
these unbilled receivables never existed or were otherwise uncollectible. More-
over, the SEC claims these changes were not adequately disclosed in the 1969 state-
ments. The SEC also charges similar misstatements in the 1969 financial state-
ments. We must await the answers of the defendants, and testimony of witnesses, 
to appraise the validity of these charges and to judge whether the financial state-
ments were, in fact, erroneously prepared, or, simply were prepared according to 
the best evidence available at the time—later to be found wanting on the dis-
covery of subsequent events. 
Accounting for Sale of Subsidiaries. A second claim of the SEC concerns 
1969 gains from the disposition of two wholly owned subsidiaries. It is claimed 
the sales not only were not at arm's-length, but also were initiated after 1969 and 
dated back to inflate the profits for that year. Moreover, Cortes Randell trans-
ferred some of his own NSMC stock to the purchasers, which they then used as 
collateral for the acquisitions. The SEC charges PMM failed to conduct its ex-
amination in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards once it knew 
of Randell's involvement in these transactions. As in Continental Vending, dis-
cussed by Mr. Sommer, we find auditing questions arising from the stock transac-
tions of the holder of a controlling interest. Should the auditor expand the scope 
of his engagement when he discovers transactions that indicate a potential con-
flict of interest? 
The Comfort Letter, the Auditor, and the Public. In addition to the fore-
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going allegations relating to the audited financial statements, the SEC is also 
bringing charges regarding a comfort letter requested by counsel in connection 
with the merger of NSM and Interstate National Corporation on October 31, 1969. 
As a result of facts discovered during its regular annual examination for the 
year ended August 31, 1969, the auditors could not render a clean letter. They 
proposed the amortization of $500,000 of deferred costs against the nine months 
ended May 31, 1969, and they suggested the write-off of receivables and recording 
of other charges totalling approximately $300,000. PMM recommended that 
NSM should consider submitting corrected data prior to proceeding with the 
closing. (This information was conveyed orally; the written letter was not de-
livered at this time.) Interim statements were not revised. Stockholders were 
not informed. Nevertheless, the merger took place. 
The SEC charges the auditors failed in accordance with their professional 
obligation to insist that the NSMC financial statements be revised in accordance 
with the comfort letter, and failing that, to withdraw from the engagement. The 
SEC moreover, claims that the auditors had a duty to come forward and notify 
the SEC or the shareholders as to the materially misleading nature of the unau-
dited financial statements. Here, as in BarChris, discussed by Mr. Sommer, the 
SEC is attempting to expand the scope of the auditors' attest function in connec-
tion with comfort letters. 
Relief Sought by the SEC. The SEC in this civil action is asking basically 
for two things: 
1) a permanent injunction restraining defendants from future viola-
tions of federal securities laws; and 
2) a mandatory injunction requiring NSM to revise the 10-Ks filed be-
tween 1968 and 1970. 
Any other lawsuit—possibly a class action for money damages—would, of 
course, necessarily have to establish its case independently of the current one. 
However, it would seem the discovery of evidence for such an action would be 
facilitated somewhat by the present case. 
What then Are the Courts Saying to Auditors? 
This case reiterates three important issues for accountants outlined by Mr. 
Sommer in his thoughtful and well balanced paper: 
1) The SEC is escalating its activist role. National Student Marketing 
is the first major case against accountants (and others) where a 
business failure has not taken place. 
2) The SEC is raising once again a possible expansion of the overriding 
ethical concept of "fairness." 
3) The SEC's actions, if sustained, will greatly expand the responsibility 
of the auditor for unaudited financial statements. 
The Activist Role of the SEC. We have seen in BarChris, Yale Express, and 
Continental Vending a new activist role for the courts—emerging after some 35 
years of experience with the federal securities laws. SEC v. NSMC signals an-
other stage in that activist role. This is the first major civil case brought by the 
Commission against a registrant, its accountants, and attorneys for alleged de-
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ficiencies in financial statements arising out of a situation other than a business 
failure. It no doubt will not be the last. At least, criminal action was not as-
serted, as in Continental Vending. But what is the next logical step in the SEC's 
policing of financial information under the federal securities laws? Will the 
SEC seek to audit the auditors? 
In Yale Express, BarChris, Westec and Continental Vending, claims against 
the accountants arose in connection with business failure. In National Student 
Marketing, no such calamity triggered SEC action. Perhaps the next step would 
be for the SEC to evaluate the quality of auditing on all financials covered by 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Suppose the SEC, under its broad regulatory powers, 
would attempt to review auditors' working papers—at least on a sampling basis? 
In my opinion the added cost of such a review of auditors' working papers by the 
government would not be justified in terms of additional and more reliable 
financial information for investors. However, it seems clear that the already 
thorough and generally excellent intra-firm review function that exists in all 
major accounting firms must be greatly expanded in the light of the new activist 
role of the SEC. The reviewing partner will want to look beyond the audit 
program. He will want to ask himself at the end of every engagement: "Would 
I invest my money in this company?" If his question raises doubts, he should 
proceed on the assumption that he might be called into court to justify each 
financial statement item. The reviewing partner should also ask himself as an 
investor, "What additional information (by footnote or otherwise) would I like to 
have?" This means the courts are saying to the auditors: increase the scope of 
your engagements; increase your manpower; increase your fees. 
The Primacy of Fairness Over Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
Not only are courts saying to the auditors "expand the scope of your activities," 
they are also making promulgations about "fairness" in financial reporting, a 
concept which judges and lay juries are construing to take precedence over gen-
erally accepted accounting principles. 
In Continental Vending, for example, Judge Friendly stated: "the critical 
test is not whether the statements were prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, but whether they fairly present financial informa-
tion such that they contain no misstatements of fact, or, at least, no misstatements 
of facts known to the auditor." As Mr. Sommer comments in his paper: "the 
notion of the primacy of fairness over generally accepted accounting principles 
is less than unanimously acceptable to accountants." The concept of "fairness" 
is not operational. Fairness, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. To 
substitute it for generally accepted accounting principles would expose auditors 
to substantially greater hazards without proof that such a change would create 
a more liquid capital market. 
The SEC is attempting to hold the defendants in NSM to the primacy of 
"fairness." The SEC charges PMM with misleading financial statements because: 
1) the statements did not fairly present the facts; and additionally 
2) the statements were not prepared in conformity with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. 
Why two separate complaints? Apparently, the SEC will try to establish both 
charges, but will be satisfied if it sustains one. 
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Action for Standard Beyond that Established by the Auditing Profession. 
Not only is the SEC apparently seeking to hold accountants for the primacy of 
fairness, but it also is attempting to require a standard of auditing beyond that 
required by the profession. At least, so it would appear from the comments of 
Victor M. Earle III, general counsel of PMM. The SEC charges the auditors 
should have insisted that NSM revise the financial statements in accordance with 
the comfort letter, and failing that should have withdrawn from the engagement 
and notified the SEC or the shareholders of the two companies. Victor Earle re-
plied: "The plain implication of SAP 41 is that client confidences and state law 
and Rule 1.03 of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics can be breached, if at all, 
only where the auditor has subsequently acquired information affecting his pre-
viously issued expression of opinion on audited financial statements. 
"Here, the information acquired related to the company's previously issued 
unaudited financial statements as to which the firm had not expressed an 
opinion."2 
While SAP 41 applies only to events discovered by an auditor subsequent to 
the issuance of an opinion on audited financials, other statements on auditing 
procedure cover the responsibilities of the auditor to disclose facts he has dis-
covered pertaining to unaudited statements that make such unaudited state-
ments misleading, particularly in connection with a proxy or prospectus. For ex-
ample SAP 47 (September 1971) at paragraph 23 states ". . . [If the auditor] 
concludes on the basis of facts known to him that the unaudited financial state-
ments [in a registration statement] are not in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles he should insist on appropriate revision; failing that he 
should add a comment in his report calling attention to the departure; further, 
he should consider, probably with advice of legal counsel, withholding his con-
sent to the use of his report on the audited financial statements in the registration 
statement." 
SAP 47 states that an accountant should insist on "appropriate revision." 
It does not specifically state that he should notify the SEC or stockholders. If the 
commissioner prevails in NSM, he will thus expand the responsibilities of the 
auditors. The courts are again urged to take auditing practice a step beyond that 
dictated by the standards currently pronounced by the members of the profession. 
Concluding Remarks 
It may be small comfort—but then at least some—for the accounting profes-
sion in the United States to note that they are not alone in their trial of fire. 
The U K cases of Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. and Hedley Byrne & Co.. 
Ltd. v. Heller and Partners, Ltd. were cited by Mr. Sommer. 
In the December 1971 Abacus, W. P. Birkett and R. B. Walker describe 
major Australian company failures of the past two decades, including the Reid 
Murray group, and discuss the resulting lawsuits. They conclude "Perhaps more 
than any other factor, company failures have tested accountants' claims to pro-
fessional status, their capacity to respond to criticism, the quality of their 
organization and the rationale of their various practices."3 
Nor have our Canadian neighbors been without their cases. In the May 
1971 Canadian Chartered Accountant William A. Farlinger concludes in the 
Atlantic Acceptance Corporation case that although Atlantic's failure resulted in 
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some large losses, those who suffered them were able to afford it.4 On the other 
hand, Atlantic has stimulated better financial information for investors. 
What are the implications of these cases? 
First, it seems highly probable that business for attorneys in the liability 
area will increase throughout the 1970's. 
Second, some major auditing firms will suffer painful consequences, in the 
short run. 
Third, the 1970's lawsuits—like McKesson-Robbins—will result in further 
extensions of auditing practices that will increase the prestige and importance 
of the auditing profession in the long run. 
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Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling 
Kenneth W. Stringer 
Haskins & Sells 
I am always glad to have an opportunity to discuss statistical sampling, 
which is one of my favorite subjects. I am particularly pleased to be able to do 
so at the invitation of Howard Stettler because my interest in the subject was 
first stimulated by reading his article in The Journal of Accountancy in January 
1954. At that point I became convinced that statistical sampling is the most 
rational means for determining the extent of audit tests of details of transactions 
and account balances. Extensive study and experience in implementation of 
statistical sampling in our Firm's audit practice in the intervening years has 
strengthened that conviction. 
Although the use of statistical sampling in the profession has not progressed 
as rapidly as I have considered desirable, I think it is fair to say that interest in 
the subject is increasing currently. This observation is based on discussions with 
interested parties in various firms concerning the extent of their current studies 
and/or applications. The reasons why progress in the meantime has been more 
evolutionary than revolutionary are understandable, and have involved both 
statistical and auditing problems. The statistical problems have included the 
general unfamiliarity of auditors with statistical methods, and technical questions 
concerning the applicability of certain statistical methods to auditing situations. 
The auditing problems have related primarily to defining and expressing audit 
objectives in terms susceptible to statistical measurement, and to the difficulty 
of combining statistical and subjective evaluations of audit evidence in forming 
overall conclusions. 
Because the auditing problems are equally or more difficult and also are 
more appropriate for my assigned topic, I will confine my discussion today to 
them. For this purpose I will review first the evolution of present AICPA 
literature concerning statistical sampling, and second the current consideration 
being given to the expansion of that literature. 
Present Literature 
The first official AICPA literature on statistical sampling was a special 
report of its Committee on Statistical Sampling, which was published in The 
Journal of Accountancy in February 1962. Although this report was quite 
general in its coverage, it was the result of extensive deliberations by the Com-
mittee and established two landmark positions. First, it stated that: 
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The Committee is of the opinion that the use of statistical sampling 
is permitted under generally accepted auditing standards. 
The second position was expressed as follows: 
Although statistical sampling furnishes the auditor a measure of 
precision and reliability, statistical techniques do not define for the 
auditor the values of each required to provide audit satisfaction. 
Specification of the precision and reliability necessary in a given 
test is an auditing function and must be based upon judgment in the 
same way as is the decision as to audit satisfaction required when 
statistical sampling is not used. 
The next reference to statistical sampling in AICPA literature was in State-
ment on Auditing Procedure No. 33, issued in December 1963, which included 
the following comment: 
In determining the extent of a particular audit test and the method 
of selecting items to be examined, the auditor might consider using 
statistical sampling techniques which have been found to be advantageous 
in certain instances. The use of statistical sampling does not reduce the 
use of judgment by the auditor but provides certain statistical measure-
ments as to the results of audit tests, which measurements may not 
otherwise be available. 
The use of expressions such as "might consider using" and "statistical measure-
ments . . . which . . . may not otherwise be available" (emphasis added) suggests 
that the Committee on Auditing Procedure was perhaps neither as enthusiastic 
nor as knowledgable as the Sampling Committee. However, the foregoing 
excerpt did represent an advance in authoritative recognition because the Com-
mittee on Auditing Procedure is senior to the Committee on Statistical Sampling 
in the AICPA committee structure. 
The next pronouncement was a report by the Committee on Statistical 
Sampling that appeared in The Journal of Accountancy in July 1964. 
In line with the position taken in the preceding pronouncements, that report 
stated that the use of statistical sampling ". . . is permissive rather than mandatory 
under generally accepted auditing standards." 
As indicated in the introduction of that report, it was issued: 
. . . to discuss more specifically a way in which statistical precision 
and reliability can be related to generally accepted auditing standards 
and to point out some of the factors to be considered by the auditor in 
deciding what degree or level of each is satisfactory for a particular 
sample; it is not issued to propose definitive numerical criteria for these 
measurements nor to discuss their mathematical aspects. 
The purpose as stated in this excerpt was in response to some of the principal 
questions that were being discussed among those interested in statistical sampling 
at that time. For example, there were differing views as to what auditing con-
siderations were relevant to precision and reliability, respectively, and as to 
whether—and if so how—internal control should be considered. 
As to the first of the questions referred to above, the Committee stated that: 
Although "precision" and "reliability" are statistically inseparable, 
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the Committee believes that one of the ways in which these measure-
ments can be usefully adapted to the auditor's purposes is by relating 
precision to materiality and reliability to the reasonableness of the basis 
for this opinion. 
Further discussion of this concept and its relation to internal control will be 
presented later in this paper. 
The next AICPA pronouncement involving statistical sampling was State-
ment on Auditing Procedure No. 36 issued in August 1966 by the Committee 
on Auditing Procedure. This Statement was concerned primarily with the 
auditing implications of the use of statistical sampling by clients in lieu of tak-
ing complete physical inventories. Pertinent excerpts from this Statement follow: 
In recent years some companies have developed inventory controls or 
methods of determining inventories, including statistical sampling, of 
sufficient reliability to make an annual physical count of each item of 
inventory unnecessary in certain instances. The purpose of this State-
ment is to recognize this development.... If statistical sampling methods 
are used by the client in the taking of the physical inventory, the inde-
pendent auditor must be satisfied that the sampling plan has statistical 
validity, that it has been properly applied, and that the resulting pre-
cision and reliability, as defined statistically, are reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
The latest stage in evolution of the AICPA's position concerning statistical 
sampling did not result in the issuance of a pronouncement, but I believe it was 
equally significant. One of the recent projects of the Committee on Statistical 
Sampling was to reconsider the July 1964 report, and after extended study the 
Committee concluded that no revision was necessary. 
Pronouncement under Consideration 
One of the major projects currently on the agenda of the AICPA Committee 
on Auditing Procedure is a comprehensive statement concerning internal control. 
The present draft of the proposed statement includes a revised definition of in-
ternal accounting control and a discussion of basic concepts implicit in such 
definition. It also includes discussion of the review, tests, and evaluation of 
internal accounting control required by the second generally accepted auditing 
standard of field work, and of the correlation of such evaluation with the other 
auditing procedures as contemplated by the third standard of field work. The 
proposed statement was originally intended to deal also with reporting on 
internal control, but the Committee decided to accelerate its pronouncement on 
this aspect of the subject and did so by the issuance of Statement on Auditing 
Procedure No. 49 in November 1971. 
Because of the obvious applicability of statistical sampling to tests of com-
pliance with internal control under the second standard and to the sufficiency 
of evidential matter under the third standard, the earlier drafts of the proposed 
statement included some discussion of these matters. However, in deference to 
the view of some committee members that any extended discussion of statistical 
sampling in the text of the proposed statement would give it a degree of prom-
inence incompatible with its permissive status, such discussion has been relegated 
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to appendices in the more recent drafts. Because of the subject matter involved 
the AICPA Committee on Statistical Sampling has assisted by reviewing and 
commenting on the drafts of the appendices. 
In order to comply fully with our professional standards of reporting, I 
want to express an unequivocal "disclaimer of opinion" as to the extent, if any, 
to which the presently proposed appendices on statistical sampling will be included 
in any statement issued by the Committee on Auditing Procedure. However, 
since the word "toward" in my assigned topic implies movement in the direction 
of standards and not necessarily their attainment, I believe it is appropriate to 
discuss the purpose and nature of the proposed appendices. The present draft of 
the proposed Statement on Auditing Procedure includes an Appendix A and an 
Appendix B. 
Appendix A is the July 1964 report of the Committee on Statistical Sampling, 
which was referred to earlier. This report would be included because of its 
general conceptual relevance, and to provide background for Appendix B. 
The purpose of Appendix B would be to amplify certain of the concepts 
in Appendix A and to provide quantitative criteria or guidelines for their applica-
tion in practice. Such criteria were not considered timely when the 1964 report 
was issued, but they have been included in the draft of Appendix B on the 
premise that the intervening years of education, experience, and changing audit 
environment have made their inclusion appropriate at this time. In making 
this statement, I should confess my personal bias and reiterate my earlier dis-
claimer as to the eventual decision of the Committee. 
The proposed Appendix B discusses criteria for reliability and precision for 
tests of compliance with internal control, and also for substantive tests as to the 
validity and the propriety of the accounting treatment of transactions and balances. 
Although compliance tests and substantive tests are discussed separately in the 
proposed Appendix because of the separate considerations relevant to each, the 
draft recognizes that a single sample can be designed to serve both of these 
purposes simultaneously. 
Compliance Tests. The objective of compliance tests is to obtain evidence 
of compliance with, or conversely, of deviations from procedures the auditor 
considers critical for purposes of his evaluation of a particular aspect of internal 
control being tested. Samples designed for this purpose should be evaluated in 
terms of deviations from such procedures, either as to the number of such devia-
tions or the monetary amount of the transactions on which the deviations occurred. 
For compliance tests, the present drafts suggest a reliability level of 95% 
with reference to the upper precision limit related to the estimated internal 
control deviations. The draft also suggests that an upper precision limit of 5% 
with respect to internal control deviations would provide satisfactory evidence 
of compliance to justify maximum reliance on internal control in performing 
substantive tests, as discussed later. If the upper precision limit exceeds 5%, 
the draft suggests that reliance should be reduced accordingly. In developing this 
position, the draft points out that although internal control deviations increase 
the risk of errors in the accounting records, such errors do not necessarily follow 
from the deviations. Deviations from internal control procedures would result 
in errors at the same occurrence rate in the accounting records to be audited only 
if such deviations and the actual errors occurred on the same transactions. Conse-
46 
quently, internal control deviations of as much as 5% of the number or amount 
of transactions rarely would be expected to result in errors of that magnitude in 
the accounting records being audited. 
Substantive Tests. In the proposed Appendix, all auditing procedures other 
than compliance tests are referred to as substantive tests, and the feature of audit 
interest in performing such tests is considered to be the monetary amount of 
any errors that would affect the financial statements being audited. It should be 
noted that this definition of substantive tests includes both tests of details, which 
are susceptible to the use of statistical sampling, and other types of auditing pro-
cedures, which are not. 
As indicated above, the proposed Appendix suggests a single reliability 
level for compliance tests. This was considered appropriate for such tests because 
the evidence obtained from them is the primary source of the auditor's reliance 
with respect to compliance with internal control procedures. This is not the case, 
however, in considering the reliability level for substantive tests, because the reli-
ance on the latter is to be combined with the reliance on internal control in form-
ing the auditor's final opinion on the financial statements. This concept was 
expressed in the July 1964 report as follows: 
These standards [the second and third standards of field work] 
taken together imply that the combination of the auditor's reliance on 
internal control and on his auditing procedures should provide a rea-
sonable basis for his opinion in all cases, although the portion of reliance 
derived from the respective sources may properly vary between cases. 
For statistical samples designed to test the validity or bona fides of 
accounting data and to be evaluated in monetary terms, the committee 
believes the foregoing concept should be applied by specifying reliability 
levels that vary inversely with the subjective reliance assigned to internal 
control and to any other auditing procedures or conditions relating to 
the particular matters to be tested by such samples. 
The foregoing reference to "subjective reliance assigned to internal control" 
introduces an important element on which judgment is required. The proposed 
appendix would express the Committee's judgment in this respect by establishing 
a range of reliability levels to be used where statistical sampling is utilized in 
conjunction with the auditor's principal substantive tests. 
The upper limit for this range would apply where the auditor's evaluation 
indicates that little if any reliance should be assigned to internal control, and 
the present draft suggests that a 95% reliability level is reasonable in such cir-
cumstances. 
Establishing the lower limit for the range of reliability factors for substantive 
tests is more difficult. If the auditor's evaluation of internal control indicates 
that both the prescribed procedures and the degree of compliance with them 
are satisfactory, the extreme position would be to assign all of the desired reliance 
to internal control and require none from other auditing procedures. This 
would be tantamount to setting the lower limit for reliability levels for sub-
stantive tests at zero. The draft rejects this extreme, however, on the grounds 
that generally accepted auditing standards contemplate that substantive tests 
will be restricted, but not eliminated, through reliance on internal control. This 
position recognizes that the maximum potential effectiveness of internal control is 
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something less than complete because of the inherent limitations in any such 
system. 
These limitations arise from such causes as misunderstandings, carelessness, 
distraction, fatigue, mistakes of judgment, dishonesty, or collusion, all of which 
relate primarily to the potential behavioral characteristics of individuals. The 
auditor ordinarily has little if any basis for making a realistic judgment as to 
the likelihood that such behavior will occur in individual situations. Accordingly, 
the draft suggests that a limit as to the maximum reliance to be assigned to in-
ternal control based on the collective judgment of the Committee would be 
useful for guidance to auditors in practice. 
The risks to be considered for this purpose were described in the July 1964 
report as follows: 
The ultimate risk against which the auditor and those who rely on 
his opinion require reasonable protection is a combination of two 
separate risks. The first of these is that material errors will occur in 
the accounting process by which the financial statements are developed. 
The second is that any material errors that occur will not be detected 
in the auditor's examination. 
The auditor relies on internal control to reduce the first risk and on 
his tests of details and his other auditing procedures to reduce the 
second. 
In mathematical terms the excerpt quoted above describes a conditional 
probability, because the second of the adverse events referred to cannot occur 
unless the first has occurred also. Therefore, the combined risk of both of the 
related events occurring jointly is the product of the respective risks of their oc-
curring individually. This concept is illustrated numerically in a tabulation that 
follows after brief comments concerning the nature of the respective risks. 
The magnitude of the inherent risk of occurrence of material errors in the 
absence of satisfactory internal control is unknown, but experience indicates 
that this risk is moderate. Although this risk is an unknown quantity, it may be 
dealt with as such in the illustration that follows by simply designating it as "X ." 
The reliance that should be assigned to satisfactory internal control is the 
portion of the risk of occurrence that may reasonably be expected to be eliminated 
by such control, while the residual risk of occurrence is the portion reasonably 
attributable to the inherent limitations on internal control. 
The risk arising from sampling and other auditing procedures (and the 
complementary reliability) is that which is required to establish the combined 
audit risk at a specified level. (These risks exclude the risk of any non-sampling 
errors and any similar errors relating to other auditing procedures.) Since the 
risk from sampling and other auditing procedures may include both of these 
elements, the concept being discussed here is broad enough to comprehend 
quantification of the latter also. I believe there is a reasonable basis for such 
quantification in many cases, but this is beyond the scope of the proposed Ap-
pendix B and of this paper. In both, the discussion of sampling reliability levels 
applies only to cases in which a sample is the principal element in the auditor's 
substantive tests of a particular aspect of the transactions or balances comprising 
the population. 
Subject to the preceding comments concerning respective risks the following 
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tabulation shows for several assumed levels of reliance on internal control, the 
resulting risk and reliability that will provide an assumed uniform combined risk: 
Inherent 
Risk of 
Occurrence 
Of Errors 
Reliance 
Assigned to 
Internal 
Control 
Residual 
Risk of 
Occurrence 
Of Errors 
Risk from 
Sampling 
and Other 
Procedures 
Combined 
Audit 
Risk 
Reliability 
from Sampling 
and Other 
Procedures 
X .00X 1.00X .05 .05X .95 
X .50X .50X .10 .05X .90 
X .75X .25X .20 .05X .80 
X .80X .20X .25 .05X .75 
X .85X .15X .33 .05X .67 
X .90X .10X .50 .05X .50 
Any presentation of a mathematical model in which subjective judgments 
and objective measurements are combined invites the somewhat annoying, but 
nevertheless completely accurate, criticism that the former cannot be quantified 
precisely. This criticism, however, does not impugn the usefulness of a model 
in focusing attention on the separate elements of a complex problem, and in 
showing the relationship between those elements. Furthermore, this criticism 
invites the rebuttal that it is more rational to quantify some of the separate ele-
ments of a problem, subjectively if necessary, than to deal subjectively with the 
entire set of elements where some can be measured objectively. 
If this analytic approach is accepted, the following two observations about 
the tabulation presented may be helpful in considering it. First, auditors' ex-
perience and understanding of the potential and the limitations of internal con-
trol makes it more realistic for them to exercise professional judgment in deciding 
in the framework of that model what reliance should reasonably be assigned to 
internal control, than in deciding in the abstract what sampling reliability level 
should be used. Second, although the inherent risk " X " is unknown, experience 
shows clearly that it is substantially less than 100% and consequently the com-
bined risk ".05X" is substantially less than 5% of all audit populations sampled. 
The present draft of Appendix B provides for but has not yet proposed the 
reliability level to be used for substantive tests where internal control is con-
sidered satisfactory. 
As to precision limits for substantive tests, the present draft of the proposed 
Appendix B accepts the concept that these should be based on the auditor's judg-
ment concerning materiality in relation to the financial statements and it does 
not propose any further guidelines in this respect. 
The determination of reliability levels and precision limits is the vital 
interface between the subjectivity of auditing judgment and the objectivity of 
statistical sampling. I believe the concepts discussed in this paper are sound in 
theory and workable in practice. I hope they will become steps—in the words 
of my assigned topic—"toward standards for statistical sampling." 
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Discussant's Response to 
Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling 
James W. Kelley 
University of Georgia 
As was expected, Ken Stringer expertly reviewed the brief history of the 
move toward establishing standards for the use of statistical sampling in auditing. 
He has also analyzed the situation and referred to specific proposed standards. 
His analysis and the recommendations have far reaching implications and 
are deserving of our most serious attention and discussion. The purpose of this 
paper is to direct further attention to some of what I hope will prove to be the 
more serious implications of establishing standards. 
Are Standards Needed? 
Several years ago over a hundred of us attended a Professional Development 
Workshop on the use of computers. We spent two full days working on controls 
over commission checks sent to some independent salesmen. Near the end of 
the program one of the most inexperienced men in attendance said with absolute 
innocence, "I don't see why we can't have the salesmen deduct his commission 
as he sends in the order. Then we wouldn't have to send these checks." You 
know, he was right. Over 1500 man hours were spent working on a problem 
that really didn't exist. 
This is not to say we have no problem, but we do hear a lot of conversation 
on what standards are needed and very little on why they are needed. We also 
hear some recommendations about what the standards should say but almost 
nothing can be found about what they will mean. 
Let us remember first, that all statistical theory can do for the auditor is 
state in mathematical terms the risk he is taking by not examining all items. 
Statistical sampling can not tell us what tests are to be performed or what evidence 
need be collected to satisfy the test. It deals only with the sample size. 
It should be understood that the courts have never ruled on the use of 
statistical sampling in auditing. A lawyer friend of mine recently searched the 
reported cases involving accountants and found no references to statistics. There 
was a by-product to this research, however, that surprised me. He found no 
cases where the auditor's sample size was questioned. I understand the attorneys 
of a national accounting firm conducted the same type of study with the same 
results. This suggests that, to date, the courts have not questioned auditors' judg-
ments on sample sizes. While we may properly decide that standards are neces-
sary, there appears to be no overpowering legal reason to do so just now. 
It is argued by some that we need to set standards before someone else does. 
This is a powerful argument, with both rational and, in the light of recent de-
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velopments within the realm of accounting practice, strong emotional appeal. 
This argument would be persuasive even if one feels there is no immediate danger 
of the courts setting guidelines, unless there are good reasons not to have stand-
ards. Are there such reasons? 
Suppose we do establish guidelines (standards) for setting confidence levels 
and precision. Now assume a firm chooses a judgment sample and in retrospect, 
the judgment sample result proves not to meet the statistical standards imposed 
by the guidelines. Would such a firm be held guilty of violating the evidence 
standard? One attorney who reviewed these hypothetical facts is certain they 
would be. 
There are also cases in which firms select sample sizes based on judgment 
but draw random samples. These firms do not statistically evaluate their results, 
but anyone gaining access to their findings clearly could. In those cases, where 
the established standards are not met, there is absolutely no doubt, again in one 
attorney's opinion, that the firm could be successfully accused of failing to comply 
with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. 
Perhaps now is the time to establish standards regarding the size of audit 
samples, but we should recognize that established standards for statistical sampling 
will likely be the benchmark that all samples can be measured against. The 
dilemma here is a real one. If we fail to enact standards for statistical testing 
the courts may well do so. If we do enact them we will, for the first time, give 
the courts a specific basis for questioning all sample sizes. Auditors using statis-
tical sampling will no doubt push hard for standards. Since my bias is with 
them, I cast a somewhat timid vote to proceed. 
Standards for Compliance Tests 
The proposed standard suggests a reliability level of 95% with an upper 
precision limit of 5%. How would such a standard be applied? First we must 
decide 5% of what. Mr. Stringer suggests that compliance tests are performed to 
determine the extent of critical errors affecting the evaluation of the internal 
control aspect being tested. 
Assume we are testing the voucher support for cancelled checks. The system 
calls for a purchase requisition, receiving report and invoice to back up each 
check. How would the standard apply? 
There are many questions we could raise but a few should make the point. 
Will the 5% refer to the number of errors or the dollar amount? Will the 5% 
apply to purchase requisitions if 5% is proper for invoices? How will we account 
for missing documents? 
The questions posed here may not be monumental but they do suggest that 
auditors do not agree on what is being tested and what standard is to be used 
to test compliance. The questions also suggest that auditors will not agree on 
how errors should be defined, let alone what makes an error critical. In short, 
in my judgment, we will not be able to get agreement on any compliance test 
standards in the near future. Since setting a precision standard for compliance 
tests is not necessarily essential, I would hate to see us spin our wheels in these 
largely semantic arguments while more important issues go unattended. 
This position must not be interpreted as opposing the use of statistical sam-
pling in compliance testing, for the opposite is true. The point here is that the 
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profession is not agreed as to what types of tests are needed. Any serious attempt 
to standardize sample sizes in the face of such disagreement will create more 
problems than it will solve. For one thing, it may well keep us from arriving 
at standards relative to substantive tests. Standards for substantive tests are both 
possible and very desirable. 
Relationship of Internal Control to Substantive Tests 
There is general agreement that the extent of the substantive tests is some-
how inversely related to the reliance placed on internal controls. There are 
floating around in published and unpublished articles as well as in private cor-
respondence, mathematical models aimed at measuring this relationship. Mr. 
Stringer presents one in his paper. As he points out, it is annoying but accurate 
that the subjective judgments necessary cannot be quantified precisely. What he 
didn't say was that because they can't be defended they also can not be proven 
wrong. Therefore, many of us, secure in the knowledge that we can be inventive 
but not proven wrong, have bitten into the apple of temptation and developed 
our own models. One of Parkinson's laws surely applies here because the newer 
models are much more mathematically complex. One of the unexplained 
phenomena of our time is our insistent belief that we can improve our assump-
tions by chi-squaring, coefficient variationing or plotting them on a curve. In 
any event the results of these various models turn out to be about the same. 
The problem of precision is easily disposed of. Precision is related to ma-
teriality and since there is always a committee working on a definition of ma-
teriality we can defer further discussion of that topic until their report is avail-
able—or at least until that topic is covered in the program tomorrow. That 
leaves the proper confidence level as the only bone of contention. A 95% level 
usually is the ceiling, based more on economic necessity than on mathematical 
analysis I suspect, but the result is a reasonable one. When we do set standards 
regarding the extent of the substantive tests required, the 95% figure probably 
will be adopted as the maximum needed when internal controls are weak. What 
the level should be when the auditor has maximum faith in internal control is 
harder to agree on. Mr. Stringer's 50% suggestion equals the lowest I've seen, 
but it does not differ enough from the answer obtained using my own un-
sophisticated approach to warrant any further comment. Since Mr. Stringer 
has, as a member, courageously predicted what the Committee on Auditing 
Procedure might do, I'll predict with equal fortitude that the Committee on 
Statistical Sampling could recommend the confidence level at 95% when internal 
controls are not relied on, and around 65% when controls are proven strong. 
(Precision will be related to materiality with materiality remaining undefined.) 
Are Compliance Tests Required? 
The standards of field work require a proper study and evaluation of in-
ternal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the 
resultant extent to which tests of the accounting procedures are to be restricted. 
If the 95% limit is enacted, there will be some interesting ramifications in audit 
strategy. 
The study of internal control is taken to mean that the auditor must familiar-
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ize himself with the workings of the client's system. This study is documented 
by completion of internal control questionnaires, and flow charts or narrative 
descriptions. On completing this study, the auditor must subjectively decide if 
he would rely on the output assuming the system is working as designed. 
He may decide he can not rely on the system's output. The system may be 
improperly designed or management may be able to render the controls ineffec-
tive. If the auditor does not plan to rely on the system, then there is no reason 
for him to determine if the system is working. 
On the other hand, often the auditor senses that the system is capable of 
producing accurate data. In these situations, he must test the system extensively 
enough to satisfy his subjective judgment that the controls are working or are 
not working. 
If the controls are working, he may decrease the substantive tests at a lower 
confidence level. If the controls are not working, he must use a 95% confidence 
level. Now even limited experience using statistical techniques will show that 
proving the controls are working may be very time consuming and expensive. 
When the population error rate is close to the maximum rate acceptable to the 
auditor, extremely large samples are necessary. If the auditor tests attributes and 
sets a maximum error rate of 5% at 95% confidence and the actual error rate is 
4%, a sample size of 1,000 is needed. Thus, we can expect cases where the auditor 
will use less time by increasing his substantive tests than it takes to accumulate 
enough evidence to support reliance on the controls. The auditor in these situa-
tions will recognize that even if the controls could be proven reliable it would 
be wise not to rely on internal control but to expand the year-end work to the 
maximum. 
I do not want to create the impression that reliance on internal control is 
doomed, or even wrong, but the adoption of the above approach will lead people 
to rely on internal controls only when it is expedient to do so. 
While the auditor will still be required to review internal control in the 
sense that he must clearly understand how the client goes about his business, the 
compliance tests will be optional. The tests would only be required when the 
auditor plans to use a confidence level of less than 95% in his substantive testing. 
Such a proposal has caused some eyebrow-lifting among some of my col-
leagues but seems entirely consistent with both the proposed statistical standard 
and generally accepted auditing standards. 
There is one final consideration in the application of this standard that should 
also be mentioned. Even if one agrees that 95% confidence is satisfactory to 
accept a client's representation, he may not agree that 95% confidence is high 
enough to support an adjusting entry. An example here may help. The client 
shows an inventory balance of $95,000. The auditor concludes his tests and 
estimates the inventory balance to be $98,000 with a precision of ± $5,000 at 
95% confidence ($10,000 is considered material). 
The auditor is 95% certain the audited balance would be between $93,000 
and $103,000. He also believes that any balance within that range will result 
in a fair presentation. Since the client's representation is within the range of 
acceptable balances, the auditor in accepting the client's statement will have met 
the standard. 
Now assume another situation in which the auditor estimates the total 
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audited value to be $98,000. Again he is 95% confident that if he audited all 
the items the audited balance would be somewhere between $93,000 and $103,000, 
but in this case the client's balance is $125,000. Clearly the evidence indicates the 
auditor should not accept the client's representation. But what can he do? 
The auditor is left with three alternatives. I am reminded here of Bob 
Uecker's classic work entitled "How to Catch a Knuckle Ball." Chapter I states 
there are three recommended methods of catching a knuckle ball. Chapter II 
says none of them work. The auditor is in a similar position here, but he must 
do something. 
(1) He could return the materials to the client for reworking and resub-
mission. 
(2) He could increase his sample and thus identify more specific misstate-
ments in the client's data. As the client adjusts for those errors discovered, he 
will eventually bring the balance into line. 
(3) He could permit the client to book an adjusting entry to agree the 
account with the statistical evidence. 
In our example, this would mean the client would book an adjusting entry, 
reducing the $125,000 total to one within the acceptable limits. 
Since we accepted the client's balance earlier without relying on the system 
that produced it, it follows we could accept the second balance based on the same 
evidence. This view is consistent with those situations in which clients use 
statistical tests to support their own adjustments. In any case, the proposed 
standards should clearly indicate the extent of the evidence needed to support 
an adjustment as well as to accept a client's representation. 
Summary 
In summary, these suggestions are made: 
(1) No attempt should be made at present to establish confidence level and 
precision statements for compliance tests. 
(2) The standards clearly indicate the options available to the auditor regard-
ing compliance testing. 
(3) A 95% confidence level (precision related to materiality) will meet the 
third standard of field work when internal controls are not relied on. 
(4) A 50%-60% confidence level will suffice when internal controls are 
proved excellent. (Precision again related to materiality.) 
(5) If the client's representation is outside the limits of the auditor's statistical 
estimates, the auditor may accept an adjustment that brings the representation 
within the limits based on the statistical evidence. 
The above suggestions are made assuming there is agreement that the stand-
ards will not jeopardize the position of auditors doing quality work but not using 
statistical techniques. 
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4 
Future Extensions of Audit Services; 
Meeting Investors' Future Needs 
Donald J. Bevis 
Touche Ross & Co. 
In a changing world, the unchanging role of the CPA is to serve the investor. 
Selfishly, the CPA wants to be the prime—even the only—servant of the investor. 
Generously, the CPA wants to serve the investor all the information he may 
need. A little clear thought shows that "only" and "all" are too strong. Yet the 
CPA is and should remain in the forefront of the campaign to provide the 
investor with quality information. 
In our world of very rapid change, the nature of "investor information" is 
changing rapidly. For example, where plant capacity, production costs or sales 
volume were once the key factors, social values may now also be material. Al-
though our role does not change, the data we audit and the scope of the informa-
tion we examine and evaluate must change. 
The Conditions of Change and Growth 
For many centuries, tomorrow and yesterday were very much alike. There 
were few dramatic changes, and they were far between. Always, the frontier 
was a wilderness. There was very little difference, for example, between 1670— 
when the Hudson's Bay Company was formed by a group of venturers and 
adventurers—and 1770 when the colonies began to flex their muscle. In those 
times, yesterday's results were a strong predictor of tomorrow's performance. 
For the investor, the venturer, historical data were very significant. 
Today, the great lament is that change comes so fast. We are unable to 
keep up, to assimilate, to digest. We wonder what will come next from the 
research lab, from the ecologists, from Congress, from the ghetto, via the 
satellite, from the moon, or from 400 fathoms. Something is coming all the 
time. The effect is to compress time, and for the investor, to diminish the sig-
nificance of historical data. More useful data must be sought, in broader fields, 
and with a visionary eye. 
In the days of the Hudson's Bay Company, entrepreneurs banded together 
in joint ventures to capitalize on opportunities in strange, new, faraway places. 
When the venture was completed, the manager called a meeting to report to the 
venturers. Usually his report was oral, and the venturers had an opportunity to 
ask questions and interrogate the venture manager and the exploring team. 
By experience, the investors found that these review meetings were more suc-
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cessful if they brought along their own expert, an experienced businessman who 
had no vested interest in that particular venture, to listen to the manager's 
presentation and to challenge unreasonable assertions. The venturers were in-
terested in the results of the completed voyage, of course; they also needed an 
understanding of management's performance so that they could make reinvest-
ment decisions intelligently. 
From these early beginnings came the auditing profession of today. The 
objective and critical independence which made the auditor valuable to the in-
vesting public during the time of colonial exploration is of even more value 
today. Absentee owners still need an independent, objective, informed opinion 
about their investments. Today, the owner is more detached than ever from the 
activity in which he invests. The detachment of the investor, the complexity of 
business today, and the trend from laissez faire to consumerism have heightened 
the need for reliable decision making information—decision making information 
independently attested. 
As the investing public demanded better decision making information, the 
profession responded. We might argue about how successful the response has 
been, but there should be no argument that the need has been evident, the pro-
fession has recognized the need, and an effort has been made to meet that need. 
We now take it for granted that a publicly-held business will prepare 
an annual financial statement. It has not always been so, however. 
The investing public is demanding more timely information and it's 
clear that interim reporting is taking on additional importance. It's safe 
to predict that eventually quarterly financial statements will be as routine 
as the present annual report. 
Accounting Trends and Techniques now reports that all companies in 
its sample provide sales information. Many in the profession will remem-
ber that the issue of sales disclosure was so controversial that it was 
viewed as the final cut which if insisted upon would alienate the ac-
countants from the business community. Today, however, many com-
panies are experimenting with segmented reporting of sales and profit 
contributions. 
Today, we are grappling with quantifying complexities such as leases 
and option plans. These studies are also controversial, but the investor 
has made it clear that there must be a better way to communicate than 
by complex, obscure footnotes. 
Each new development in public reporting brought with it cries of anguish 
from those who could only see potential dangers. Public pressure, however, has 
overcome that resistance and with the help of the profession, the investor today 
has more reliable, more useful decision making information than ever before. 
But, considering the changing, complex world today, is the investor really 
informed? Does he have more information, relatively, than the venturer who 
invested in the Hudson's Bay Company? 
Public Forecasting Is the Next Step 
It has become increasingly clear that the investing public is dissatisfied with 
simple, historical data. The public is saying that they need more information 
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about the future prospects for a business. Based on past developments in financial 
reporting, it seems safe to predict that the investors will be given what they 
demand. 
It has long been acknowledged that the public investor tends to use the 
classic, historical financial statement as an indication of the company's future 
prospects. The market price of a stock is influenced by many factors, but even 
the most uninitiated investor recognizes that a major influence is a company's 
prospects for future earnings growth. Analysts use the historical financial state-
ments as the basis for their projections, adjusting prior years' performance for 
predicted variations in the economy and the industry. Individual investors follow 
trend lines and tend to make assumptions about the future based on the com-
pany's past performance. But in all too many cases investors find these history-
based trends to be inadequate and turn to rumor and speculation to make their 
decisions about the future. 
The investing public is hungry for profit—and therefore for information 
about a company's prospects. Whether we like it or not, decisions will be made 
based on forecast data. The decisions will be made whether the forecast data are 
reliable or not. 
The SEC had long taken the position that a company may not talk about 
its prospects for the future when it is in registration. However, the SEC is 
taking another look at that policy, and has stated that factual information should 
always be timely given. And in a recent speech, the Chairman of the SEC sug-
gested it might be appropriate to experiment with forecast information in a 
prospectus. The Commission has apparently concluded that the investor should 
have formalized, controlled forecast data rather than relying on street talk. 
In England, the City of London Code requires an accountant's report on 
any projection of operating results included in a takeover or merger proposal. 
John P. Grenside, writing in The Journal of Accountancy, said, "It is indeed 
difficult to see how shareholders can form a judgment as to the value of their 
shares or the merits of the [takeover] offer without this [profit forecast] informa-
tion, particularly when a significant change in a company's fortunes is expected."1 
In a speech before the Chicago Chapter of the Planning Executives Institute 
in January, 1972, Dean Sidney Davidson of the University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business, predicted that within five years publicly held companies 
would be including forecast data with their regular annual reports. Dean David-
son said "It is not a question of if, it is simply a question when and in what form." 
The financial analysts have concluded that public companies must give the 
investing public more information about their prospects—and do it in a more 
structured way. At the Seaview Symposium in November of 1971, the analysts 
expressed their concern that a company avoid surprises in the market place. In 
that context, it was concluded, "Among the participants the analysts seemed 
generally in agreement that public forecasting was an idea whose time had come."2 
The trend seems abundantly clear. The investing public will demand in-
formation about the future potential of their investments and that demand will 
be met. It also seems clear that the profession must anticipate that demand and 
be prepared to meet the public need in the most productive way. 
Forecasting Defined 
Before we pursue this subject further, it will be helpful to define our terms. 
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Forecasting is a broad term, and it encompasses many different levels of predictive 
information—micro and macro, internal and external. Let us agree, for instance, 
that a feasibility study to determine whether to expand the plant or whether to 
buy a component from a supplier or manfacture it ourselves is one form of fore-
cast. Investment analysts estimate earnings per share information for many 
publicly traded companies, and this data too can be considered to be forecast data. 
Some consumer oriented companies publish actual and projected information 
about their industry. For our purposes, these industry projections still can be 
considered forecast data even though the investor must make his own assump-
tions about market share and product costs to convert this broad economic 
information into a measure of a company's operating prospects. Finally, most 
well managed companies prepare a profit plan to guide them in their current 
decisions. That profit plan is technically a budget, but for the purpose of this 
paper, we will consider it to be a part of the family of forecast data. 
Reporting Forecast Data to the Public 
What kind of forecast information should be made available to the investing 
public? Since we are on the threshold of a new accounting concept, perhaps we 
can take a new approach to the kinds of information to be made available. 
Perhaps we can avoid some of the problems we have had with traditional financial 
statements. Traditional historical statements have grown like Topsy; perhaps we 
can anticipate the need for forecasting information and shape its development 
rather than follow its evolution. 
It would be a mistake to insist on one format for forecast data from all 
companies. The kind of information provided should vary, depending on such 
circumstances as the quality of information available, the degree of certainty 
related to the assumptions, and the company's track record. 
The long-established, stable company, such as a public utility, might well 
present comparative earnings information: last year, this year and next year. 
Ideally, such an earnings statement should show last year's projections for the 
current year, this year's actual results, and next year's forecast. This presentation 
would be appropriate for most stable companies because their products are ac-
cepted, they can look to their own sales experience as well as reliable external 
information to forecast volume, and their management experience gives them a 
clearer understanding of their company's volume—cost relationship. 
At the other extreme, a new development company, formed to exploit an 
idea, should not try to provide that kind of comprehensive information. Instead, 
they should make available all reliable component information. What are product 
costs expected to be at various sales levels? What are the results of market re-
search studies? What factors might influence the company's sales success? For 
many companies in the development stage, it would be inappropriate to prepare 
a comprehensive earnings forecast because there are simply too many variables. 
Those variables do not excuse a company from publishing the information it 
has available, however. The investor must recognize that his investment in a 
development stage company carries greater risks than his investment in the 
long-time, stable company. The investor will assemble his own forecast for the 
development company—he is doing so today, but he must be given all of the 
reliable information that is available. 
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In between these two extremes, the stable company and the development 
company, different kinds of presentation will be required. For most companies, 
the single, most important variable in their forecast is product sales. It may be 
appropriate to present several earnings projections based on different sales as-
sumptions, making appropriate cost adjustments because of the different volume 
projections. The text of the forecast should describe the sales assumptions and 
relate them to the company's prior experience and to that predictive information 
which is available about the industry or the economy as a whole. 
In any situation, the assumptions underlying the forecast data must be 
clearly spelled out. Al l significant assumptions should be disclosed; "significant" 
in this context should be related to the significance of the assumptions to the 
reader's understanding of the forecast data and the degree of certainty or risk 
associated with the forecast. 
Auditing a Published Forecast 
It seems apparent that the public investor will demand and will be given 
forecasting information. It also seems apparent that the public will insist on some 
form of attestation on the forecast data. The outside stockholder has felt the 
need of an objective, independent comment on the representations of manage-
ment as expressed in historical financial statements. It seems reasonable to expect 
that management representations about forecast data will become critical to 
investment decisions, and as they increase in importance, independent attestation 
will be required. 
Ijiri says ". . . usefulness of budget disclosure to stockholders and other 
investors is unquestionable. Implementation of budget disclosure must be 
supported by effective budget auditing in order to insure the reliability of the 
budgets."3 
Nurnberg agrees, "It seems apparent that budgets will be published even-
tually . . . and once budgets are published, auditors will be called upon to attest 
to them. The attest function will be extended to budgets as the need for attesta-
tion is demonstrated."4 
Our English counterparts experienced this evolving demand. Originally, 
the City Code required that in any proposed merger or takeover, the directors 
were to prepare forecast information and the accountants were to act as advisors 
and consultants to see that the forecast data was prepared with due care. The 
accountants agreed to report on their study of the forecast data and to make 
their reports available to the City Panel but not to the public stockholders. This 
proved to be an untenable situation: 
The public knew that the accountants had issued a report on the fore-
cast and they were exerting pressure to have that information made 
available. 
Company management took the position that they had paid substantial 
sums to have the auditors participate and they ought to be able to make 
the auditors' report public information. 
If an auditor had some reservation about forecast material prepared by 
a company, he found it very difficult to make his reservations known 
when he was precluded from publishing his report. 
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Mr. Grenside reports, "There were thus obvious and increasing difficulties 
in the application in practice of the Institute's advice that reporting accountants 
should not permit their names to be directly associated with profit forecasts 
and there was pressure for the accountancy bodies to reconsider their position."5 
After much soul searching and negotiation, the accountants and the City au-
thorities agreed that the accountant's report, covering the accounting basis and 
calculations for the forecast, would be published and the accountant would 
formally consent to (or deny) the use of his report in the merger documents. 
The public accounting profession is in a unique position to meet the need 
for audited forecast information. In the area of historical financial reporting, the 
profession has established a reputation for independence and objectivity. The in-
vesting community also accepts as fact that the CPA is a prudent business 
man, an expert in the field of accountancy and reporting and that he has 
thorough understanding of his client's business. These qualities—and the public 
recognition and acceptance of them—are necessary for effective attestation of his-
torical and forecast financial data. 
Standards of Performance—Auditing Forecast Data 
If we accept the fact that the public accounting profession will be a part 
of this new accounting concept—published forecast data—it will be important 
to develop a framework for his participation. As a starting point, let us para-
phrase the ten generally accepted auditing standards and consider how they ap-
ply to the auditing of forecast data. For some of the standards, their application 
will be self-evident and no further comment will be required; for some others we 
must expand our traditional understanding for this new application. 
The General Standards 
The examination is to be performed by experienced CPAs who have 
training in the unique skills required for forecasting. The CPAs will 
conduct their examination with independence and due professional care. 
Clearly the spirit of the General Standards applies to the examination of 
forecast data. The examination should be performed by a proficient CPA: one 
who is trained to gather and evaluate evidential matter; one who is trained to 
evaluate the fairness of presentation; one who is experienced in challenging the 
representations of management. 
It is true, of course, that there are a number of unique skills involved in the 
preparation of a forecast. Companies who do internal forecasting today may use 
the skills of a market researcher, an economist, and an expert in cost behavior 
analysis. The CPA must be expected to be familiar with these unique skills in 
order to evaluate management's forecasting, but it's not necessary that he be a 
specialist in all of these fields. He must understand them so that he can be alert 
to possible misapplication or misuse of the procedures, but he need not have the 
same level of expertise as the specialist in the field any more than he need be a 
specialist in cost accounting, credit and collection, or electronic data processing 
in order to perform his traditional examination of historical financial statements. 
It is understood that the CPA must proceed with an independent mental 
attitude. We're not talking about the independence rule which forbids him from 
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owning stock in his client, although the appearance of independence is certainly 
crucial to the public acceptance of any attestation. When we're talking about 
auditing a forecast, however, we're looking for the kind of independence that 
is demonstrated when a CPA: 
Issues a qualified opinion on historical statements even though he knows 
he is inviting criticism of his prior years' unqualified opinions: 
Insists on a certain accounting treatment because he is convinced it is 
right, even though there may be precedent for an alternative; 
Faces up to a mistake and insists on withdrawal and correction of a 
report which he previously certified; 
Proceeds on the basis that his client is the investing public. 
The Standards of Field Work 
The CPA will review the procedures used by management in preparing 
the forecast data and will gather and evaluate such competent evidential 
matter as is necessary for him to formulate an opinion as to the reason-
ableness of the underlying assumptions and the forecast presentation. 
If we're going to be involved in forecast reporting, we must go beyond the 
compilation stage. If we're to be associated with a forecast, we must be satisfied 
that the assumptions used in preparing the forecast are reasonable. Again, the 
experience of our English friends as reported by Grenside will be helpful: 
. . . the accountants' report is to be published, but it is to be confined 
to the "accounting bases and calculations for the forecast." 
The accountants are, however, required to give their consent to the 
publication of their report. This, in my opinion, imposes on the ac-
countants an obligation to satisfy themselves as to the general reason-
ableness of the forecast itself and the assumptions on which it is based. 
If they are unable to do this, the accountants should qualify their report 
or, as an ultimate resort, withhold their consent to publish.6 
In attesting to the reasonableness of the assumptions used in the forecast, 
the CPA will also have to be satisfied that a thorough job has been done. He 
will have to be satisfied that management has taken all steps that could reasonably 
be expected to search out those factors which might influence the forecast. 
If a CPA is to form an opinion on the reasonableness of the underlying as-
sumptions and the forecast presentation, he must have evidence in support of 
his opinion. It is not possible to anticipate what form the evidence might take 
because the circumstances in each situation will vary. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that the CPA will want to consider: 
published statistics from trade associations 
government information about a market segment 
specific market research studies by the company or outside consultants 
volume—cost studies prepared by the company's accounting unit. 
In some cases, it may be necessary for the CPA to retain an outside con-
sultant to assist him in his evaluations of the evidence. 
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As companies develop experience in public forecasting, good procedures 
will be codified. When a company is able to proceduralize its forecasting proc-
ess, the auditor will be able to review the procedures and will report on their 
reasonableness and their consistent application. It is doubtful whether a new 
company (or one new to forecasting) will have developed a satisfactory set of 
forecasting procedures, and this stage of development will naturally affect the 
CPA's level of satisfaction. The public investor will expect audit comments on 
forecasting procedures, and it is reasonable to assume that he will expect im-
provement from management. 
The Standards of Reporting 
The objective of the CPA's report is to assure the reader that the forecast 
information is the best available under the circumstances and that it is 
presented without bias, but the CPA must disclaim any opinion as to 
the outcome of the forecast. 
In the same way that the presentation of the forecast information should 
vary depending on the circumstances, the attest report on forecast data must not 
be confined to a standard format. Today, audit reports on historical statements 
are either unqualified, qualified, or adverse. The traditional, historical financial 
statement can not be understood in "yes or no" terms, and the profession should 
never have allowed itself to fall into the trap of issuing a boilerplate, "yes or no" 
report. Forecast data is even more complex than traditional financial statements, 
and the attest report on forecast data must be written in such a way that the 
reader will read the report, evaluate all of the CPA's comments, and understand 
what he is trying to say. For instance, the CPA must be able to say, if necessary, 
that there is insufficient data available to form an opinion, without leaving an 
implication that management has been derelict in its duty. There will be many 
straight-forward, clearly legitimate situations where there will be inadequate 
data. The investing public must be able to understand the report, understand 
the nature of the risk, and act accordingly. 
Each report on a forecast engagement must be a special report, written for 
the unique engagement. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the key elements 
required in any such report: 
Identification of the data covered by the report 
Statement of the purpose of the forecast 
Reference to the underlying assumptions and an opinion on their rea-
sonableness. (If certain assumptions are not evaluable, a statement to 
that effect) 
A disclaimer as to responsibility for the ultimate attainment of the pro-
jected results 
For example, a forecast report on a real estate tax shelter program might take the 
following form: 
The accompanying forecast financial statements of XYZ Properties (a 
limited partnership) for the years 1970 through 1990, shown on pages 
2 through 6, were prepared to provide estimates of cash inflow from 
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partners' investments, net cash flow returned to partners, and tax 
consequences of projected operations to individual partners in selected 
income tax brackets. The forecast statements have been prepared using 
the assumptions and rationale set forth on pages 7 through 11. 
We have reviewed the assumptions and rationale underlying the fore-
cast financial statements. We believe these assumptions and rationale 
are reasonable and appropriate for the purpose of this forecast. 
Since forecasts are based on assumptions about circumstances and events 
that have not yet taken place, they are subject to the variations that 
may arise as future operations actually occur. Accordingly, we cannot 
give assurance that the predicted results will actually be attained. 
If the CPA has not been able to find support for the key assumptions underlying 
the forecast report he might use the following words: 
The accompanying statement of projected operations of the ABC Com-
pany (proposed to be formed) for the year ending June 30, 1972 was 
prepared on the basis of the assumptions and rationale as set forth on 
pages 3 through 8, to estimate what net income might be if the com-
pany were to produce a certain new line of children's toys. 
We have reviewed the assumptions and rationable underlying the state-
ment of projected operations. Since there is no similar line of toys 
presently on the market and no marketing research has been conducted, 
we are unable to evaluate the reasonableness of the assumptions relating 
to unit volume and selling prices. All other assumptions appear reason-
able and appropriate for the purpose of this projection, but since their 
application to the statement of projected operations is, in most cases, 
directly related to unit volume, the reliability of their application depends 
on the accuracy of the unit volume assumption. 
These projections are based on assumptions about future circumstances 
and events. We do not know the future and we cannot give assurance 
that the projected results will actually be attained. 
It should be understood that the CPA would insist on disclosure of material con-
flicting evidence, or if he should conclude that the forecast data is misleading, 
he would withdraw from the engagement. 
Forward Work 
The issue is not whether forecast material will be provided to the users of 
financial statements, but what form will the forecast report take. The question 
is not whether CPAs will be asked to comment on the forecast data, but what 
must be done to be able to comment intelligently. There is a great deal of re-
search to be done, and judging by the momentum behind the idea, there may 
not be much time. There are three specific areas which should be explored care-
fully in practice and in the literature: 
We must understand how the public will use forecast data when it is 
provided to them in an organized way. 
We must develop the principles to be followed in presenting forecast data. 
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We must study the question of a common body of knowledge for those 
who will work in forecasting, and bring the profession up to speed. 
But What About— 
There are those who say that the legal liability aspects of reporting on fore-
cast data are so great that we can't afford to be involved. There are those who 
say that the investor will lose confidence in the auditor's attestation on historical 
statements when some of the forecast data we attest to prove to be only a rea-
sonable man's best efforts. However, George O. May put it very well when he 
said, "Preoccupation with the importance of not misleading investors has ob-
scured the desirability of enlightening them."7 
Numbers Aren't Enough—How about Management's Performance 
A CPA engaged for an examination of public forecast data finds himself in 
familiar territory—he will be evaluating and reporting on financial data. It has 
been suggested, however, than an analysis of data, historical or prospective, is a 
superficial way to comprehend an enterprise. It has been suggested that the 
only way to understand a company's prospects for the future is to understand 
management's ability to manage. 
Within the profession there is considerable interest and debate about whether 
or not the CPA can appropriately give an evaluation of management. The major 
objections seem to be: 
there are no standards for measurement of management performance. 
people (management) change, conceivably rapidly, and they all have 
their "good" periods and "bad" periods. 
It seems fair, however, to point out that it took a while to develop a base of 
generally accepted auditing standards, and certainly there is more to be done in 
the basic audit area where we feel so comfortable. You will recall that CPAs 
were attesting to financial statements before today's auditing standards were 
articulated. If the profession were not continually evolving, we would not be 
discussing in this symposium "Where do we go from here?" 
The Hudson's Bay venturers never went exploring but they had first hand 
contact with their agents who did. At the completion of a voyage they had the 
opportunity to sign up for the next trip or look elsewhere for investment po-
tential. They made their decision based on their experience and on their first-
hand appraisal of management's skills. Today, can the investor make an intelli-
gent appraisal of management skills? He can do so only on the basis of the 
company's historical performance. Tomorrow we may be able to evaluate man-
agement's ability based on their performance against a forecast. Doesn't the 
investor need—can't he be given—a more direct appraisal? 
What Is a Management Evaluation? 
Semantics give us a problem. If we are evaluating management, we are 
probably talking about people. If we are evaluating management systems, we are 
covering both people and their adopted systems in a given area. If we are 
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evaluating management performance, we must consider how the people per-
formed against their systems, which also must be evaluated in terms of external 
standards. 
We should not attempt to evaluate management except in the broadest 
terms—management performance. While doing less may seem to be a conserva-
tive extension of the attest function, there is a probability that stopping short is 
a most dangerous posture. Partial consideration of a given subject by the CPA, 
a professional expected (in the information user's subjective view) to assure full 
disclosure, will leave an implication that what is not said is satisfactory. 
Where to Begin 
Let us examine our recent efforts on reporting on internal control (State-
ment on Auditing Procedure No. 49). This pronouncement resulted because 
CPAs were already attesting to the adequacy of internal controls. The degrees 
varied, of course, from simple specification of weaknesses, to negative assurance, 
to a positive opinion on adequacy. The AICPA Committee on Auditing Pro-
cedure had planned to develop an SAP on the substance of internal control and 
the related auditor's approach, but contemporary pressures required attention to 
the visible problem of reporting. The result: a long, but informative, report 
cautioning the reader about the difficulties of measurement and concluding with 
what amounts to a form of negative assurance. The reception to SAP 49 has not 
been uniformly laudatory, particularly by government agencies, some of which 
suggest that it is a cutback in auditing as well as in responsibility assumed by 
the CPA. Change may be required in SAP 49, but when is change not required 
on the path of progress? 
The formal entry into reporting on internal control is but a few steps removed 
from evaluations of management performance. If we admit that the system of 
internal accounting controls can be evaluated, then we will have to agree that 
administrative controls are similarly situated, given standards and a competent 
examiner. If we can address ourselves to the entire system of internal control, 
accounting and administrative, we should be able to evaluate the system as well 
as management's performance within it. 
The Critical Factors 
The issues of standards of evaluation and the competence of the evaluator 
are critical, of course. John L. Carey, in The CPA Plans for the Future, lists a 
number of possible quantitative criteria; perhaps those in which public interest 
was high at the time. Surely the list can be adjusted if the profession is willing 
to invest in the effort needed to articulate preliminary performance standards, 
both social and profit oriented. And there should be no misconception that there 
can ever be a standard for every situation. We do not have this now. A good 
example is the debate over whether non-arm's length transactions require no 
disclosure, full disclosure, or full disclosure with evaluation of the terms of the 
transactions—yet we continue attesting to historical financial statements none-
theless. 
If we tell our attest users what we are attesting to in the area of management 
performance, the users will let us know what changes they want made. And the 
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standards will evolve in any event, through continuous consideration by the 
profession. 
What about the CPA's competence? The major assets of the CPA are his 
independence, his objectivity and a thorough knowledge of his client. Even if 
specially engaged to evaluate management performance, the CPA has the knowl-
edge of how to go about investigating the whole of the business, because of his 
usual audit approach. The use of experts from other disciplines is already com-
mon in financial auditing, particularly when major uncertainties seem to exist. 
There is every reason to believe this use can expand to accommodate the new 
criteria needing evaluation. The auditing profession will be far better off attest-
ing to management performance under its own guidelines than being required 
to consider, as in historical financial auditing, performance criteria which will 
surely be created outside the profession. 
Professors Langenderfer and Robertson believe it is feasible to perform 
independent management auditing.8 Their hypotheses are considered in parallel 
to financial auditing postulates,9 and they believe that the same philosophy covers 
both financial and management auditing. Their position would make a good 
starting point for serious consideration of the CPA's role in this area. 
Conclusion 
Historical financial information has value to an investor—to a limited 
degree because it is history, but more so because it has been an indicator of the 
future. Because of the rapid rate of change, the value of historical data as an 
indicator of the future has diminished. The investor needs and will somehow 
find other indicators of future performance. It is our responsibility to see that 
the investor has the best possible information. If we are to meet our time 
honored responsibilities in the future we must move beyond traditional practice 
and into the frontiers of forecasting and management evaluation. Like the 
voyagers of old, we must take the risk so that we may thereby best serve the 
needs of the public. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Future Extensions of Audit Services; 
Meeting Investors' Future Needs 
John C. Burton 
Columbia University 
Historically, when I have been asked to comment on the observations of a 
leading member of the public accounting profession I have been in the position 
of saying, "Go faster; look at the potential benefits of innovation rather than 
emphasizing the costs and dangers." After reading Don Bevis' paper, I am 
happy to be able to say "three cheers!" It may even be that some of my remarks 
might be interpreted as urging deliberate rather than precipitous speed toward 
some of his well articulated objectives. 
Two Principal Extensions 
The paper develops two principal extensions of the attest function: reporting 
on forecasts and reporting on management performance. I concur that both are 
logical and needed. It has long been my view that the current short form report 
which is the auditor's principal public output represents an enormous public under-
utilization of the competence of the highly talented professionals who perform 
audits. To render a standard report, substantial economic and human investments 
must be made which could logically lead to far greater and more useful public 
output than two standard paragraphs. This is not to belittle the importance of 
the attest function today, since I believe it is one of the underpinnings of our 
capital markets and corporate system, but simply to call attention to the oppor-
tunity costs which exist. 
The paper devotes far more space to the subject of forecasting, and it develops 
the subject in an interesting and thoughtful manner. The discussion of auditing 
standards applied to forecast data and the illustration of possible audit reports 
on forecasts are significant contributions. They go far to indicate the conceptual 
feasibility of this extension of auditing within the broad framework of auditing 
standards today. 
The second major extension discussed in the paper suggests an auditor's 
report on management performance, but the topic is only considered superficially. 
The author asserts his faith in the CPA's competence to undertake the task of 
evaluating management, and he incorporates by reference the article by Langen-
derfer and Robertson on the theoretical structure for such audits, but he does 
not offer any significant new insights of his own. While the fact that he supports 
such an extension of the auditor's function is in itself significant, one might 
have hoped for the same kind of new insights as to how this might be done as 
are found in the discussion on audits of forecasts. 
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Since I support fully the concepts advanced in this paper and because I 
largely applaud the way in which the author develops them, the rest of my 
comments will be devoted to some supplemental views on the topics advanced 
rather than specific comments relating to the paper. 
Forecasts 
The subject of forecasts has received great attention of late, both because 
of demands by investors and because of an apparent prospective change in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission's historical opposition to the public dis-
closure of forecasts in registration statements and other documents filed with the 
Commission. I concur with the conclusion in the paper that something is going 
to happen in the near future and it is important to make every effort to assure 
that it is the right thing. 
The need for forecast data is a reflection of the fact that business is a con-
tinuum which cannot be adequately described by looking simply at history. Tra-
ditionally, history was valued for its objectivity and because it served as a basis 
for prediction. Recent developments have indicated that both of these qualities 
have perhaps been excessively attributed to financial statements to the detriment 
of users who accepted them on faith. Financial statements already contain many 
explicit forecasts, and in the face of the uncertainties of the future, it may be that 
our traditional single-valued format is obsolete. In addition, as Bevis points out, 
the world is now changing so rapidly that the predictive power of historical data 
is also being eroded. 
An appropriate response to these developments is to expand the availability 
of future expectations which are being used by management to run the business, 
as well as possibly to adjust the traditional accounting model for "historical" 
financial statements. It is important, however, that in doing this, we do not 
create even in the short run a childlike faith on the part of users of financial 
statements in the forecasts which are presented. This means we must identify 
the uncertainties which exist and distinguish between history and projection 
both in forecast data and in standard financial statements. 
A first step in this process would be clearly distinguishing in format between 
historical data and forecasts. I am troubled by Bevis' suggestion that for a stable 
business we could show "last year-this year-next year" data in simple columnar 
form. It would seem more desirable to make the "next year" data quite different 
in format. Perhaps we should use ranges or sensitivity analyses which analyze 
the relationships between data and identify the crucial variables which will affect 
the operations of the business in the future. It should not be the job of the 
Company or the auditor to furnish a simple crutch for the analyst such as next 
year's earnings per share. Rather, information about the business continuum— 
past, present and future—should be supplied in a variety of formats appropriate 
to the information being communicated so that improved allocation of resources 
in the economy can take place. 
The public accountant's role in this process is twofold. First, he must be a 
reporting consultant who can effectively discuss with the company the types 
of disclosure which would be appropriate in particular circumstances. This will 
not simply represent the performance of a truth ritual; it will require long and 
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hard work to establish criteria for various kinds of data and then probably the 
application of personal judgment to many ad-hoc problems. 
Second, the auditor must add reliability to the forecast data which is re-
ported to the public. Here he must play the role of the objective, dispassionate 
professional. He must understand what represents good current forecasting 
techniques and decide whether they are in use in a particular firm. He must 
appraise assumptions. While he may today possess many of the skills necessary 
in this area, a significant increment will be required and must be developed 
within the profession if this function is to be performed. 
There are several other problems in this extension of the audit function which 
must be considered and acted upon. The question of liability for error is a 
major one. In some fashion this must be defined. In addition, we must deal 
with the problems of self-fulfilling prophecies in forecasting. One of the major 
arguments against presenting next year's income statement is that the fact of 
public presentation will bias the subsequent actual figures in the direction of the 
forecast. If the same auditor reports on both, the problem is made more acute, 
although both forecast and historical data are part of the information system 
under audit. With sufficient quality controls in the firm, a rotation of staff and 
other increases in professionalism, these problems may be overcome. 
Evaluation of Management 
The extension of the attest function to the evaluation of management is in 
some ways more frightening and in others more familiar than its extension in 
the forecast area. Auditors have appraised internal control for many years, even 
though few public reports have been issued thereon and few probably will be 
until SAP 49 is revised. Nevertheless, appraisal of a control system in the largest 
sense is a form of management appraisal. The review of the system does not 
complete the appraisal of management but it is a starting point. 
Another step may be associated with the audit of forecasts. Management 
itself has long used the analysis of the variances that arise between actual and 
forecast data as a means of appraising subordinates, and the same general approach 
may be applied to the top management by an outsider such as an auditor or 
analyst. The CPA might, for example, express an opinion as to the fairness of 
a company's description of the reasons for variances between historical and fore-
cast data. This would leave the decision as to whether the variance was a man-
agement deficiency or a chance fluctuation up to the user of the statement. 
It may well be that the evaluation of management will take the form of a 
number of specific attestations such as the ones relating to control and the ex-
planation of variances just referred to. It seems unlikely that a single overall ap-
praisal could be effectively presented until standards have been developed, and 
there are few signs that such development is imminent. A piecemeal approach 
therefore seems more likely. This is not inconsistent with the ideas expressed 
by Bevis, although he does not explicitly predict development in this fashion. 
Summary 
In the final analysis, I can only agree with and cheer for Don Bevis' forecast 
as to the extension of the attest function, even if I cannot as a CPA ethically 
associate my name with it in a manner which may lead to the belief that I vouch 
for its achievability. 
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5 
Toward Standards for Materiality(?) 
William Holmes 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
The term "materiality" in accounting and auditing literature is variously 
used in relation to misrepresentation, disclosure, segregation of extraordinary 
items, and audit requirements. The original use in accounting was in relation 
to misrepresentation and disclosure. If we can concentrate on these aspects of 
materiality, I believe the findings will apply equally well to the remaining aspects. 
This is the approach that has been adopted throughout this paper. 
Some History of Materiality 
In an artictle I recently wrote for the February, 1972 Journal of Accountancy, 
entitled "Materiality Through the Looking Glass," I traced the history of the 
use of the term materiality in American accounting and quoted examples to show 
that the concept was already well established in the early 1900's. I pointed out 
that the English Chartered Accountants who arrived in the 1880's and 1890's 
had brought the concept with them, and I showed that the concept was inherent 
in the provisions of the early British Companies Acts. I quoted the definition of 
Lord Davey's committee relative to an 1895 updating of these acts that— 
Every contract or fact is material which would influence the judgment 
of a prudent investor in determining whether he would subscribe for the 
shares or debentures offered by the prospectus.1 
The article pointed out that this type of definition was merely the old com-
mon law doctrine governing cases of misrepresentation and deceit applied to the 
sale of securities, and Oliver Wendell Holmes was quoted to show that the 
American Common Law paralleled the English Common Law in this respect. 
The article also reviewed the accounting literature in America on the 
subject of materiality, pointing out that the earliest articles on the subject date 
from the 1930's. I surmised that prior to the 1930s accountants generally re-
garded the term in its legal context; as something for the courts to interpret and 
not something over which accountants could claim jurisdiction. 
The term materiality was increasingly used in "official" accounting literature 
beginning with the 1930's. An "official" definition from the Securities Acts was 
incorporated in the S-X Regulations published in 1940, and the term was also 
used extensively in the early Bulletins of the American Institute. Despite this, 
writers in the 1930's and 1940's still seem to have regarded the concept as a 
child of law and only a foster child of accounting and asked for, at most, "a part in 
any final determination of its meaning." 
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The Search for Standards 
Since the early 1950's a different mood predominates—a search for standards, 
and a growing conviction that the accounting profession should be the one to 
establish such standards. This "positivist" attitude has been best represented in 
the writings of Sam Woolsey and Leopold Bernstein, who believed "standards," 
"official guidelines," and "border zones" should be established, and established 
by accountants. In my earlier article I discussed this matter briefly in the light 
of recent court decisions and articles by non-accountants and suggested that it 
would be extremely difficult to establish meaningful standards which would 
embrace "all the circumstances"—to quote the judge in the BarChris case. Robert 
H . Montgomery recognized the problem succinctly in his 1940 sixth edition, 
which took account of the impact of the Securities Acts, when he said— 
The auditor who examines a balance sheet to be included in a registra-
tion statement must decide for himself what the mental processes of the 
"average prudent investor" might be!2 (The final punctuation is ex-
pressive.) 
As I see it, the chief difficulty in establishing standards for materiality lies 
with the common law doctrines of "influence" or "reliance." To quote Oliver 
Wendell Holmes again— 
It is said that a fraudulent representation must be material to have that 
effect. But how are we to decide whether it is material or not? It must 
be by an appeal to ordinary experience to decide whether a belief that 
the fact was as represented would naturally have led to, or a contrary 
belief would naturally have prevented, the making of the contract.3 
(Emphasis added) 
The more modern Restatement of Torts says much the same thing. 
A fact is material if its existence or non-existence is a matter to which 
a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his course 
of action in the transaction. (Emphasis added) 
So we see that in the common law it is not so much the nature or extent of the 
"fact" as the influence it had on the mind of a reasonable man in the particular 
transaction, and, to quote the judge in BarChris, ". . . in the light of all the 
circumstances." 
Professor Louis Loss comments that many of the Blue Sky Laws carry for-
ward the common law concept. With respect to the New York law, he says— 
The offense is committed by material misrepresentation intended to 
influence the bargain, although they may be due to negligence rather 
than dishonesty.4 (Emphasis added) 
The Securities Acts, where they apply, introduced a different doctrine in 
that reliance on the misrepresentation is not always necessary—for instance under 
Section 12(2). This may explain the different emphasis of the SEC definition 
which— 
. . . limits the information required to those matters as to which an 
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before pur-
chasing the securities.5 (Emphasis added) 
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I do not know whether the words "before purchasing the securities" carry 
with them the thought of influence and reliability. However, if it is argued 
that materiality has a different meaning under the Securities Acts than under 
common law or under respective Blue Sky laws, the problem of setting standards 
becomes doubly difficult. Presumably then materiality would mean one thing 
for a large private placement of bonds and another for a public sale of common 
stock under the SEC. 
To quote Louis Loss again— 
Inevitably, to be sure, some element of reliance is inherent in the concept 
of materiality.6 
So we see that the concepts of "reliance" and "influence" coupled with the 
requirement to look at "all the circumstances" lie at the heart of difficulties in 
any attempt to establish accounting standards for materiality. The weight of the 
accounting data as against the weight of other factors will vary case by case and 
an accounting misrepresentation that would be material in one situation may 
well not be material in another. The factors are entirely relative rather than 
absolute. One wonders whether this dichotomy between relative and absolute 
values could be at the heart of the disagreement between the Company and its 
auditors on the one hand and the SEC on the other hand in the Occidental 
Petroleum matter where, based on the figures given in the Wall Street Journal 
report, the distortion of net income amounted to $8.9 million out of a total of 
$174.8 million. We noted above the different emphasis of the SEC definition 
of materiality. 
My own opinion is that if we accept the term materiality with all its 
attendant legal nuances—and I see no alternative to doing so—it becomes im-
practical to establish purely accounting standards for the term. I would suggest, 
however, a practical alternative. 
A Practical Alternative: Significant Distortion 
The auditor's "certificate" states that the financial statements are fairly 
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. We have 
no professional definition for the word "fairness," but it would seem to me to 
be more of an intrinsic attribute of the financial statements themselves and less 
dependent on the many factors involved in the term materiality. If we accept 
this for the moment, we might establish standards to measure the point at 
which financial statements per se might cease to be "fair"—a standard of "sig-
nificant distortion" if I may coin a phrase. For instance, we might decide that 
any distortion in the balance sheet in excess of say five per cent of total assets 
would be "significant distortion" of the balance sheet, irrespective of the effect 
in a particular instance on the average prudent investor. The income statement, 
of course, poses more problems since the standard would have to embrace com-
panies with regular income, companies with cyclical income, and companies with 
a pattern of negligible income. It might be better to relate such a standard to a 
theoretical income necessary to provide "normal" return on investment. To 
cancel the effect of variations in debt/equity ratio as between companies it might 
be advisable to measure the return on a base of total assets less current liabilities. 
However, my purpose here is not to offer solutions as to how the standard would 
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be defined but merely to set the stage. If we adopted such standards we could 
then require disclosure action or qualification of the auditor's opinion for distor-
tion in excess of such standard—even if materiality indicated a higher level. For 
instance, turning again to BarChris, the 15.7 per cent difference in net income 
might be "significant distortion" even although the judge ruled it was not material. 
When materiality considerations suggested a factor lower than the "sig-
nificant distortion" factor, the lower measure would take effect—a rule of 
"lower of materiality or standard significant distortion factor." For example, 
suppose we establish a 10 per cent factor for the income statement, and in a 
particular case the company is on the verge of breaking through a "times interest" 
coverage factor affecting its bondholders where a 5 per cent change in income 
would spell the difference between interest covered and interest not covered. In 
this case the 10 per cent standard distortion factor might have to give way to 
the 5 per cent materiality factor. 
It is fairly obvious that in those cases where the accounting misrepresentation 
is the only factor involved which would influence the investor—i.e., ignoring 
completely such things as nature of industry, size of company, history of stock 
prices, changes in management, announcement of technology breakthrough, 
acquisition of significant patents, discovery of new resources, environmental prob-
lems, the state of the national economy, and the international financial scene, 
etc. etc.—then, ignoring all of these except the accounting data, 
Materiality = Significant Distortion 
This is the problem in evaluating the possibility of establishing materiality 
standards from research studies based on case examples, such as those used by 
Professor Woolsey in 1954. The responses were answers primarily to levels of sig-
nificant distortion rather than to real life problems in materiality. 
It is for this reason, also, that I do not like the latest (1968) English Institute 
pronouncement that, "In an accounting sense a matter is material if its nondis-
closure, misstatement or omission would be likely to distort the view given by 
the accounts or other statement under consideration."7 I don't believe the term 
materiality can be limited to "in an accounting sense." It may be said that any 
decision by an accountant as to materiality in a particular case is always correct 
short of a court of law. If the decision isn't challenged, then at least pragmatically, 
the decision was a good one. The court will not limit its judgment to matters 
"in an accounting sense." I believe the English Institute was seeking to isolate 
the accounting misrepresentation in the manner I have suggested above and might 
have solved the problem by recognizing this as "significant distortion" rather 
than materiality. The English common law and the various Companies Acts 
have always followed the "reliance" concept with its attendant "in the light of 
all the circumstances," and I do not believe the Institute's latest definition is 
meaningful since it obviously seeks to establish a concept of materiality based 
purely on the accounting data. 
Distinguishing Materiality and Significant Distortion 
It may be suggested that the above arguments amount to no more than 
splitting hairs on a matter of semantics. This may be so, but they are hairs of 
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some importance and this distinction between materiality and significance is 
somewhat overdue. In 1959 Carman Blough was saying— 
Possibly these (reasonably informative disclosures; materiality; and 
significance) are terms which defy definition . . . 8 
and the need for the distinction is noticeable in paragraph .11 of the General 
section of the Current Text of APB Accounting Principles, which states— 
The committee contemplates that its opinions will have application 
only to items material and significant in the relative circumstances.9 
(Emphasis added) 
As things stand today I am not sure what distinction between the terms the 
committee had in mind. 
An interesting situation related to this matter of semantics is evident in 
looking at the evolution of the present AICPA ethics rule governing misrepre-
sentation. The earliest rule in 1917 used the word "essential," and in 1923 this 
was changed to "essential and material" with respect to misrepresentation for 
which disciplinary action could be taken. However, in both cases the rule was left 
in the broad concept of looking beyond the financial statements in measuring ma-
teriality. The 1941 version of Rule 5, which has been readopted as Article 2.02 
of the 1965 amendment, reads as follows: 
In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements which 
he has examined, a member or an associate shall be held guilty of an act 
discreditable to the profession if— 
(a) He fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not dis-
closed in the financial statements but disclosure of which is neces-
sary to make the financial statements not misleading (emphasis 
added) 
(b) He fails to report any material misstatement known to him to 
appear in the financial statements 
(c) Etc., etc. 
It should be noted that paragraph (a) is aimed at the financial statements 
themselves; paragraph (b) leaves the concept open for the concept of influencing 
the investor. Paragraph (a) is "significant distortion;" paragraph (b) is 
"materiality." 
Proprietary Considerations 
I believe we must take note of the legal origin of the term materiality. I 
have pointed out before that frequent use of the term in accounting literature 
does not establish for accountants a proprietary right to the term. The courts 
would still try us subject to the legal concept of materiality if we had never 
mentioned the word in accounting literature. Nor do I believe the courts would 
be overly impressed with any standards we might adopt which looked only to 
accounting data. 
On the other hand the word significant is ours to do with what we will— 
despite some use of the term in SEC literature. We can have significance "in 
an accounting sense" and can set standards of significance if that seems desirable. 
However, as I have pointed out above, the adoption of such standards does not 
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absolve us from making a judgment also in each instance as to whether "in the 
light of all the circumstances" materiality might not suggest a lower factor. 
The question remains, if we adopt standards of significance, how do we 
police our standards? For instance, how would we deal with those cases where 
the courts rule that the "significant distortion factor" in a particular instance was 
not material? This is not an easy matter to decide. However, the present ethics 
rule with respect to mispresentation of material facts must be even more difficult 
to apply until some court has made a decision. How, for instance, would the 
Ethics Committee rule on the facts presented in Occidental Petroleum short of a 
decision in the courts? It would obviously ease the problem somewhat if their 
decision in a particular case was based only on the accounting data without the 
need to examine "all the circumstances." It would seem to me, moreover, that 
a judge would find a "standard of significant distortion" set by the accounting 
profession a useful starting point in arriving at his decision in a matter involving 
materiality. Here would be one factor quantified for him which he could weigh 
against other factors in arriving at his decision. 
Conclusions 
Adopting a standard of significant distortion does not do away with the 
problem of materiality, particularly where other factors indicate a lower level of 
concern. I have stated that I do not believe we can "standardize" the measure 
of such other factors. How, then, will the accountant deal with this problem? 
The first thing is for the accountant to recognize the problem exists. I will 
repeat a quote from an article written by Martin J . Whitman and Martin Shubik 
in The Financial Executive, May 1971, which takes issue with the importance at-
tached to net income by accountants as a factor in determining or influencing 
stock market values: 
The accountants, the regulatory authorities, and the so-called funda-
mentalists have taken a limited tool of analysis which is useful for ap-
praising large, stable public utilities which enjoy little, or no, tax shelter; 
which reinvest virtually all their retained earnings in their own in-
dustry; and whose common stockholders tend to be non-speculative and 
dividend-income conscious; and they have assumed that this is either 
the appropriate tool of analysis for almost all investor owned companies 
or that everyone else thinks that it is an appropriate tool of analysis. 
Many of us can remember the late 1950's when certain textile companies 
with reasonable earnings were selling below book value so that management 
found it advantageous to buy publicly traded stock into the Treasury to improve 
earnings per share. The relationship between earnings and market value was 
less than sensitive. The same can be said for many "start-up" ventures, the 
cable-T.V. companies being an excellent example in the first four or five years 
of their existence, when they are building their base load connections. At the 
other end of the scale are the established "high-flyers" where the market has 
discounted the future on the basis of an annualized coumpounded rate of growth. 
The stocks of such companies are significantly more sensitive to any failure to 
meet the expected earnings. I believe the accountant must make some evaluation 
of these investor behavioral patterns in assessing a materiality—as distinct from 
"significant distortion"—decision. 
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The example I cited earlier with respect to "times interest coverage" with 
respect to utility bonds suggests another area of sensitivity where contractual 
clauses of debt agreements impose restrictions of one kind or another on addi-
tional borrowing powers, freedom to pay dividends, etc. In marginal situations 
such restrictions may well influence a materiality decision. The accountant can 
surely be cognizant of these factors as they arise. I have attached as an Appendix 
a few additional examples to bring out the scope of the problem. 
The examples above, however, do not cover the whole field. Consider the 
effect of discovery of new oil or gas resources (Alaska), the impact of sudden 
new technology that makes existing plants obsolete (coke-oven gas when natural 
gas lines expanded), action of foreign governments (the copper companies), and 
so on. The items mentioned had such impact on investors that they superseded 
the reported earnings as a factor influencing investor behavior, sometimes over 
a period of years. 
My rule of "lower of the standard distortion factor or materiality factor" 
simplifies the problem by at least 50 per cent. The accountant need only concern 
himself with the situation where the materiality factor is lower—not higher— 
than the distortion factor. That is, the accounting data must be more important 
than usual and, as influencing the investor, these situations are usually within 
the ken of the accountant. 
And what of the other 50 per cent? I believe we have a way to go before 
we can come close to standardizing that. Much of stock market response is 
still pure Barnum & Bailey, a circus where W. C. Fields rates equal time with 
Graham & Dodd. I will close with the same paragraph I used to close my 
earlier article. 
By all means let us continue to discuss, dispute, dissect, deplore, and gen-
erally "look before and after and pine for what is not" in this matter of materiality. 
My personal opinion is that we must widen our understanding and narrow our 
judgments—short of official standards. 
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Appendix 
Some Interesting Examples Showing Problems in Determining 
Materiality Purely in Terms of Financial Statements 
Cases relatively insensitive to present earnings: 
From Newsweek—March 6, 1972: 
(a) Curtis Wright has doubled in price since January 1 and in one week 
alone nearly 30% of its shares were traded—all because the com-
pany hold limited North American rights to the Wankel engine, 
and on the fragile theory that the major automakers may turn to 
the Wankel and suddenly transform Curtis-Wright, one of the 
market's perennial laggards, into a hot property. 
(b) Cartridge Television, Inc. 
At current prices the stock market was saying the company was 
worth close to $75 million. Yet Cartridge T.V. not only hasn't 
made any profits, it isn't even scheduled to make its first sale until 
this month. But the company's story is that it hopes to cash in on 
a long-time dream—a massive consumer market for video recorders 
and video cassette players. 
Cases particularly sensitive to earnings: 
From Newsweek—July 26, 1971: 
When IBM reported that its second-quarter net was unchanged from a 
year ago at $2.22 a share—and added that the outlook for the rest of 
the year wasn't exciting—investors stampeded for the exit. The stock 
slumped 13 points in a single day, continued to drift lower and finally 
closed the week at $294-1/2 vs. the 1971 high of almost $366. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Toward Standards for Materiality(?) 
Sam M. Woolsey 
University of Houston 
Mr. Holmes has prepared a very interesting and thought provoking paper 
on this elusive problem of materiality. As discussant it is my intention to rein-
force and stress the importance of many of his points as they affect the accounting 
profession. A few of my own concepts on how to handle the problem will be 
given, either as a modification or an addition to his other comments and 
conclusions. 
Various Meanings of Materiality 
Mr. Holmes' references to legal opinions and interpretations given by 
regulatory bodies have brought out different shades of meaning associated with 
the word "material." Materiality, as it is used in the narrow sense, relates to 
the correct recording and reporting of accounting data. Mr. Holmes points out 
that for a statement to be considered "fair" it must be free of "significant dis-
tortion." This concept says that if a statement contains significant accounting 
errors, it should be corrected regardless of the surrounding circumstances and 
without the necessity of being concerned whether or not the error is large enough 
to influence the action of the "average prudent investor." 
Materiality, in its broadest sense, is related to whether or not the item in 
question (e.g., the existence of an error) will likely influence the thoughts and 
actions of the reader when considered under the surrounding circumstances. 
There may or may not be significant distortion. 
I believe that the profession should recognize the difference between the 
two meanings of materiality (significant distortion and materiality) and that, 
as Mr. Holmes suggests, the terms "significant distortion factor" and "materiality 
factor" could be used to identify them. His suggested rule of "lower of standard 
distortion factor or materiality factor" may become generally accepted by the 
profession. 
Setting Standards 
In response to the problem of whether the profession can set standards for 
judging significant distortion and/or materiality, Mr. Holmes implies that it 
might be possible to establish standards for the former. But he says, "It may 
be said that any decision by an accountant as to materiality in a particular case 
is always correct short of a court of law." It is hard to believe that a materiality 
decision is correct just because it has not been challenged and settled in court. 
If so, how do we explain the situation where one qualified accountant, after 
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giving consideration to all surrounding circumstances says an item is material 
while an equally qualified accountant in the same situation says it is not material. 
Both decisions cannot be correct. Probably what he means is that until a court 
has decided a case involving materiality no one knows for sure what the legal 
answer is. That situation—difference of opinions (based primarily upon judg-
ment) of company accountants, independent auditors, SEC, courts, security 
analysts, and others—stresses the need for more objective guidelines for making 
materiality decisions as well as decisions related to significant errors. 
If this need is urgent, should the accounting profession undertake to estab-
lish acceptable standards to guide the accountant in his distortion/materiality 
decisions? Can such standards be set? I wish to give an affirmative response 
to each question and would like to express my belief as to the type and form of 
such standards and to recommend a general approach on how to set them. 
The errors referred to when attempting to determine if their existence 
significantly distorts financial statements include errors in recording amounts 
(or failure to record), errors in statement presentation (e.g., wrong classification 
of an item or failure to set it out separately), and failure to disclose pertinent 
information (such as the existence of a contingent liability). It is to be recognized 
that some errors, because of their nature are not subject to being judged by a 
significant distortion factor. The answer to the question of how large an error 
may be before it results in significant distortion may be based on a relative 
amount, expressed percentagewise with upper and lower limits. Suppose that, 
for a particular type of error, the most relevant base for judging significant dis-
tortion is average net income. The primary standard distortion factor could be 
expressed, for example, as 7%—10% of average net income. An error above 
10% should be considered as significant, and one below 7% as not significant, 
unless the accountant can justify departure from this guideline. The gray area 
(7% to 10%) recognizes that no attempt should be made to set an exact dividing 
line between significant and insignificant errors. A precedent for setting this 
type of guideline is found in the Committee on Accounting Procedure pro-
nouncement that in the case of stock dividends, retained earnings should be 
charged for par (or other legal capital base) for large dividends and charged 
with market price of the stock for small dividends. The Committee gave a 
dividend rate range of 20% to 25% as a basis for distinguishing between large 
and small stock dividends. 
For a given instance of an error it is usually necessary to recognize that the 
significance of an item may have to be judged on two or more bases. A guideline 
for each base should be established (e.g., 12%—15% of stockholders' equity, 
9%—12% of current assets, etc.). An error (or accumulation of errors) would 
be considered insignificant only if it was found to be insignificant by each of 
the tests applied. 
I suggest that some board, such as the newly approved Financial Account-
ing Standards Board, should be responsible for determining which situations 
involving errors should have significant distortion factors set for them and it 
should establish upper and lower limits of the factor in each case. The board 
need not undertake to study the entire problem of significant distortion as one 
project with the hopes of coming up with a pronouncement covering the entire 
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field. Instead, a study resulting in a pronouncement could be made of each type 
of significant distortion, each taken one at a time. 
The board, using questionnaires and personal interviews, could identify the 
most frequently found instances on which accountants have found it necessary 
to make a significant distortion decision, could determine bases and percentages 
that have been used in actual practice, and could, after presenting an exposure 
draft based on the study, come up with guidelines for making a decision related 
to the type of error in question. Instances of a professional organization or a 
governmental agency providing numerical guidelines for decision making are not 
unique. Many examples of this practice are found in APB Opinions and SEC 
Regulations. 
Materiality Standards 
But what about errors that are insignificant, but which might be considered 
as material such that under the existing circumstances they would influence the 
action or opinion of the reasonably prudent investor, etc.? If the importance of 
an error is to be determined by Mr. Holmes' rule of "lower of significant dis-
tortion factor or materiality factor," there should be some way of determining 
the latter measure. Mr. Holmes correctly says "we have a way to go before we 
come close to standardizing that." It is certainly recognized that considerable 
judgment by the accountant is necessary to decide whether an error or other 
item would likely influence or mislead an informed reader. 
Factors to be considered in making a materiality decision may be of a 
quantitative nature or of a non-quantitative nature or both. The accountant's 
judgment may be the sole basis for determining materiality if factors to be con-
sidered are non-quantitative. However, even in that situation, a standard may 
provide that the mere existence of an item or circumstance should require its 
disclosure or special reporting. For most materiality decisions involving account-
ing (quantitative) data, it should be possible to set standards in somewhat the 
same form as those suggested to provide guidelines for judging significant dis-
tortion. Some of these standards could be different in two respects. They could 
require use of a different base or have a different border zone. 
For example, in his recent Journal of Accountancy article, Mr. Holmes re-
ferred to a recommendation by a well-known analyst that materiality of an error 
in earnings "be based on the percent of change from the prior year rather than 
the percent of net income." 
In many instances, it may be possible to use the same base for a materiality 
factor—but to set different percentages for the border zone than were set for 
the significant distortion factor. For example, if the investor likely would be 
sensitive to a change in trend of earnings, the standard distortion guideline could 
be reduced by a certain number of percentage points (hereinafter called points) 
to provide new limits for judging materiality. Additional circumstances may be 
found in a particular company such that an error would be considered material 
for decision and analytical purposes even though it would not result in sig-
nificantly distorted financial statements. For each type of circumstance a certain 
number of points could be set as a basis for lowering the guidelines for judging 
significant distortion to give guidelines to be used to judge materiality. This 
procedure is somewhat in line with the thinking expressed in Mr. Holmes' paper 
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when he says, "Suppose we establish a 10 per cent factor for the income state-
ment, and in a particular case the company is on the verge of breaking through 
a 'times interest' coverage factor affecting its bondholders where a 5 per cent 
change in income would spell the difference between interest covered and interest 
not covered. In this case the 10 per cent standard distortion factor might, in some 
situations, give way to the 5 per cent materiality factor." As Mr. Holmes sug-
gests, circumstances which would cause the materiality factor to be higher should 
be ignored. Of those circumstances which would cause the materiality factor to 
be lower, the one which causes the standard distortion factor to be lowered by 
the greatest number of points should be used to obtain guidelines for judging 
materiality. As an alternate to using points for adjusting a significant distortion 
factor to obtain a materiality factor, link relatives may be used. For example, 
the guideline for judging significant distortion may be 8% to 11% of income 
in some cases. The existence of an unusual circumstance may require a "70% 
adjustment factor" which would result in the guideline for judging materiality 
becoming 5.6% to 7.7% (8% X 70% to 11% X 70%). If appropriate, more than 
one adjustment factor could be used in this link relative. 
A study of all major distortion/materiality problems and the issuing of 
recommended guidelines for each will take several years. In the meantime, any 
issued guideline can be revised as it may become appropriate. 
Mr. Holmes implies that it is possible to establish standards to measure sig-
nificant distortion when he says, "My rule of 'lower of standard distortion factor 
or materiality factor' simplifies the problem at least 50 per cent." That belief 
certainly seems to be a reasonable one. Although I agree with him that the 
problem of determining materiality is a much more difficult one, it does seem 
that guidelines could be provided which would simplify the problem another 
20 to 25 per cent. 
Benefits 
The establishment of guidelines with border zones would provide a tentative 
answer to a distortion/materiality decision. These benefits should result: 
1. The guidelines should be the basis for settling a disagreement on 
the subject between the company and the independent auditor. The 
burden of proof is on the one departing from the guideline. The 
auditor would be much more inclined to "stick to his guns" if his 
decision agrees with the guidelines. 
2. As Mr. Holmes says of court cases, "A judge would find a 'standard 
of significant distortion' set by the accounting profession a useful 
starting point in arriving at his decision in a matter involving 
materiality." 
3. An Ethics Committee would have a better basis for making a decision. 
4. The use of established guidelines should help close the credulity gap 
which exists in the minds of many readers who see two qualified 
accountants making opposite decisions. Statements should be more 
useful with controversial items handled on a uniform basis. 
Mr. Holmes raises the question, "If we adopt standards of significance, how 
do we police our standards?" That question could be asked about the enforce-
ment of any pronouncement or generally accepted accounting principle. For-
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tunately, most accountants are ethical and would try to make a correct decision 
on a difficult problem if they have some guideline for doing so. 
Summary 
I wish to commend Mr. Holmes on his very interesting and challenging 
paper. I agree with most of what he has said. I have tried to show how it would 
be possible to carry out some of his suggestions, especially those related to the 
establishment of significant distortion standards. I admit that I feel more 
optimistic than he and other accountants, as to the practicality of putting the 
process of making materiality decisions on a more objective basis. 
I hope that, as a result of hearing Mr. Holmes' paper and his comments and 
participating in the discussion which follows, you will want to encourage the 
development of guidelines to help in the exercise of judgment in making ma-
teriality decisions. 
Is there merit in trying to set standards? I think so. Will it be an im-
possible task? Difficult, but not impossible. Will the accounting profession rise 
to the challenge? I have confidence that it will. 
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6 
Toward a Philosophy of Auditing 
R. K. Mautz 
Ernst & Ernst (formerly of University of Illinois) 
Some may be wondering what more anyone can possibly have to say who 
has already used two hundred and forty-eight pages of fairly fine print to discuss 
the philosophy of auditing. This troubles me a little also. The assigned topic 
may imply that all those pages didn't take us in the right direction. But there 
are also some advantages in the wording of my assignment. "Toward" is a 
vague kind of direction, so with such a guide one might be excused if he appears 
to wander somewhat, and "philosophy" is a word subject to varying interpreta-
tion as well. 
To refresh myself, I referred to my dictionary and found the following 
definition of "philosophy": 
1) The inquiry into the most comprehensive principles of reality in 
general, or of some limited sector of it, such as human knowledge or 
human values 
2) The love of wisdom, and the search for it. 
3) A philosophical system; also, treatise on such a system. 
4) The general laws that furnish the rational explanation of anything: 
the philosophy of banking. 
5) Practical wisdom; fortitude, as in enduring reverses and suffering. 
And then two definitions noted as "archaic": 
6) Reasoned science; a scientific system: natural philosophy. 
7) The sciences as formerly studied in the universities. 
This provides quite a range doesn't it? An attempt to establish a fairly specific 
or limited topic with no more boundaries than those provides so little restriction 
that almost anything qualifies. 
I have tried to reduce it to reasonable dimensions by using my earlier work 
with Hussein Sharaf as a base, and by trying to tie to what appear to be some 
current problems. The result combines two quite different kinds of efforts; first 
an attempt to develop a concept of responsibility that meshes with, or at least is 
not in conflict with, the concepts of evidence, due audit care, fair presentation, 
independence, and ethical conduct, which we explored in our Philosophy; sec-
ond, an emphasis, using a "practical wisdom" approach, on something of a per-
sonal philosophy for auditors, that is, a way of viewing what our essential re-
sponsibilities as auditors are. Thus, the paper centers on two major questions: 
1) To whom are we responsible? 
2) For what are we responsible? 
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To Whom Are We Responsible? 
The Traditional View. Two conflicting views appear to exist. Tradition-
ally, auditors have considered themselves responsible to the client company as 
represented by its management. Auditing engagements have come primarily 
through management. It is the management of the company that makes the 
arrangements with the auditor to provide audit service.1 If one goes back far 
enough, he finds ownership and management identified in the owner-managed 
company. As companies grew larger and the idea of professional management 
took hold, a separation between ownership and management appeared, a separa-
tion to which many independent auditors may have given less attention than 
desirable. 
Largely ignoring that separation, auditors continued to make audit ar-
rangements with management. At the same time, an increase in the extent of 
tax and management advisory services plus the emphasis upon constructive 
auditing, that is, the desire to be of positive help to the client as well as to offer 
an opinion on financial statements, may have led to an inadvertent identification 
by independent auditors of the interests of management with the interests of the 
company. In some cases, perhaps in many, this resulted in efforts to be of as 
much assistance to the management of client companies as possible. 
In many engagements, management is the only interest in the company 
with which the independent auditor has significant contact. True, the auditor 
may be invited to the annual meeting of the shareholders, but in appearing there 
his position is likely to be as an aid to management to answer questions by 
shareholders and to strengthen the representations of management about the 
reliability of the financial statements. Certainly in closing conferences on in-
dependent audits, unless the company has an audit committee composed of non-
officer directors, any discussions of accounting problems are likely to be settled 
between management and the auditor. Insofar as auditor-client relationships are 
concerned, in many cases one has difficulty in distinguishing these from auditor-
management relationships. 
A Competing View. Recently, however, quite a different point of view has 
been expressed. It may best be summarized, perhaps, in the expression, "The 
public is the accountant's only client in the world of today."2 This assertion 
recognizes a much larger responsibility for independent accountants—and, indeed, 
a different role for them. It recognizes that there are many users and uses of 
accounting data, and and that many of those users must be regarded as non-
insiders. Public shareholders, creditors who are not represented directly on the 
board of directors, potential shareholders, financial analysts and fund managers, 
representatives of labor unions, government planners who rely upon financial 
statement data as a basis for their prognostications, and members of the general 
public, all have an interest in financial statements. Yet many of these have no 
way of assuring themselves that the financial data presented to them are useful 
or reliable other than to depend upon the services of independent certified public 
accountants as expressed in audit opinions. This leads some writers to contend 
that the dependence of these people on CPAs creates a client-type relationship 
between the auditor and the public. 
Those who emphasize this new and expanded role for independent auditors 
are quick to point out that financial statement data are an important basis for 
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resource allocation and that the social importance of the nation's resource alloca-
tion is such that the work of accountants must be considered to have a strong 
public interest. They argue that although the audited company pays the bill, 
the accountant's responsibility runs more to the public and to those outside the 
company than to the company's management. 
Which view is right? There is a great deal of difference philosophically, 
and I think practically as well, in this emphasis on the public service aspects 
rather than the client-management aspects of audit responsibility. Let us turn 
first to an inquiry as to the nature of the client-professional relationship in gen-
eral. Perhaps we can find some indications here that will help us come to a 
conclusion. 
Nature of the Client-Professional Relationship. With only unusual excep-
tions, the services of professionals, whether accountants, lawyers, doctors, archi-
tects, or others, are obtained on the initiative of the client who selects the pro-
fessional, has some control over the scope of the engagement, and can terminate 
the relationship at will. The professional has a direct, contractual relationship 
with the client and owes the client a degree of loyalty that requires him to 
resign the engagement if he cannot avoid conflict between the client's interests 
and the interests of anyone else to whom the professional has a competing 
responsibility. We find this, for example, in the lawyer's refusal to serve con-
testing clients and in our own rules about confidentiality. 
In the typical situation, the client who has selected the professional com-
pensates him for his work. The relationship is not exactly an employer and 
employee relationship although there are some similarities. The professional 
maintains that his expertise not only qualifies him to make independent decisions 
about the method of accomplishing his objectives, but requires him to establish 
and maintain a degree of independence from his client in order to be of maximum 
service. Thus, he is willing to discuss the scope of the engagement in broad 
general terms but refuses to be limited by a specification of detailed procedures 
imposed on him by the client. 
By no stretch of the imagination does "the public is our only client" notion 
fit this pattern. Members of the public do not choose the independent auditor, 
they have no control over the scope of the engagement, they cannot terminate the 
engagement, nor do they compensate the auditor for his services. 
But, then, neither does the notion that management is the auditor's client 
fit the situation either. In some cases, a company's management may indeed 
select the auditor, discuss with him the extent of his examination, make arrange-
ments for compensation, and may even be in a position to terminate the ex-
amination. But, in so doing, management operates not as an independent user 
of the auditor's services, but as a representative of the company. It is the com-
pany's funds that compensate the auditor, not the management's. Other interests 
in the company require that the services of the auditor be obtained, and they 
benefit from those services as much as does management. In more and more 
cases we see evidence of this relationship as independent auditors are elected, or at 
least ratified, at shareholder's meetings, and as audit committees made up of non-
officer directors work closely with the independent auditors in the development 
of audit programs and review of the auditor's conclusions. 
Ultimately, it is the shareholders who are "the company." Either directly 
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by them or through their representatives, independent auditors are selected, in-
structed, compensated, and, if necessary, the audit relationship terminated. 
As with the work of other types of professionals, a CPA's services are 
beneficial to people other than his direct client; they are something of a social 
good. The nature of his service induces others to rely on financial information, 
and such reliance leads to financial decisions. If the service is found to be mis-
leading or substandard, a liability on the part of the auditor to others who are 
not directly his clients may result. CPAs are not the only professionals to face 
such a possibility. It is not unheard of, for example, for the relatives of a deceased 
patient to sue the doctor, or for the relatives of victims in a building failure to 
sue the engineer or architect. 
The fact that some type of obligation runs from the professional to people 
other than the professional's client is not the same thing as establishing a client 
relationship, however real that obligation may be. If an expression like "the 
public is our only client" is intended to remind us of this kind of relationship 
and of the social responsibility of professionals in general, one cannot quarrel 
with it. However, as a statement of audit responsibility, it is grossly in error and 
at odds with reality. Further, it may well be a virtual invitation to those who 
would impute additional responsibility to public accountants. 
Some there are in the profession who feel that the independent auditor's 
burdens are already overwhelming in their potential impact and out of proportion 
to what he can bear. An open invitation to an unknown number of people with 
whom he has no direct relationship to consider themselves to be his client with 
the rights and privileges thus implied borders on the reckless. 
The Auditor's Varying Responsibilities. To follow this up a little, note that 
the CPA has responsibilities to a variety of interests and these vary in extent and 
nature. He is responsible to: 
1) Shareholders. Here the client relationship is at its strongest. He owes 
to the shareholders his primary loyalty including the duty of main-
taining confidential anything that would work an injury to their best 
interests. [But see (2) and (5).] 
2) Management. The CPA has a derivative responsibility to manage-
ment. The interests of management in the CPA's activities derive 
from its position as the authorized representative of the shareholders. 
To the extent that management's requests to the auditor benefit share-
holders and do not infringe on the auditor's necessary independence, 
the auditor should consider them. Improper activities by manage-
ment, that is, those which injure the interests of the shareholders, 
are diametrically opposed to those which benefit shareholders. 
3) Creditors. Two kinds of creditors can be distinguished: those with 
a present financial interest and commitment to the company and those 
with only a potential interest. Surely the auditor's responsibility 
should not be the same for these. In the one case, there is a real exist-
ing financial commitment; in the other there is no more than a pos-
sible commitment. Reality and possibility are not the same. A major 
loan by a bank may be so important to the company and to the bank 
that all parties at interest agree the bank's relationship is such that it 
is to have periodic reports of information not provided to others. A 
contention that such a creditor should be considered to have no rights 
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to information any greater than the rights of potential minor trade 
creditors is to ignore both reality and equity. 
4) Potential shareholders. Like potential creditors and for the same 
reasons, potential investors have a claim on the auditors but a more 
limited one than that of present creditors and investors. To potential 
investors the auditor owes the responsibility of professional quality 
work in his examination of financial statements and the opinions he 
issues thereon. Potential investors have the right to rely on the audi-
tor's opinion and to the extent that it is unreliable because of his 
substandard work they may have some cause for action against him. 
They do not have any right to instruct the auditor, to make specific 
demands upon him, or to influence his selection. 
5) General public. If the general public has an interest in the work of 
auditors separate from that of potential creditors and investors, it 
must be that they expect the auditor, as a licensed and acknowledged 
professional, to have appropriate consideration for the public good in 
all that he does. As a minimum this would mean that the auditor 
would provide no support of any kind for illegal acts or their con-
cealment. 
Conflicting Responsibilities. It is not difficult to conceive of situations when 
the independent auditor's responsibility to one of these interests might conflict 
with his responsibility to another. Let us take an extreme case, one in which 
the management of the company has engaged in an illegal action for the benefit 
of shareholders. In The Wreck of the Penn Central,3 its authors point out that 
the Penn Central management was unlawfully involved in attempting to estab-
lish an air transportation system in violation of the 1958 Federal Aviation Act 
which prohibits rail carriers from doing so. Later, the company was fined a total 
of seventy thousand dollars, allegedly the second largest fine in CAB history. 
Now without expressing any views at all on responsibility for discovering 
such a development, let us assume that independent auditors learned of this 
activity, knew of its illegality, but, because of their ethical rule requiring that 
they keep all matters confidential, felt constrained to make no public mention 
of this. Given the size of the Penn Central, it is quite likely that the potential 
fine would be considered immaterial. What should the independent auditors 
do in this situation? 
Does the established professional rule requiring confidentiality define ap-
propriate conduct, or can society expect and require something more of auditors? 
Let me suggest as a tentative conclusion that in a situation of this kind, one in 
which a company's management is clearly in violation of the law, that manage-
ment has little, if any, right to claim the loyalty of the auditor. In such cases, 
may the auditor's loyalty run to another audience? May not society expect the 
CPA, as part of his professional responsibility, to have concern for all interests, 
to take into account the specific circumstances, and to give wise professional 
consideration to the relative rights of all those interests? No single set of rules 
can cover all possible cases of conflict among those interests. The auditor must 
have in mind certain general principles regarding the nature of his responsibilities 
to each of these interests. Given those principles, he must then be prepared to 
apply "situation ethics" in arriving at a solution to any given conflict. 
Summary of Auditor Responsibilities. To whom then is an auditor responsi-
ble? To a variety of interests and in a variety of ways. His first responsibility 
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runs to the present shareholders of the company under examination. In serving 
them adequately he should supply whatever service to management that is re-
quested and can be provided without violation of his obligation to others. To 
those others, an auditor has an obligation to perform in accordance with reason-
able professional standards and to refuse to condone any actions that are in con-
flict with established laws or accepted moral standards. This may require that 
he withdraw from an engagement if he learns of illegal or even immoral acts. 
In my opinion it would not require that he hold a press conference to disclose 
it to the world.4 
My conclusion is that management is not the auditor's client. Neither is 
the general public. To steer a course that gives proper respect to the relative 
rights of all the several interests in the auditor's work is not an easy one, but it 
is the kind of responsibility that can rightfully be expected of professionals. 
For What Are We Responsible? 
This question is inseparable from the preceding question because in dis-
cussing the extent of responsibility which auditors have to the various interests in 
the company, the nature of that responsibility could not be avoided. Now, how-
ever, I would like to explore the question from a different point of view. Let me 
suggest that the independent auditor is responsible to all interests in his work for: 
1) Professional competence. 
2) Independence. 
3) Authority. 
Professional competence has two aspects: technical competence and "social 
competence." Technical competence includes (1) a knowledge of accounting prin-
ciples, (2) an understanding of the theory of evidence, which covers the matter 
of auditing standards, auditing techniques and procedures, and their application 
in specific situations, (3) an understanding of internal control, and (4) the 
procedural expertise to perform the steps in an audit program, prepare adequate 
work papers, develop audit programs, and review the work of subordinates. These 
are all matters which have been discussed elsewhere and to which I will devote 
no further attention now. 
The Responsibility for Social Competence. Another type of competence at 
least hinted at in my preceding comments might be described as "social com-
petence." It includes at least three aspects. First, the socially competent auditor 
must appreciate the role of auditing in the economy. He must accept his task 
as something more than just getting his client past the Securities and Exchange 
Commission requirements. He must view his role in the broad sense as an es-
sential step in the allocation of resources and as a factor in the financial decisions 
of unknown people and organizations. The auditor has an obligation of some 
sort to all who benefit from allocation of the nation's resources through the func-
tioning of the investment market mechanism, an obligation to avoid any sym-
pathies with the company's management or its shareholders that would permit 
him to find unrealistic financial presentations to be fair. 
He must constantly balance his responsibility to the shareholders against his 
responsibility to society generally. In the same way, he must recognize that a 
great many individuals stake their personal fortunes on investments in the com-
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pany. He also has a responsibility to balance his obligation to present share-
holders against his obligation to potential shareholders and to avoid any unfair-
ness in serving either one of these at the expense of the other. 
Social Competence and Competition. Another aspect of social competence 
is that it is unavoidably affected by one's attitude toward competition. In this 
country we are strong believers in the benefits of competition. Those benefits 
run to the services of professional practitioners as well as to business activities. 
But like so many forces, competition is a good thing only within reason. No, I 
am not about to take a position on competitive bidding. My interest is of 
another kind. 
Public accounting is a highly competitive profession. On the one hand, 
this competition undoubtedly urges both individual members and firms in the 
profession to higher standards of performance, in their desires to retain and 
attract clients, than might otherwise exist. Unfortunately, an opposite result is 
also possible. The competitive pressures upon independent CPAs as company 
managements "shop for accounting principles" could, at least in some cases, re-
sult in lower rather than higher standards. If we look closely at the nature of 
competition among public accounting firms we see that it can be effective on three 
different levels: at the levels of price, of principles, and of service. 
Competition on the basis of price is in some ways unfortunate, but it is im-
possible to avoid. For instance, price competition is within the scope of what 
the Department of Justice considers desirable, as indicated by recent actions of 
the Department. 
Competition in the matter of accounting principles, if deliberate, should be 
regarded as almost unforgivable. To the extent that it does occur, it probably 
is not intentional but rather is an unintended and often unrecognized result of 
trying to meet the needs of clients in the face of competition from other firms. 
The ever present knowledge that there are other firms of equal prestige and status 
that just might see the results of a transaction differently is a specter difficult to 
shake from the minds of any who make audit decisions. 
Competition on the basis of service, to the extent that we can separate 
service from price and principles, is a good thing and we should be in favor of it. 
Social competence requires not only that the auditor understand the nature and 
influence of competition on his decisions but that he discipline himself sufficiently 
to be constantly alert to its pressures. 
Attitude Toward Clients. A final aspect of social competence for the in-
dependent auditor is found in his attitude toward his clients. Obviously, he has 
a responsibility to them to be as efficient, effective, and helpful as he can be. In 
addition, he fails them in his most important function if he is less independent 
in the development of his program, in the performance of the work required 
thereby, and in making audit and accounting judgments than the circumstances 
require. The auditor also has a responsibility, and a very difficult one, to keep 
a client's requests and demands in perspective. Certainly there are times when 
a client's request must be rejected as inappropriate. To the extent that the auditor 
is aware of and can remember his responsibilities to other interests, he is less 
likely to accede to requests that have any taint of impropriety. 
Is Audit Service an Inalienable Right? Now let me pose two questions 
which I think are related and rather difficult to answer. First, does an auditor 
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have a responsibility to avoid unsavory clients? Second, is everyone who needs 
the services of an independent certified public accountant entitled to obtain those 
services? I see these two questions to be in conflict. We have, on the one hand, 
the feeling that auditors will seldom get into any kind of litigation difficulties 
if they can hold their practice to seasoned and thoroughly reputable companies. 
On the other hand, companies in the development stage, even those promoted 
by people with a string of failures, may be considered to have some rights. 
Certainly they need the services of an independent CPA if a public offering of 
securities is involved in arranging financing. 
One can readily argue that the best interests of the public accounting firm 
would be to steer clear of any client that might possibly pose financial difficulties. 
One can also argue that the best interests of the economy require that every 
promoter be given a chance because we never know when a speculative under-
taking may prove to have significant social benefits. Perhaps what we need is 
something a little like the public defender role played by lawyers. Perhaps some 
auditors should be designated or assigned to serve clients who otherwise would 
not be able to obtain the services of a reputable firm. In such cases the "assigned" 
auditor might require some special protection against litigation. 
Another Aspect of Independence. Independent auditors are required to be 
independent. In this tautology we find one of our most complex concepts. I do 
not plan to explore it fully here. In their excellent work, Messrs. Carey and 
Doherty distinguish the self-reliance required of every professional from the 
special meaning of independence to the CPA. 5 Both Mr. Higgins6 and Mr. 
Blough7 have emphasized the difference between real independence and ap-
parent independence and found both of them significant. Sharaf and I distin-
guished practitioner independence from profession independence. 
To complicate things a little further, let me experiment with two terms 
which are useful in pointing up another problem related to independence. 
"Operational independence" was used in our earlier work to describe the kinds 
of freedom which an auditor must have in developing his audit program, in 
performing the various verification procedures required by it, and in preparing 
his report. Without these freedoms he cannot be considered independent. "At-
titudinal independence," that is, the state of mind which leads an auditor to be 
objective in all his decisions, is no more than another name for the traditional 
"state of mind" description of independence already so well expressed in our 
professional literature. To be truly independent, an auditor must have both 
operational independence and attitudinal independence. 
Operationally, the freedom to develop a program, to perform it without 
interference, and to report on the results of that performance is not enough. One 
must also have sufficient knowledge to utilize that freedom effectively. The less 
one knows about an industry or about a company the more he must depend upon 
others for guidance. An auditor unacquainted with a specialized industry or 
an unfamiliar client may have to ask questions and depend upon the responses 
he gets to those questions in order to make any progress whatever. Such de-
pendence may infringe on his operational independence as effectively as would 
deliberate interference by company officers or employees. The less one knows 
about a company or an industry, the more he must depend upon others. The 
more he knows the less dependent he is. Some degree of intimate knowledge is 
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therefore important to independence. One can therefore argue that the per-
formance of management services is directly beneficial to the auditor in that it 
helps him to attain a degree of understanding and knowledge that he might not 
be able to obtain in any other way. 
Apparently opposed to this is the position we took in our Philosophy that 
auditor participation in the performance of management services may infringe 
upon the auditor's attitudinal independence. Attitudinal independence requires 
that the auditor avoid identification of his goals with those of the company and 
its officers. Any activities that bring him into a more intimate relationship with 
the company or its personnel may lead him to identify with them, to sympathize 
with their problems, to view the welfare of the company and the attainment of 
its objectives as taking precedence over his responsibilities to others. Such 
identification unavoidably infringes upon attitudinal independence. 
Which side do you wish to take? I find myself torn between the two. My 
good friend, Walter Frese, argues with me that the performance of management 
services is desirable because it helps the auditor to understand the position of 
management and therefore to avoid that degree of dependence which ignorance 
strengthens. My personal inclination is to argue strongly in favor of maintaining 
attitudinal independence for the auditor and requiring that the extent of audit 
work be strengthened or expanded sufficiently that true operational indepen-
dence is possible. 
Audit Authority. Those of you who have lasted this far may have noted 
that I seem to be getting myself into deeper and deeper trouble as I proceed. 
This last item continues that unfortunate trend. In responding to the question, 
"For what are we responsible?" I introduced the idea of authority. The in-
dependent auditor is responsible for the exercise of authority. I must confess to 
some reservations about this choice of words, but at the moment have no better 
one to offer. 
Authority has been defined as "the power to command and enforce 
obedience." Given this definition, what authority does the individual CPA 
have in the performance of an audit? Our conclusion must be that his authority 
is tenuous at best. This follows from the nature of the client relationship as well 
as from our insistence that the financial statements are the client's. As pointed 
out earlier, the CPA-client relationship is a voluntary one and can be suspended 
by either the client or the CPA. Hence, if the client feels that he is subject to 
too much control or authority by his independent auditor, he can terminate the 
relationship. The initiative is with him to continue or to terminate. Likewise, 
the fact that compensation flows from the client to the CPA almost unavoidably 
has some impact. In addition, we have established the position that the financial 
statements are representations of the client and, as such, that he should have 
the final decision as to what they will or will not say. This combination of 
circumstances does not necessarily rob the independent auditor of all "power to 
command and enforce obedience," but it serves to reduce that authority in a 
good many individual cases. 
Now let us turn to the authority of the CPA profession. Here we find a 
considerable degree of authority. To the extent that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires that the opinion of an independent CPA accompany the 
financial statements of a company filing with the Commission, and the listing 
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requirements of the stock exchanges call for the opinion of an independent CPA, 
companies are subject to the audit requirements of the profession. I recall a 
former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that the ac-
counting profession was so vital to business that business could not get along with-
out it. Can you imagine what would happen to a major company if an accounting 
treatment which its management insisted upon was considered unsatisfactory by 
all CPAs? There seems little doubt but that the company would have to give. 
To repeat, then, for the sake of emphasis, the CPA profession has con-
siderable authority. The individual CPA seems to have very little. Therein 
lies a difficulty. 
Perhaps we should give some attention to the question of whether it is de-
sirable that the independent CPA have greater authority. Would we be better off 
if a company, having once committed itself to a given CPA, had no choice but to 
accept the CPA's decisions with respect to the presentation of financial state-
ments? 
My response to that question is that we would not be better off. I believe 
strongly that the financial statements must be the company's and that the company 
should have the freedom to present those financial statements in any way that 
it pleases. The auditor who finds himself in disagreement with the company's 
presentation should be expected to so state in his opinion. Is it not conceivable 
that the company and its auditors could have an honest difference of opinion, 
one that even after careful examination of all the facts and a thorough under-
standing of the principles involved might be irreconcilable? In such a situation, 
are those who use the financial statements better served by a forced agreement, 
one in which either the views of one or the other dominate or a compromise 
position is worked out, or would the users be better served by having both pre-
sentations made available to them with an explanation of the difference? 
What I am getting around to saying is that the time honored policy by the 
SEC of requiring that qualifications and exceptions be removed from audit 
opinions may be working to the disadvantage rather than to the advantage of 
financial statement readers. If the requirement of a clean opinion does force 
compromise in some cases, if it reduces the total amount of information that 
otherwise would be available to the readers of financial statements, if it submerges 
actual and perhaps even justified differences between auditors and company 
management, is it a good policy? 
The purpose of the SEC's policy, of course, is to strengthen the independence 
of the accountant, and certainly this is important. Can other ways be found to 
strengthen that independence without submerging useful information? 
One source of authority is fear. If I am afraid of a physical beating, I may 
choose to obey the commands given to me. A company's management may fear 
an open comparison of its views with those of its auditors. Fear of the withdrawal 
of its auditor from the engagement may also be effective, particularly if this 
requires an explanation of the differences between auditor and management at 
a shareholder's meeting. 
At the present time, the auditor's alternatives are limited. If he has a real 
difference with management, he must take an exception which may well cost 
him the client and which he has no real opportunity to explain or defend. 
Alternatively, he can withdraw from the engagement, but here he faces the 
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same problem in that no one will ever know his reasons. If we could establish his 
right to report independently of the management, and perhaps even establish a 
requirement that differences between them must be publicly disclosed, would not 
his alternatives, his independence, and perhaps even his authority be improved? 
Conclusion 
By way of conclusion let me confess that for few of the questions raised 
here today do I even pretend to myself to have final answers. It would be very 
useful if some authoritative study group would undertake to establish for us the 
nature and extent of the independent CPA's responsibility to each one of the 
several interests in financial statements. The tendency to state that "the public 
is our only client" is a most unfortunate kind of expression, if for no other reason 
than it implies that we are thoroughly confused about who our client is and 
what our responsibilities are. It would also be helpful if we could have some 
extended discussion of whether what I have called social competence is really 
relevant to the independent CPA's activities. 
Perhaps you have had from me very little in the way of "practical wisdom" 
and a good deal in the way of speculation. I leave it to you to judge. Until we 
can answer to whom and for what we are responsible, however, we have not 
advanced very far "toward a philosophy of auditing." 
Footnotes 
1. In this connection see Business Week, March 25, 1972, p. 36 for a note describing SEC 
consideration of "a staff recommendation that outside directors nominate corporate auditors." 
2. See Robert M. Trueblood, et al., "Information for Proprietors and Others," Touche 
Ross & Co., 1972, p. 29. 
3. Joseph R. Daughen & Peter Binzen, The Wreck of the Penn Central, Little Brown and 
Company, Boston, 1971. 
4. See Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 41 for the profession's solution to a some-
what similar problem. 
5. John L. Carey and William O. Doherty, Ethical Standards of the Profession, AICPA, 
Inc., New York, 1966, p. 18. 
6. Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics: A Time for Reappraisal," The Journal of 
Accountancy, March, 1962, p. 81. 
7. Carman G. Blough, "Responsibility to Third Parties," The Journal of Accountancy, May, 
1960, p. 60. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Toward a Philosophy of Auditing 
Henry P. Hill 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
One of the distinguishing differences between academicians and practitioners 
is illustrated in this paper. The academic oriented tends to speak in abstractions, 
searching for generalizations of theory in abstract terms whereas the practitioner 
tends to use concrete terms and concrete illustrations. 
Our chairman was aware of this, I'm sure, when he selected the preparer 
and discussant of a paper on the topic Toward a Philosophy of Auditing. The 
topic lends itself to a discussion of abstracts, and Dr. Mautz has followed the 
route that might be expected and has given us a paper inquiring into the theory 
behind auditing. He has also done a job that someone with a long practicing 
background like mine could never have done. I think, however, that what's 
appropriate to inquire into is whether the presence or absence of a theory makes 
any difference. 
I have heard for some time the critics of the accounting profession say that 
accountants have no idea what the generally accepted accounting principles are 
that they so glibly refer to. Now Mautz tells us that we don't have a philosophy 
in support of those examinations we, again so glibly, say we have made. There's 
only one more accusation that could be made against the professional auditor, 
which is, "If you don't have a philosophy for your conduct or a frame of reference 
for its output, why do you bother?" However, despite the inarticulateness of 
most of its practicing members, there are some members of this profession of 
ours who believe the independent auditor has a useful role in society—and there 
are some nonaccountants who believe it, too. 
Dr. Mautz addresses himself to two questions: 
1. "To whom are we responsible"? 
2. "For what are we responsible"? 
He then proceeds to demonstrate we don't have the answer to either. Let's take 
them one at a time. 
To Whom Are Auditors Responsible? 
First—"To whom are we responsible?" Well, to whom is anyone responsible? 
Is a policeman responsible only to his lieutenant because his lieutenant 
is the primary control over his paycheck? 
If an airplane crash occurs, does the crew have its responsibility defined 
as "Get the passengers off the seats so their blood won't stain the up-
holstery which belongs to the company that pays our salary"? 
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Of course not! The days of supremacy of property over people are over. 
Society imposes a responsibility on its functionaries which develops as a reaction 
to individual situations. Occasionally, of course, this lack of definition backfires 
as in the case of my staff assistant who laid his coat down on the subway platform 
and helped an injured victim lie down on it and was sued for causing him 
physical injury. But, for the most part, it works. 
I must say, I am somewhat disturbed by the cynical implications I draw 
from the part of the paper that discusses relations with management. In the 
early part of the paper, a point is made that independent auditors may have 
inadvertently identified the interests of management with the interests of the 
company. I used the word "cynical" to describe the implications even though 
I know from the rest of the paper and from other things Mautz has written 
that cynicism was never intended. Other writers have not been so charitable, 
however. Some refuse to believe to this day that one or two of us really do 
believe there's such a thing as a pooling of interests or that immediate recogni-
tion is the right way to record investment credit. 
I am reminded of a number of dinner table conversations that took place 
in my house when my sons were approaching their teens. They centered around 
just what it was that Daddy did during those daylight and evening hours when 
he was away from home. One friend's father drove an airliner, another owned 
a print shop, another ran a company that printed school books. Well, to describe 
my excuse for living, I finally settled on this: "What I do for a living is spend 
my time convincing people they ought to do some things they don't want to do." 
Not very illuminating to a nine-year-old, but give me a better one. 
It does emphasize, however, that the mature auditor does not make the 
mistake Mautz attributes to him. He does not mistake the relative positions of 
management and company. This is what we mean by independence. It's what 
one of yesterday's speakers was referring to when he spoke of the need for 
experience. 
What this adds up to is that I, for one, don't see the need for any better 
definition of audit philosophy. I don't see any pressure for improvement in 
defining responsibility in the terms Bob Mautz has—i.e., to management, share-
holders, or the public—debates over Ultramares notwithstanding. 
For What Are Auditors Responsible? 
Mautz's second question is—"For what are we responsible?"—This is the 
key question if we add to it "and to what extent?" It is the key question because 
a major apprehension of the accounting profession stems from the potential 
assessment of financial responsibility against independent accountants for damages 
that have no relation to any deficient action of the auditor. For example: 
The stockholder who sues for his losses on a highly speculative stock 
when he never opened, no less read, the prospectus. 
The banker who prides himself in lending on the basis of his evaluation 
of the person and then wants restitution from accountants for misstated 
assets. 
The director who cross-claims against the accountants for misleading 
financials when he himself never really asked a question about them. 
The purchaser of a company who sues the accountant on the basis of 
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lack of disclosure in the financial statements of facts that even a neophyte 
would know enough to ask about. 
And you can think of others. 
We have to start thinking more in terms of responsibility to people who 
are truly damaged as a result of legitimate use of the financial reports within the 
purpose for which they were intended; a responsibility measured in financial 
exposure commensurate with the legitimate assumption of risk. For, after all, 
if the legal system demands perfection, there are only three ways for accountants 
to go: 
1. Become gamblers, start auditing people rather than facts, take a 
chance. 
2. Raise the total amount of work and the fees. 
3. Look for another line of work that's safer, like sandhogging. 
Synthesis 
Which brings me to a startling conclusion. Despite the negative tone of 
these comments, I agree with Mautz. The kind of responsibility that should 
be assigned to accountants "gives proper respect to the relative rights of all the 
several interests in the auditor's work." That's the "Whom." 
As to the "What," I wish he had looked at this proposition: "The auditor 
is responsible to see that the reader is not misled if he uses the financial statements 
intelligently according to the purpose for which they were intended." 
As usual, after I wrote those words down, I found that G. O. May had said 
it far better long before I even found myself in the accounting profession. 
I cannot believe that a law is just or can long be maintained in effect 
which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a purchaser may 
recover from a person from whom he has not bought, in respect of a 
statement which at the time of his purchase he had not read, contained 
in a document which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not 
measured by injury resulting from falsity in such statement. 
Using my own, less effective, prose, "The auditor is responsible to see that 
the reader is not misled if he uses the financial statements intelligently according 
to the purpose for which they were intended." This statement serves to focus 
on underlying audit philosophy as a means to an end and to avoid what I'm 
afraid is an ever-present danger in inquiries that involve confusion of means 
and ends. If an inquiry devotes itself too earnestly to a goal like that contemplated 
by Mautz's paper, the effort may make the philosophy the goal rather than the 
means. Should we let that occur, we may someday allow our standards to be 
governed by the means, i.e., the philosophy, rather than the end, that is, the 
attesting of financial statements. 
This is a very real danger. I am already convinced that some of the as-
sistants on our staff think the objective of their toil is to prepare audit working 
papers. 
Some Final Comments 
So much for philosophy. I should like to put forth a few specific comments 
which may serve to stimulate discussion. 
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1. When we explore the nature of the client relationship, we may be 
helped by the fact that originally the auditor had to be a member of 
the company. That is, he was not even allowed to be independent. 
What better evidence have we that the starting point was responsi-
bility to shareholders. All else is an extension. 
2. The auditor's primary responsibility to his client's management is to 
assist the management to perform properly its responsibility to report 
to shareholders. To the extent this results in improvements in ac-
counting procedures, etc., it falls within the audit function. Other 
services may be performed by accounting firms, but just because they 
are accounting firms does not make the services auditing. Whether 
accounting firms should be limited to auditing is another question. 
3. The primary relationship with shareholders is not confidentiality. It 
is anything but. Full disclosure and confidentiality are irreconcilable. 
Obviously, a selection has to be made when a conflict arises, but 
there's no doubt if full and fair disclosure needed to keep financials 
from being misleading is pitted against confidentiality, which has 
to win. 
4. Every time there is a temptation to chastise an auditor for not telling 
something, ask this question: "What has it to do with the audited 
financial statements?" You'll be surprised how many questions go 
away. Maybe it was morally reprehensible for the Penn Central to 
get into Executive Airlines. I don't need to pass that judgment, how-
ever, if I know (as Mautz points out) the fine of $70,000 is not ma-
terial. The real question is whether the discontinuance of the air 
transportation business portends a future change in financial position 
and results of operations of the company. That's what the auditor 
talks about and that's what the auditor's responsibility is all about. 
5. Finally, let me answer this question that Mautz raises: "Does every-
one have a right to an audit?" Well, my answer is that everyone has 
a right to medical treatment except the guy who's trying to shoot the 
doctor. There are a lot of people around whose objectives toward the 
auditor are not much better. I certainly can't see any philosophy that 
says they have a right to an audit. 
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7 
Future Directions for Auditing Research 
Douglas R. Carmichael 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
In mid-1969 the AICPA's auditing research program was officially launched.1 
For three years I have attempted to plan and initiate a program to provide the 
Committee on Auditing Procedure, the Institute membership and others in-
terested in the advancement of auditing theory and practice with evidence and 
information useful in reaching sound decisions on auditing problems. A num-
bered series of monographs has been authorized and additional staff have been 
devoted to the effort. We are also beginning to contract for studies by outside 
researchers. Since we firmly believe that a researcher should have his own in-
dependent commitment to a project, we would prefer to find researchers in-
terested in, and working on, a subject rather than commission an individual with 
no demonstrated interest in the area. The main purposes of this paper are to 
identify major research problems, or topics, which will be significant in the 
future; indicate the factors which should be considered in approaching these 
topics to specify the problem and select a research method; and reflect upon the 
relationships which should be achieved among research, theory, and practice. 
An underlying purpose of the paper is to interest qualified individuals in con-
ducting research for the AICPA's auditing research program. 
The Relation of Practice, Theory, and Research in Auditing 
Research is the meeting ground of theory and practice for any applied field 
of knowledge. In its most general form, the research process consists of the 
identification and measurement of variables that are relevant to a given problem 
or phenomenon and determination of the nature and strength of the interrela-
tionships among these variables. The research process cannot ignore either 
theory or practice. 
Auditing Theory and Practice. The link between theory and practice, how-
ever, exists apart from their intersection in the realm of research. In a treatise 
on accounting theory, A. C. Littleton offered the following observation on this 
interrelationship: 
Practice is fact and action; theory consists of explanation and rea-
sons. Theory states the reason why accounting action is what it is, 
why it is not otherwise, or why it might well be otherwise.2 
While the need for and desirability of a theory of accounting have been 
well accepted for a respectable length of time, the subject of auditing, until re-
cently, has remained for many a completely practical field of knowledge. From 
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the "theory as explanation" viewpoint, there has been a steady development of 
auditing theory on a piecemeal basis. Examples of this piecemeal development 
include the recognition of auditing standards and their differentiation from pro-
cedures, and explication of the nature and classification of evidential matter. 
However, a theory is something more than discrete bits of explanation; 
theory is comprehensive explanation. A theory of auditing should be an organ-
ized and systematized body of knowledge of the field of auditing, which identifies 
the variables of auditing practice and explains their importance, interrelation-
ships, and implications. 
At the close of their treatise on auditing theory, Mautz and Sharaf made the 
following observation on the interrelationship of theory and practice. 
In the past, auditing has been conceived only as a practical subject 
with little need for or possibility of any underlying theory. Thus at-
tention has been given to its practical applications to the almost complete 
exclusion of theoretical considerations. We hope we have indicated 
the close connection between the theory and practice of auditing, for 
we are convinced that the only sure solution to practical problems is 
through the development and use of theory.3 
Thus Mautz and Sharaf propose a relationship of interdependence for auditing 
theory and practice. Adequate consideration cannot be given to the practical 
applications of auditing without regard to the supporting theory. On the other 
hand, auditing theory developed to the exclusion of practical considerations can-
not fulfill its primary justification for existence. 
Mautz and Sharaf characterize the field of auditing knowledge as 
. . . a rigorous field of study able to make a substantial contribution to 
our economic life and one requiring considerable attention not only to 
the development of a systematic and satisfactory theory but to the ap-
plication of such a theory to its practical problems.4 
Since auditing is an applied field, its ultimate contribution must be made at the 
practice level. Thus, the ultimate test of auditing theory is its application to the 
practical problems of auditing. 
Auditing Research. The juncture of theory and practice becomes most ap-
parent and important in auditing research. In broad outline, research relies 
upon practice to identify problems or phenomena for study and it relies upon 
theory to guide the complex task of organizing the facts and actions of practice 
into a systematic pattern. Without a scheme of organization, the real significance 
of the collected observations of practice might never surpass the level of descrip-
tion. Without the direction of practice to important problems the significance 
of theory might not escape the level of trivia. Thus, research brings theory into 
contact with practice for the purpose of expanding knowledge and, in the proc-
ess, research both explains practice and heightens the impact of theory. These, 
then, are the general relationships of practice, theory, and research. 
Research in Auditing 
The above relationships may be highlighted in more detail by a more in-
tensive examination of research. The research process in its ideal form has been 
described as follows: 
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First, the scientist notes some phenomenon of interest (Y); in the 
case of social science, Y is some aspect of human behavior. Then he 
notes variation in the phenomenon: sometimes Y is present, sometimes 
not; or sometimes Y exists at a high intensity while it has lower intensity 
at other times. The scientist then begins a search for concomitants 
(X's) of the phenomenon Y; that is, he tries to discover conditions (X's) 
under which Y is or is not present, or conditions (X's) which vary as 
Y varies. When the scientist has identified an X condition that varies 
with Y, he then needs to establish whether X causes Y, Y causes X, or 
X and Y both result from some other phenomenon. 
While the general procedure can be stated in a fairly simple form, 
the research process by which the procedure is carried out is often 
complicated, requiring elaborate procedures for measuring phenomena 
(Y's) and associated conditions (X's) and for taking into account the 
effects of other conditions (Z's).5 
Although actual research seldom follows this exact chronological sequence, that 
is the logical sequence of research procedure. 
For the moment let us pass the process by which a particular phenomenon 
of interest is selected for study, and consider the question of research method— 
measurement of variables relevant to a phenomenon and determination of their 
interrelationships. A convenient scheme for classifying research methods dis-
tinguishes the methods on the basis of the type of setting within which data 
may be collected. The following classification scheme is based upon the degree 
of abstractness of the data collection setting.6 
I. Natural Setting—Data are obtained from real, existing situations of 
the type to which the results of the study are intended to apply. 
A. Surveys—Typically a random sample of a defined population to 
determine the distribution of a particular characteristic—usually 
attitudes, opinions, motivations, or expectations of people. 
B. Field Studies—Study of a situation which includes the phe-
nomenon of interest to observe and records the phenomenon 
and its surrounding conditions in detail. This method is well 
suited for exploratory research to determine major variables. In 
contrast, the survey is a broader study of selected variables. 
C. Field Experiments—A natural setting with some control ex-
ercised over selected major variables. 
II. Abstract Setting—Data are obtained from a setting constructed by 
the researcher. 
A. Experimental Simulation—A created situation which is a rela-
tively faithful representation of the natural setting to study the 
activities of the participants. Such studies vary greatly in terms 
of the degree of fidelity to reality. 
B. Laboratory Experiments—A setting which abstracts variables 
from the real situation, represents them in some symbolic form, 
and studies the operation in that form. 
C. Computer Simulation—A closed model (mathematical) of the 
situation studied; all variables are built into the model. 
Since each of these methods has some disadvantages in terms of what it 
cannot do as well as some advantages in terms of what it can do, the methods 
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are not freely interchangeable. The particular research problem should determine 
the choice of method in any given instance. 
Generally, research methods with a natural setting offer less opportunity 
for control of variables by the researcher than those with an abstract setting. 
Consequently, in the natural setting, measurement of variables is less precise 
and less certainty exists that the research results are attributable to a particular 
variable. On the other band, with more abstract settings, gains in precision of 
measurement and control of variables are accompanied by a loss of realism. 
Since the settings are abstracted and artificial representations of the real-life 
conditions under which the phenomena actually occur, more doubt surrounds 
the applicability of the research results to real-life situations. 
More important than considerations of realism versus precision, is the extent 
of prior knowledge about the problem implied by the choice of research setting. 
To use the more abstract settings, the researcher must either know or assume 
that he knows a good deal more about the phenomenon of interest than with 
natural settings. In the abstract setting, the researcher creates the situation and 
must know what conditions need to be controlled. As the research setting be-
comes more abstract, the research results become more and more a function of 
the structure imposed by the researcher. 
Although the natural settings impose less structure on the situation, this 
does not mean that no structure at all is imposed. The choice of research setting 
highlights an important relationship between theory and research. When ab-
stract settings are used, the researcher must incorporate theory in the situation 
before the data are collected. In contrast, when using natural settings the re-
searcher collects the data and then incorporates theory as he interprets the data. 
Examples of Auditing Research 
Some examples of existing auditing research should make the categories 
distinguished in this classification of methods a little more meaningful. This 
review of extant research, for convenience, begins with the more abstract settings. 
To my knowledge, no computer simulations involving auditing problems have 
been attempted; the most abstract setting used has been the laboratory experiment. 
Behavioral Impact of Audits. Churchill, with the assistance of several others, 
demonstrated that the performance of the audit function influences the people 
whose activities are audited. Using laboratory experiments they have shown 
that both the anticipation of an audit and the occurrence of an audit cause people 
to modify their behavior.7 According to these experiments audits evidently exert 
a positive influence on conformance with prescribed control procedures nor-
mally expected. 
To conduct the experiments Churchill abstracted the key variables in an 
audit and represented them symbolically in the laboratory. The subjects were 
given a simple problem solving task—locating a polluting water station in a 
water system represented by colored lights in a wired key-board—and a pre-
scribed method for solving of the problem. Some groups were reviewed to see 
if they complied with the prescribed solution approach and some groups were 
told they would be reviewed in advance of their first attempt at solving the 
problem. By ignoring the prescribed method and innovating the subjects could 
solve the problem more efficiently. Thus, the key elements of an audit were 
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present: (1) actions of the participants, (2) prescribed criteria for those actions, 
and (3) a comparison of the actions and the criteria. Note that in the laboratory 
experiment no attempt is made to recreate the setting of the real situation under 
study. 
Departure from an APB Opinion. Moving up the continuum to the less 
abstract experimental simulation, a study by Purdy, Smith and Gray indicates 
that implicit assumptions commonly made concerning the effect of reports on 
users may not be valid.8 Their experimental simulation tested the visibility of 
the required notice of departure from an APB Opinion. In October, 1964, the 
Council of the AICPA issued a Special Bulletin stating, in part, that departures 
from an APB Opinion if they have "substantial authoritative support," may 
be disclosed either (1) in the auditor's report or (2) in a footnote to the financial 
statements, with no qualification of the auditor's opinion. This study measured 
the visibility of these two alternative methods of disclosure to financial state-
ment users. Contrary to normal expectations, the researchers found that the 
two forms of disclosure—footnote versus auditor's report—were equally visible 
to financial statement users. 
The research method involved several groups of businessmen familiar with 
financial statements—such as bankers—who were presented with a set of financial 
statements accompanied by footnotes and an auditor's report. Some groups re-
ceived statements disclosing the departure in a footnote while others received 
statements disclosing the departure in the audit report. These subjects were 
then asked questions about the statements. 
In contrast to the laboratory experiment, the experimental simulation at-
tempted to achieve some degree of fidelity to reality. Although the participants 
realized that they were involved in some sort of research study, there was an 
attempt to approximate the actual analysis of financial statements. 
Confirmation of Receivables. Several field experiments have been conducted 
of the audit procedure of mail confirmation.9 In all the studies confirmation 
requests were sent to actual individuals or businesses. Thus, the setting was 
natural and the control exercised by researchers involved only major variables— 
the form of the confirmation request and the dollar amount of the account 
balance identified in the request (two studies) or a surrogate for the balance. 
Auditee Attitudes. Churchill followed his laboratory studies of the audit 
process with a field study. Field interviews of people in organizations who had 
experienced audits (auditees) indicated that they do not perceive the audit as 
influencing their behavior, and view it primarily as a procedural check and 
somewhat of a policing function.10 These results are in direct contrast to the 
laboratory findings that audits did influence behavior. 
While the conflicting results of these two studies need not concern us here, 
their temporal order is of interest. The research began at the abstract setting 
stage with laboratory experiments. The question I wish to raise is whether 
auditing researchers should first conduct more extensive studies using a natural 
setting. In the social sciences, one researcher suggested this ordered progression 
in the use of research methods. 
If we are starting research on a relatively unexplored phenomenon, 
it would seem best to start far over at the field study end of the con-
tinuum. As we learn more about the problem, we can then work with 
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methods further along the continuum, with which we can gain more 
precise information. Then having explored the problem with precision 
and in depth, and perhaps having formulated and thoroughly manipu-
lated a formal model, we can return toward the field study end of the 
street to find out how closely our presentations fit the phenomena of the 
real world.11 
This suggested order, at least, proved beneficial in a study of criteria used for 
the different types of auditor's reports.12 
The AICPA's ARM No. 1. The study of the fourth standard of reporting 
described in Auditing Research Monograph No. 1 used a natural setting—the 
field study. The choice of research setting was more or less dictated by the 
extent of prior knowledge of the reporting decision process. With so little prior 
knowledge, an explanatory study was needed to identify the important variables. 
The purpose of the study was to determine the meaning of "sufficiently material," 
the single reporting criterion offered in Chapter 10 of SAP No. 33 for distin-
guishing between qualified opinions and adverse opinions and disclaimers of 
opinion. 
It is interesting to consider how the choice of another method might have 
influenced the research results. If an abstract setting, such as an experimental 
simulation or a laboratory experiment, had been chosen, certain assumptions 
would have been necessary in the design of the study. If "sufficiently material" 
had been equated with relative magnitude, that variable would have been manip-
ulated by varying the dollar impact of the exception. Research results would 
have established relative magnitude cut-off points for distinguishing between 
"material" and "sufficiently material" based on reporting decisions made by 
the subjects. Note the extent to which the research results would have been 
influenced by the structure imposed on the setting. On the other hand, research 
results obtained by a case by case study of audit reports indicate that certain 
qualitative variables seem to be more important than, or at least as important 
as, the quantitative variable. 
Surveys. Recently, there has been a virtual explosion of surveys dealing 
with auditing topics. In fact they are too numerous to identify specifically, and 
singling any one study out for attention is not essential since most accountants 
are by now quite familiar with this type of research. However, far too many 
of the current surveys deal with insignificant problems and, in my view, the 
survey method of research is being abused today. This observation naturally 
leads to the critical question: What are the significant problems which should 
attract the attention of auditing researchers? 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Developments in auditing research, theory, and practice are by nature evolu-
tionary. For example, the research reported in ARM No. 1 should serve as a 
foundation, or at least provide a background, for future study of the decision-
making process of auditors in reporting. ARM No. 1 identifies the central report-
ing concepts and describes the role of these concepts in reporting decisions. With 
limited prior knowledge about the subject, the research method sacrificed some 
precision and several questions remain to be answered. Care was taken to 
obtain the data from real, existing situations of the type to which the results 
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were intended to apply. This constraint need not be applied so stringently in 
future studies, and precision of measurement may be increased by using more 
abstract methods—with one or two important reporting concepts isolated for 
study. This approach makes possible exploration of phenomena which do not 
occur frequently in practice, such as situations leading to adverse opinions. How-
ever, the reporting decision process is certainly not the only important research 
topic. Many other subjects are important, some of which are outlined below. 
A. Expansion of the attest function 
1. Historical financial summaries: what are the minimum require-
ments for fair presentation? 
2. Interim financial statements: what evidential matter is necessary 
to support an opinion, and can the evidence-gathering process be 
structured to implement the continuous auditing concept? 
3. Forecasts and projected financial statements: what degree of 
responsibility for assumptions should the CPA assume in light 
of the nature of evidence available and the comprehension capa-
bilities of the report reader? 
4. Operational auditing: what type of audit report is appropriate 
and what form of evidential matter is adequate to support the 
report when propriety criteria are not well formulated? 
B. Refinement of auditing methods 
1. Use of other experts: in what circumstances should evidential 
matter include the work of other experts, such as geologists, 
actuaries, lawyers, or engineers; should any reference be made to 
these experts in the audit report? 
2. Auditing fair value: what forms of evidential matter are neces-
sary to support an opinion on financial information based upon 
fair value rather than historical cost? 
C. Professional responsibilities 
1. Objectivity and integrity: what alternative arrangements for 
selecting, changing, and compensating auditors would be feasible? 
2. Communication responsibility: to whom—both within the au-
dited entity and outside the entity—and in what manner should 
the auditor communicate knowledge which may fall outside the 
audit report on financial statements, such as illegal acts, internal 
control weaknesses, and improper client-prepared financial in-
formation? 
These are the auditing subjects which I would regard as most significant 
for future study. Each topic is followed by the major question to be answered, 
which would have to be reduced to a number of relevant researchable questions. 
This distinction is very important—in fact, critical. Each problem must be 
specified in terms of more specific researchable questions so that evidence and 
information may be gathered that bears directly on the problem. Mautz and 
Gray expressed the point in this way: 
The specific issue must be stated in such a way that it meets the 
needs for which the research is proposed and indicates the kind of evi-
dence relevant to the research subject. The research methodology must 
be such that it will provide convincing evidence and valid reasoning 
from that evidence.13 
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The Mautz and Gray article is such a well-reasoned blueprint for effective re 
search that expanding greatly upon what they have said so well is not necessary. 
In the auditing research program, we have endeavored to follow a similar ap-
proach from the very beginning of the formal program. 
Development of ARM No. 1 
Problem specification is such an important aspect of research that I would 
like to explore, as an illustration, some of the factors considered in the prepara-
tion of ARM No. 1. Many, if not most, discussions of research method focus 
on the steps in the process after the phenomenon of interest has been selected 
for study and the problem specified in some detail. However, problem selection 
and specification are critical steps in the research process. It is at this point that 
research should draw significantly upon practice. The difficult problems in prac-
tice, at the profession level, should identify what phenomena require study and 
explication. Determination of the important questions to be answered—specifica-
tion of the problem—should also rely heavily on practice. An exploratory review 
of practice to determine the major questions to be answered should be undertaken 
in every study no matter what research setting is chosen to collect data. 
In the study of the fourth reporting standard reported in ARM No. 1, an 
initial study of practice disclosed that the primary problem was lack of criteria 
for the distinction between a "subject to" qualification and a disclaimer of 
opinion. Consequently, uncertainty exceptions received the bulk of attention 
in the study. Further exploration disclosed that one particular type of uncertainty 
exception—the going-concern problem—was of major importance and, therefore, 
that subject was given more extensive treatment than other types of uncertainties. 
For a number of reasons, research directed to the influence of audit reports 
in the decision process of financial statement users did not seem appropriate for 
an initial study. Although future research should definitely consider this dimen-
sion of the reporting process, careful attention should be given to those factors 
that eliminated that approach as an initial choice. 
To study the decision process of financial statement users and retain control 
over the relevant variables, an experimental simulation or a laboratory experi-
ment would seem to be the most logical choice for a data collection setting. The 
problems involved in this research approach can be conveniently explored by 
considering one possible experiment. If we want to test the users' reaction to 
different types of audit reports when a material uncertainty is present, we might 
prepare a set of financial statements for a company that has a large amount of 
research and development cost of doubtful recoverability with extensive footnote 
disclosure of the problem. Different groups would be presented with the financial 
statements and accompanying auditor's report and control would be exercised 
over the type of report. One group would receive statements with a qualified 
opinion, another group would receive the same statements with a dis-
claimer of opinion, and the statements received by a third group would be ac-
companied by an unqualified opinion. Other sets of financial statements would 
be used to vary the relative magnitude of the amount involved. In this manner, 
the impact of the type of audit report on users could be measured. However, 
while establishing the data stimuli is not too difficult, the method of measuring 
response is more troublesome. 
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An easy approach would be to allow the subjects to read through the informa-
tion and then, without allowing reference to the statements, have them answer 
a series of questions about the statements. In this fashion, it would be possible 
to determine whether variations in the audit report created a greater awareness 
of the uncertainty problem. However, this approach does not get at the critical 
question of whether the audit report has an impact on the decision process of 
the user. Would variations in the audit report cause any change in the user's 
decision? Would the different decisions be better decisions? 
Research on the impact of the audit report on the decision process adds an 
extremely complex element to an already difficult research problem. Research 
of this sort would require some knowledge of the financial statement user's fore-
casting model (conversion of historical data into estimates of the future) and his 
decision model (interaction of the estimates in reaching a decision). Research 
on the decision process typically assumes that all data presented to the subjects is 
of equal reliability. The subject is given no reason to doubt the veracity of the 
data. Introducing degrees of qualification concerning the reliability of the data 
considerably complicates the research problem. 
Usually in research of this type, to achieve adequate controls over the ex-
perimental situation, the phenomenon of interest must be simplified to such an 
extent that only a portion of the phenomenon can be captured and the research 
results are of doubtful applicability to the real world situation abstracted in the 
experiment. Consequently, the potential results of this type of research did not 
hold enough promise to serve as a basis for major policy decisions. In addition, 
with so little information available on the decision process of auditors, establish-
ing the criteria actually used by auditors seemed to be a more logical starting 
point. Future research, however, should begin to delve into this complex aspect 
of the reporting process. 
Those of us involved in the auditing research effort at the AICPA hope 
that the above list will serve as an early identification of significant research 
topics and stimulate the interest of academic researchers capable of performing 
adequate research on the issues. 
Research Environment 
Those performing research, however, should recognize that a distinction 
exists between academic and, for want of a better word, institutional research— 
meaning research conducted for a professional organization. Naturally, we ex-
pect the two to be different and some of the differences are legitimate, but others 
are of doubtful merit and might well be eliminated. 
Time-Span. Generally, academic research may be conducted over a longer 
time-span. Time constraints are usually personal and imposed by the desire or 
interest of the researcher. An academic researcher may envision a series of related 
studies conducted over a long period of time with each new study adding addi-
tional refinements to the previous effort. Institutional research must usually go 
directly from research results to implementing guidelines for practice. The 
study is usually related to the development of a professional pronouncement or a 
firm position and pressing deadlines may be attached to these publications. 
Real-World Referents. Academic research frequently opts for the simplifica-
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tion and control of highly abstract research settings. Experiments and simula-
tions allow precise measurement of variables, which is attractive even though 
there may be some doubt about the applicability of the results to the "real world." 
On the other hand, institutional research must often accept the loss of rigor and 
control to gain greater confidence that the research results are applicable to practice. 
Audience. Academic research is in many cases unabashedly aimed at other 
academicians, while institutional research must satisfy policy makers and practi-
tioners as well as other researchers. Since these groups undoubtedly have different 
norms and values, the reaction to institutional research results is likely to be 
mixed. 
Subject Choice. Institutional research almost always begins with a problem 
to be solved. The research method must be fit to the problem and there is little 
opportunity for restricting and tailoring the problem so that it may be answered 
by the available evidence. If the problem is defined and narrowed too much, 
the institutional researcher will fall far short of his task. In contrast, academic re-
searchers in many cases seem to choose a research method they would like to em-
ploy and then search for a problem that might be solved by that method. 
Bureaucratic Infringement Institutional research seems to be obviously 
plagued by possible conflicts between bureaucratic and professional norms. How-
ever, the academic researcher has a similar problem. In fact, his plight may be 
greater because the problem is much harder to recognize. The university is a 
complex oganization and survival and advancement in the academic community 
at times requires compliance with norms that may be in conflict with the ideals 
of a scholar. Blind adherence to an in vogue research method may take pre-
cedence over generation of fresh insight on difficult problems. The nonpara-
metric test of significance may assume more importance than the actual sig-
nificance—meaning relevance and importance—of the research results to the 
resolution of any real problem. As a consequence, too often academic research 
results in a glorification of technicians over discoverers, quantification for its own 
sake, and fitting problems to research techniques rather than the reverse. 
Concluding Remarks 
Auditing theory is important, but theory developed in isolation from the 
problems of practice at the profession level has little significance and risks being 
trivial. Note that there is a substantial difference between those problems which 
face the auditing profession collectively and those problems raised in each in-
dividual audit. 
To be worthwhile in the effort of solving significant problems, auditing 
research must be empirical. Nevertheless, deductive reasoning and attention to 
theory may never be ignored, and these elements should play an instrumental part 
in any auditing research. A clear specification of the problem, which is primarily 
a process of logic, may be the most important step in the research process. How-
ever, a convincing solution to an important problem is not likely without 
empirical evidence on the issues. 
There are many forms of empirical research. Too often empirical research 
in accounting has meant research methods employing an abstract data collection 
setting, with the possible exception of the ubiquitous "survey." At this stage in 
the development of the auditing field of knowledge, there is probably a greater 
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need for field studies and field experiments, or at least a combination of these 
methods with the more abstract methods in an ordered program of research. 
In closing, I would not discourage any auditing research, but I would en-
courage research directed to the problems identified in this paper; research that 
gives full recognition to the role of practice, as well as theory, in the research 
process. There is no legitimate distinction between theoretical and applied re-
search in auditing since neither theory nor practice can reach its full potential 
without the other. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Future Directions for Auditing Research 
Frederick L. Neumann 
University of Illinois 
We are indebted to Mr. Carmichael for stimulating our awareness of audit-
ing as a subject for research, for broadening our perspective as to the challenges it 
presents, and for reminding us of the varied forms such research may take. 
One of the difficulties in discussing research is the plethora of terms, the 
abundance of jargon, and the attendant confusion which inevitably results from 
the clash of varying philosophies that abound in this area. In this respect, at 
least, it's easy to believe that scientists were called philosophers well into the 
middle of the last century. 
One of the first exercises we assign our Masters' students in their research 
course is to have them define and discuss their concept of research. You would 
be amazed at the range of views this term conjures up. It is for this reason that, 
when discussing this area, one must be very careful in defining terms and creat-
ing classifications to be sure they are not only understood but are also appropriate 
to the intended use. We must try to select those properties for partitioning our 
subject matter which will provide the most useful set of pigeonholes for the pur-
pose at hand. I would like to employ some of the classifications used in Mr. 
Carmichael's paper as a means of discussing some of the issues they raise. 
Theoretical vs. Applied Research 
For example, it is inevitable that one or more of our Masters' students will 
introduce the theoretical vs. applied dichotomy in discussing research. This dis-
tinction may have some advantages conceptually, but it can be confusing when 
applied to actual research. It may be used with some benefit to describe the 
motivation for specific research, but it can be misleading if employed to label 
the results. 
I can understand Mr. Carmichael's considerable interest in applied auditing 
research but the role of theoretical research in auditing should not be neglected. 
(Hopefully, I will be able to avoid any of the semantic traps I have warned 
against above.) 
Kerlinger defines theory as " . . . a set of interrelated constructs, definitions, 
and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying re-
lations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phe-
nomena."1 
The role of theory is to provide general explanations of empirical events 
and objects to enable us to link together our knowledge of separate occurrences 
and predict events yet unknown. It helps to identify relevant variables and the 
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relationships between them—regularities which we can express in generalizations. 
Without it we have difficulty classifying our knowledge and evaluating our find-
ings. It also helps to direct further research. As has been said, "There is nothing 
more practical than a good theory." 
Primary induction, to attempt to find explanations for observed behavior, 
is interesting and useful for learning facts and developing hypotheses; but our 
ultimate goal must be secondary induction, which seeks to incorporate results 
of primary induction into an explanatory theory covering a wide range of inquiry. 
Limited, specific research projects have their value. Theoretical research, how-
ever, is the more general and more widely applicable. I, therefore, believe it is 
essential for reasonable progress. 
Without adequate theory we may lack direction, proper perspective, and 
consistency in our decisions. We have already experienced—in the problems of 
the APB—some of the consequences of pragmatically based decisions. As 
Business Week recently noted about activity in accounting, "When loopholes 
are closed and detailed rules are drawn up on an issue-by-issue basis, the result 
often is illogical, arbitrary, and inconsistent."2 
Without adequate theory, we may extend current actions which are faulty 
—simply because they are generally practiced—and, thus, compound the error. 
Whitehead pointed out a similar fallacy with regard to common sense by ob-
serving, "Its sole criterion for judgment is that the new ideas shall look like the 
old ones."3 Mr. Carmichael seems to favor a role for theory but appears to link 
it very closely to the problems of practice. Were others to extend this emphasis 
unduly, it could have unfortunate consequences. 
Bernstein states that applied accounting research, ". . . has more limited 
objectives and addresses itself to finding the most feasible and best possible 
solutions to specific problem areas."4 A preoccupation with practice may tend 
to focus primarily on the present state of knowledge to the neglect of its future 
development. Lynd has observed that, while ". . . the role of the learned man in 
earlier times may have been to stabilize custom and to conserve the past; . . . the 
social scientist, as his modern day counterpart [and I view the accountant in this 
light] . . . is bound more closely to the moving front edge of man's experience."5 
Lynd continues: 
This means that, granting all due weight to the institutionalized past 
as it conditions present behavior, the variables in the social scientist's 
equation must include not only the given set of structured institutions, 
but also what the present human carriers of those institutions are groping 
to become.6 
In the same Business Week article cited above, James S. Mahon, a partner 
in Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, ascribes the public's current disillusion-
ment with accounting to the failure of the profession to discern three significant 
trends in attitude: 
First, we failed to perceive the growing cleavage between independent 
ownership and professional management; second, we were slow to rec-
ognize the emerging power of the institutional investor in the financial 
community; third, and perhaps most important, we did not anticipate 
the public clamor for exactitude in financial reporting.7 
113 
A singular focus on practice is apt to result in more of such surprises. 
Furthermore, to overemphasize practice could lead to the neglect of a vast 
amount of knowledge being developed in related fields. As Justin Davidson 
has observed: 
But perhaps the most serious flaw in the present arrangements is the fact 
that needed knowledge of vital interest to the accounting profession is 
simply not produced—whole areas of important subject matter can be, 
and have been, completely overlooked so far as research is concerned.8 
Moreover, Mr. Carmichael's hope that a theory of auditing that will be a 
"comprehensive explanation . . . an organized systematized body of knowledge" 
may be illusory if it is drawn from practice which is itself inconsistent, unorgan-
ized and unsystematic in its approach to problems. 
There are indeed numerous, pressing problems in practice today for which 
there is very little, if any, "evidence and information available to assist in reach-
ing sound decisions." And the situation looks as though it may get worse before 
it gets better. Nevertheless, if one were to be overly attentive to these practical 
issues, without an equal awareness and development of the broad-based theory 
which underlies—or should underly—this area, he would be asking for more of 
the same confusion which plagues the profession today. 
Academic vs. Institutional Research 
Another dichotomy in Carmichael's paper which, if improperly interpreted, 
could lead us astray is the one of academic vs. institutional research. Again, 
this is a distinction which may play a useful role when properly applied but 
which can also be the cause of mischief if carried beyond the bounds of its 
relevant range. 
Mautz and Gray, in the article cited by Carmichael, allude to such a dis-
tinction as one means of describing past developments and explaining the current 
status.9 The Wheat Committee and others have done so, as well. While it may 
be a useful classification in such a context, it should not be interpreted as a 
necessary characterization of research endeavors in the years ahead. If Mr. 
Carmichael's remarks were extended in this latter manner, these terms could 
have the unfortunate consequence of hardening lines of demarcation which are 
at once unnecessary and potentially deleterious. Such a misinterpretation could 
perpetuate distinctions which are not germane to the needs of research. Rather 
than a possible further widening of the breach, what we need is a greater effort 
to narrow the differences. Let's not perpetuate the unfortunate stereotype of 
the academician as one who is only incidentally interested in the problems of 
the man on the firing line. Alternatively, there is Chambers' characterization of 
the practitioner as ". . . concerned with analysis of the immediate problem con-
text of a client."10 Each party has certain skills and knowledge which may be 
of significant help in solving the problems of auditing. Our abilities should be 
of more interest than our orientation. In fact, we have some empirical evidence 
present here at this conference that this is so and I heartily endorse the sugges-
tion that there be "more attempts at cooperative research linking practitioners 
and theorists in joint efforts."11 
I would recommend to the Institute—and to public accounting firms as 
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well—that, rather than sort out projects in terms of academic vs. institutional 
interest, they endeavor to combine the best attributes of people in both areas and 
seek to assign practitioners and academicians to the same project. It may re-
quire that those oriented toward practice develop a better understanding of 
research and a greater appreciation of the role of theory. Some theoreticians on 
the other hand may have to descend from their ivory towers to learn more about 
the realities of practice. 
The Wheat Committee has estimated one year as sufficient time to complete 
most accounting research studies.12 Many firms now offer internships to faculty 
to experience auditing "like it is." Why couldn't there be faculty research intern-
ships as well?—or, for that matter, practitioner sabbaticals? They could be at 
a firm's office; or some practitioners might find it easier to do such work on the 
campus. Also, there is the growing manpower represented by retired practi-
tioners and professors, as well. There would seem to be much potential for 
cooperation. 
Research Methodology 
Joint projects might also succeed in getting a better hearing for their results. 
The failure of accounting research, to date, to attract more attention, is a prob-
lem that concerned Mautz and Gray among others.13 One explanation hypothe-
sized by them for this condition is the lack of an established research method-
ology.14 It may be that we have been derelict in its use but the classical approach 
of scientific methodology is as applicable to auditing as it is to any social science. 
We may be impatient that such an approach offers, at best, slow and tedious 
progress; but it is still the most dependable route to reliable knowledge that 
man has yet found. As Pierce has noted, 
To satisfy our doubts, . . . therefore, it is necessary that a method should 
be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, 
but by some external permanency—by something upon which our think-
ing has no effect . . . The method must be such that the ultimate con-
clusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. 
Its fundamental hypothesis . . . is this: There are real things, whose 
characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them . . . 1 5 
Carmichael has stressed—and rightly, I believe—the importance of problem 
specification as the first step. If a researcher wishes to solve a problem he must 
know what that problem is. Progress toward the solution is significantly en-
hanced when the researcher determines what it is he is attempting to do. Prob-
lems are perhaps best expressed as questions about the relationship of two or 
more variables—hopefully, with some indication as to the potential solution. 
Carmichael emphasizes the need at this point for a close tie to practice. 
Practice "should identify what phenomena require study and explication." 
Again, I am reluctant to place such a heavy emphasis on practice. I noted, 
above, my fears that using practice as the primary referrent may lead to com-
pounding errors. Primary reliance on the perceptions of the practitioner without 
due consideration of the broader issues and of theory may be short-sighted and 
could be quite harmful. As the paper observes, "In its most general form, the 
research process consists of the identification and measurement of variables that 
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are relevant to a given problem or phenomenon . . . " A singular focus on practice 
could overlook significant variables and, as a consequence, result in incomplete 
observation, inadequate data collection, and misleading results. The selection 
process sets in motion the empirical testing program which Carmichael feels is 
so important. Limiting the selection process to considerations of practice may 
very well bias the program and provide results which are deceptive. 
The classical approach of science to a problem is through the formulation 
of an hypothesis—a tentative or conjectural statement about the relationship be-
tween the variables in question, propounded with the object of following out 
its consequences. Morris Cohen has noted, 
There is . . . no genuine progress in scientific insight through the 
Baconian method of accumulating empirical facts without hypotheses 
or anticipation of nature. Without some guiding idea we do not know 
what facts to gather. Without something to prove, we cannot determine 
what is relevant and what is irrelevant.16 
Hypotheses may be derived from theory and are a means of extending 
theory. They should be testable and, under proper conditions, can be demon-
strated to be probably true or probably false, independent of man's beliefs or 
desires. They are a very powerful tool in acquiring dependable knowledge. 
Mr. Carmichael might have formulated several hypotheses in response to 
his problem in ARM No. 1, to determine the variables used in defining "suf-
ficiently material." There is ample precedent in the literature, for example, to 
have hypothesized certain financial statement measures as both necessary and 
sufficient conditions for defining this term. 
The next step after hypothesis formulation is to deduce testable consequences 
from the selected hypothesis. There is little to be gained from metaphysical 
hypotheses that have no testable implications. In ARM No. 1, this step could 
have led, as Carmichael suggests, to "if . . . then" propositions that certain 
relative magnitudes on the financial statements would prompt practitioners to 
change their opinions from "qualified" to either "adverse" or "disclaimed." It 
should be noted that the process of formulating hypotheses can often aid in 
clarifying problem statements as well as in leading to operational implications 
and testing situations. 
The test of the hypothesized relation then follows, to see if, under the 
deduced conditions, that relationship seems to hold. Here the role of the 
hypothesis may become clearer. For without some guide as to what is to be 
watched, incomplete and inaccurate observations may be made. 
Mr. Carmichael has spelled out in his paper one way in which an hypothesis, 
such as the one just propounded, might be tested. He thus gives recognition to 
the amenability of auditing phenomena to scientific research methodology. 
It should be noted, as Dewey points out, that this methodology, in imple-
mentation, is usually not as neatly defined.17 The sequence may be irregular. 
Steps may overlap and mutually support each other in development. 
Carmichael chose an alternative approach to his problem, however, for the 
reasons explained in his paper. He undertook the study with apparently no 
clearly formulated hypotheses but an awareness of the variables which might 
possibly be at work in the decision process. In view of the primitive stage of 
our theory and the pressing need for decisions, perhaps the best route to knowl-
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edge about particular issues is to identify as many possible independent variables 
as we can, to come up with as many possible explanations as Marvin Stone can 
dream up, and undertake large data gathering projects that are guided, of course, 
by appropriate statistical methodology. Properly done, such efforts may permit 
us to narrow more rapidly the bounds of probability and to focus more readily 
on subsequent investigation. 
Topics for Investigation 
I might also observe that such studies as these that we have been discussing 
are of a positive nature—that is, they seek to explain what is and, thereby, to 
predict what will be. That is consistent with our common preoccupation: 
witness "generally accepted" accounting principles and "generally accepted" 
auditing standards. This orientation, however, tends to overlook any normative 
aspects—what should be. Remember, to Judge Friendly in the Continental 
Vending Case, as we noted yesterday, generally accepted accounting principles 
did not necessarily result in "fair presentation." 
In one sense, research into normative aspects could result from findings 
regarding user behavior. Developments in this regard could conceivably be 
tested as Mr. Carmichael has noted. In another sense, however, normative be-
havior enmeshes both the user and the auditor in questions of value. Questions 
of this nature are almost impossible to test with the approach suggested above. 
In his proposed topics for research, Carmichael has presented a rather far-
ranging set of suggested challenges. Investigations into user needs and user 
behavior are noticeably deemphasized, however. Though such investigations 
may be implied by some of the topics listed, none explicitly calls for it. If the 
auditor's work is to assist the user in evaluating the quality of the material pre-
sented, then the auditor's criteria must inevitably be drawn from the needs and 
concerns of those users. Difficult and complex though the area may be, it must 
be explored. Both auditors and accountants could profit from extensive research 
into this area. I hope it will not be ignored, for to me it represents an ultimate 
authority in guiding future decisions. It may require patience and humility as 
well as wisdom and care. Perhaps it may even result in a new Journal of Unsuc-
cessful Research in Accounting and Auditing, but we must start. 
Abstract vs. Natural Research Methodology 
I was pleased to see that the paper takes time to discuss research method-
ology, particularly research design, as a separate issue. An adequately planned 
and executed research design is of considerable help both in making observations 
and in making inferences therefrom. Research design establishes the framework 
for the test. It is through its implementation that the researcher attempts to 
answer the problem posed and to control variance. We have already alluded to 
the importance of a properly formulated problem and how it may be approached. 
Research design should help to answer the problem as validly, objectively, ac-
curately, and economically as possible. We have not, however, said much about 
control of variance—the major technical function of research design. 
Control of variance usually refers to changes in the dependent variable. The 
research endeavors to isolate, as much as possible, the effect of the independent 
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variable in question. The researcher tries to minimize, nullify, or eliminate the 
influence of all other variables that might play a role but which, for one reason 
or another, are not of interest at the time. It is through the relative ability to 
control variance that Carmichael arrives at the traditional classification scheme 
of research design. 
It should be made clear, however, that the researcher must be aware of 
variables at work that might influence his dependent variable under any type 
of research, if he is to be able to say anything about his results. In this sense, 
theory must precede all forms of research. It is true that under abstract condi-
tions, the researcher builds the experimental environment, while under field or 
natural conditions, he must accept much of what already exists. It may, how-
ever, be a rather sweeping generalization to state, "in the natural setting, there 
is less precision in the measurement of variables and less certainty that research 
results are attributable to a particular variable." 
Nevertheless, under either condition, the researcher is dealing with less 
than the whole. Selective perception in the natural setting can be just as destruc-
tive of validity as can the failure to secure correspondence with reality in the 
abstract setting. To say that "when abstract settings are used, the researcher 
must incorporate theory in the situation before data are collected . . . [while] 
. . . when using natural settings, the researcher collects data and then incorporates 
theory as he interprets the data" is to me another distinction which could be 
misleading. Under either condition, theory can provide guidance for identification 
of variables and control of variance in advance of observation and should, to 
enhance our confidence in our results. As Poincare noted, 
It is often said that experiments should be made without preconceived 
ideas. That is impossible. Not only would it make every experiment 
fruitless, but even if we wished to do so, it could not be done.18 
Perhaps an alternative distinction might be between those conditions under 
which the researcher can observe the action of the independent variables and the 
dependent variables' response, and those under which the action has preceded 
the observation and the researcher must impute the relationship by retrospection. 
There is a significant difference between these two cases, as in the latter there 
was no chance for the researcher to exercise control of the independent variables 
and a hypothesized relationship can therefore be asserted with probably less 
confidence than under the former conditions. 
Control is crucial if we are to have confidence in research outcomes. With-
out it, as Professor David Green has said, "The results cannot be illuminating; 
interesting perhaps, but not illuminating."19 
Conclusion 
One of the ironies of research in auditing—to me—is that a group which 
proclaims some interest in objectivity and which pretends some expertise in 
evaluating control, analyzing evidence, and enhancing credibility should have 
such a poor track record in research. Mautz and Sharaf showed us our potential. 
Hopefully, Mr. Carmichael's program will lead to an era of joint cooperation 
of academician and practitioner that will result in significant, new, and reliable 
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knowledge about auditing, about those who practice it, and especially about 
those whom it seeks to serve. 
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8 
The Problem with Auditing Is . . . . 
(The Stuff Dreams Are Made of) 
Marvin L. Stone 
Stone, Gray and Company 
Most of the other papers delivered at this symposium commence with the 
word "toward," e.g., Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling, Toward Stand-
ards for Materiality, Toward a Philosophy of Auditing. Apparently our chair-
man had no wish to go "toward" further problems in auditing when he assigned 
my topic. Consequently, my talk may be described as "untoward." I have 
thought a great deal about my topic since I received the assignment—so much in 
fact, that it has found its way into my dreams. Before addressing myself formally 
to the topic, let me describe a few of those dreams. My dreams are seldom, if 
ever, in technicolor. Everything is in sharply defined black and white—no gray 
areas, as in real life. 
Dream No. 1—Independence and Fees 
The scene of dream number one is a courtroom in which Ralph Nader is 
presiding judge. As my dream commenced, I was on the witness stand and 
was being asked to describe the CPA's role. The questioner was a not-too-
friendly banker who frequently questions the CPA's independence. In all 
candor, his question was a little more pointed—something like, "What the hell 
do you auditors do, anyway?" 
Casting aside my well-known reticence to speak before an audience, I 
delivered the following carefully prepared extemporaneous remarks: 
The business community in which all of us live and work is very much 
like a giant football game. Businessmen play the game. The SEC and 
we CPAs are the officials—the only difference being that the SEC has a 
whistle, but the CPAs don't. 
The public, watching from the stands, relies on the officials to see that 
everyone plays by the rules—the same rules. The rules are written to 
permit a little deceptive ball-handling, designed to fool competitors on 
the other team, but not to prevent the spectators from determining how 
the game is going—who is gaining ground and who is losing. 
Many of the onlookers don't even know what the game is all about. They 
just came along to watch because that's what everyone else was doing. 
Everyone watching the game is entitled to know that the gains and 
losses of all the players are measured against the same yard markers. 
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They are entitled to expect that first-down measurements are all made 
with the same ten-yard chain, and that all players are battling over 36-
inch yards. Even the best binoculars don't provide an observer in the 
stands with vision equal to that of a person on the playing field. That's 
why officials are needed. 
Its the very nature of things that occasional disagreements arise between 
the players and the officials. Rule enforcers seldom win popularity con-
tests. And, of course, a few shouts from the stands of "Kil l the Ump" 
are in the best American tradition. In our case, whenever anyone sees 
an infraction which escapes the official's view, the shouts come out, 
"Where was the Auditor?" 
Like officials at other games, the officials in this game of business are 
rarely accused of dishonesty, I am happy to say. One hears an occasional 
derogatory comment about our eyesight or intelligence, but then the right 
to call an Ump blind or stupid is also part of our American Heritage. 
Once in a while a particularly incensed spectator may even question the 
legitimacy of our birth. Unpleasant as it is to hear epithets such as these, 
all of us—officials and players alike—must grin and bear it. For if the 
public didn't buy tickets to the game—i.e., if they didn't buy stock in the 
companies whose statements we audit—there would be no game. 
While many of the spectators may just come along for the ride, the 
majority have a vital stake in the outcome of the game. They have 
placed heavy bets on one team or another. It's up to the CPA to give 
those who have a stake in the game the best possible data with which 
to evaluate the teams. 
Naturally, I expected applause, or at least rapt attention interrupted peri-
odically by chuckles of amusement at the cleverness of my analogy. Instead, the 
judge and jurors exhibited an attitude of obvious skepticism as they shook their 
heads in disbelief. When I looked closer, I noted that each of the jurors was also 
a bank loan officer. In fact, it began to look like a Robert Morris Associates 
meeting. 
The examining counsel continued his questioning: 
Q. In this football game of business, Mr. Stone, how does it happen that 
each team hires its own referees? 
A. Traditionally, every firm has always had the right to engage auditors 
(and for that matter, all types of professional advisors) of its choice. 
The right was questioned during Congressional hearings which pre-
ceded passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. When a spokes-
man for the accounting profession was asked at that time who audits 
the auditors, he replied, "Our consciences." 
Q. You're supposed to be independent of your clients. Isn't that right, 
Mr. Stone? 
A. Yes, that is correct. Our code of ethics contains strong rules designed 
to insure our independence, both in appearance and in fact. 
Q. How can you be independent of the client who pays you? Doesn't 
his right to discharge you in favor of another auditor impair your 
supposed independence, both in appearance and in fact? 
A. No, not at all. We are governed not only by our consciences, but also 
by a growing body of official pronouncements which provide guide-
lines to eliminate at least part of the potential areas of disagreement. 
The possibility that some agrieved party might sue for damages un-
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doubtedly acts as an additional safeguard against the auditor's suc-
cumbing to client pressure. As you probably know, no member of 
the auditing firm may serve as an officer or director of the company 
to be audited, nor may any member own any interest whatsoever, 
either directly or indirectly. 
My questioner obviously considered my answer somewhat lame and not al-
together responsive. He continued by saying: 
Your profession seems to have taken great pains to avoid minor infringe-
ments of actual or apparent independence. For example, you can't 
audit a company if even a few of its shares are owned by the wife of 
one of your partners in Seattle or Miami because that might make it 
appear that you aren't independent. Yet you consider your independence 
unsullied by the fact that your entire relationship with the client depends 
completely on his willingness to re-engage you and to pay your fee. 
Although these comments weren't framed as a question, I took the oppor-
tunity to comment on the growing feeling that the public is really the CPA's 
client and to describe the AICPA's 1967 statement urging corporations to appoint 
audit committees composed of outside directors to nominate auditors and to re-
ceive their reports. This led to the following additional questions: 
Q. Is this AICPA statement binding on anyone? 
A. No. It's merely an advisory statement. 
Q. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that this advisory statement has had 
very little effect on publicly held companies? 
A. I believe some corporations have adopted the recommendation, but 
I don't know how many. 
Q. How would this recommendation affect the thousands of companies 
that have no "outside" directors? 
A. It would have no effect. 
Taking a somewhat different tack, the questioner asked: 
Q. Mr. Stone, a minute ago you commented that the CPA's real client 
is the public. If that is so, why are auditors' reports addressed to the 
company, its board of directors, or its stockholders? Why not "to 
whom it may concern" or simply no salutation at all? 
After pondering the question for a few moments, I was tempted to quote 
Tevye, the impoverished dairyman in "Fiddler on the Roof," who when asked 
to explain one of his people's traditions says, "You may ask, 'Why do we wear 
our little round skullcaps?' Well, I'll tell you—I don't know." 
However, since I had been billed as an expert, I felt obliged to burble a few 
ill-chosen words to the effect that the apparent inconsistency was merely evi-
dence of the dynamic nature of the accountant's world. I agreed that different 
wording might well be more consistent with the auditor's present relationship 
to the public. 
At this point, my lawyer took advantage of the rather liberal procedural 
rules which pervade my dreams and warned me in a stage whisper that eliminat-
ing the traditional salutation from the auditor's opinion could well lead to a 
further deterioration of the Ultramares doctrine which requires a greater degree 
of care by CPAs to their clients than to third parties who have no privity. Easing 
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the seeming distinction between clients and third parties could serve to ac-
celerate that trend. 
Then, in a typical display of what for want of a better term I will call "law-
yer other-handedness," he said: "But on the other hand, the Shatterproof Glass 
decision may have already buried Ultramares." Once again, I yearned for a 
one-armed lawyer. 
Having been thus forewarned (if not forearmed) by my lawyer, I turned 
my attention back to the examining counsel. He concluded his interrogation 
with one more salvo: 
Q. Mr. Stone, if, as you say, the public is your client, should not your 
pay come from the public? After all, he who pays the piper calls 
the tune. 
Before I could respond, I was dismissed and James Needham, a member 
of the Securities Exchange Commission, was called to the witness stand. 
Q. Mr. Needham, would you describe your professional qualifications. 
A. I am a Certified Public Accountant, and was engaged in the practice 
of public accounting for a number of years before appointment to 
the SEC. 
Q. Is the SEC considering the issuance of a recommendation that out-
side directors nominate the corporate auditors? 
A. Yes, the Commission is considering such a proposal. In its present 
form, the recommendation would not have the force of law. If 
adopted, it would amount to a strong nudge. 
Q. Could you tell us why the SEC is considering this move? 
A. We've become concerned about the quality of work performed by 
many accounting firms. In fact, I've suggested that accounting firms 
might find it beneficial to reevaluate their current large outlays on 
professional development in light of the actual audit performance. 
The SEC has found instances of problems relating to elementary 
disclosure, succumbing to obvious pressure by clients, faulty judg-
ments and decisions at the partnership level of the certifying account-
ing firms, and questions of independence bordering on commercial 
fraud. 
After James Needham stepped down, the examining counsel summed up 
by saying: 
When life insurance companies want to know whether they should bet 
on my survival, they don't ask me to hire a doctor—they send me to 
theirs. The same thing happens when I apply for a job and the employer 
requires a physical examination. Perhaps its time for someone other 
than the contestants to hire the referees in the game of business 
described by Mr. Stone. 
As my dream faded out, I kept hearing the song from the "King and I" in 
which the King of Siam, musing on what to tell his son and heir about women, 
and life in general, wonders aloud if he should educate him in all the ancient lies. 
Then, frustrated at the indecision fostered by his new-found modern knowledge, 
the King sings: "When my father was a king, he was a king who knew exactly 
what he knew." 
As the King says: "Is a puzzlement!" 
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Dream No. 2—Audited Forecasts 
The second dream I would like to tell you about again found me on the 
witness stand. This time, however, the examining counsel was a well-known 
financial analyst. His questions went something like this: 
Q. I use financial statements to help predict the future. If you insist 
on using historical costs, why don't you at least give me a projection 
for the next year or two? 
A. Management is hesitant to divulge its plans, since to do so might aid 
competitors. 
Q. Management must have prepared a budget and cash forecast. Why 
can't we see them? 
A. Management would rather not answer for differences between pre-
dicted and actual results. Not only that, unscrupulous managements 
could adjust predictions to further their own aims. Over-optimistic 
predictions could be used to generate short-range increases in stock 
prices. Overly pessimistic predictions could be made public in order 
to cause actual results to look good by comparison. From the data in 
an annual report, readers can construct their own forecasts. 
Q. What you are giving us then, is a kind of "do-it-yourself kit." That 
arrangement doesn't seem very efficient. Management and its ac-
countants have the best grasp of the pertinent facts and are most 
knowledgeable about future plans. Yet they withhold the very data 
we users need. What kind of full disclosure is that? 
Even in my somnolent condition, I recognized this as a rhetorical question to 
which no answer was expected. Counsel continued: 
Q. Do CPAs audit budgets and other forecasts? 
A. CPAs often assist clients in preparing budgets and forecasts; however, 
we don't audit them. Our ethical rules prohibit the expression of 
an opinion on forecasts. 
Q. Why the prohibition? 
A. CPAs traditionally report on data that is susceptible to objective tests. 
Forecasts are based on opinions as to future events. An evaluation of 
the likelihood of such events occurring and of their probable results 
necessarily must rely largely on subjective evidence. 
Q. You say CPAs aren't permitted to render opinions on future events. 
Isn't a historical statement full of assumptions about the future? Isn't 
your examination of receivables and the related provision for un-
collectible accounts explicitly directed toward future collectibility? 
Isn't your examination of inventories concerned primarily with future 
saleability? Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that future recoverability of 
unamortized plant and equipment costs is one of your principal con-
cerns when examining fixed assets? Similarly, isn't future recover-
ability of primary concern when you examine capitalized research 
and development costs? 
You say that CPAs render opinions only on objectively determined 
historical costs. Frankly, it seems to me that the line between the 
past and the future is hazy indeed. In fact, Mr. Stone, isn't it true 
that the "going concern" concept which underlies the financial state-
ments of every business entity is, in effect, an implied opinion as 
to the future? 
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Suppressing a mischievous desire to ask that the question be repeated, I again 
assumed the question to be rhetorical. Mistaking my silence as a sign of tacit 
agreement (or at least the absence of any objection) my interrogator continued: 
Q. We only consult history to shed some light on the future. Since 
auditing purports to be a utilitarian art not an academic exercise, 
why do CPAs audit history but not budgets? 
My recollection of how this dream ended is somewhat hazy. I recall ex-
amining counsel repeating the last question over and over with ever-increasing 
insistence. I remember wondering why my lawyer failed to come to my aid by 
objecting to the questioner's haranguing and argumentative line of inquiry, until 
I noticed that the presiding judge was one Lewis Gilbert. 
Should any of you wonder how this dream sequence ends, a midnight snack 
consisting of a liverwurst and smoked oyster sandwich on rye and a bottle of 
beer will produce an instant replay—at least, that's what induced the original. 
Dream No. 3—Management Advisory Services and Independence 
I seem to have tuned in late on the next Dream, so I didn't catch the ques-
tioner's name. As the dream opened, I was again on the witness stand and 
questioning was already underway. This time, the questioner was speaking in 
a pleasant, disarming way, with a hint of New York in his voice. He was hum-
ming a tune that I couldn't quite place. His questions began: 
Q. Mr. Stone, you were saying that audits often result in recommenda-
tions to the client. 
A. Yes. Most CPAs consider the suggestions for improvement of a 
client's operations the most important result of an audit—certainly 
the most tangible. 
Q. Are CPAs often engaged to render management advisory services 
as a result of the recommendations contained in the so-called man-
agement letter? 
A. That depends somewhat on the nature of the CPA's expertise and 
his ability to convince the client that consulting services are needed 
and that the CPA is the most logical supplier of those services. In 
many instances, CPAs are engaged to render the services recom-
mended in a management letter. 
Examining counsel continued in a friendly vein: 
Q. Could you give us some examples of these services? 
A. CPAs are often engaged to improve a client's accounting system or 
even to install a completely new system. We advise clients how 
taxes may be reduced by choosing the most beneficial accounting 
methods for such items as depreciation and inventory valuation. We 
occasionally assist clients in revising their financial structure to im-
prove working capital or to facilitate expansion. Clients sometimes 
need help in deciding to buy or lease needed equipment or real 
estate. CPAs can be useful in that area as well. 
Q. Aren't you being too modest, Mr. Stone? I've read that CPAs con-
tribute to client profitability. I've heard them described as a vital 
part of the management team. Don't CPAs often play an important 
role in merger, sale and acquisition negotiations? 
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I cast my eyes downward, blushing slightly, and kicked my foot to the side 
diffidently as I uttered some modest phrase like, "Aw shucks." Then I proceeded 
to describe in some detail a few of the more imaginative consulting services I 
have performed during my professional career. I must confess that even the 
retelling itself became somewhat imaginative as I warmed to the task. I was 
feeling positively eloquent by the time I finished. 
The euphoria into which I lapsed was interrupted by my questioner. With a 
sardonic smile on his lips and a somewhat more insistent tone in his voice he 
asked: 
Q. After performing these many and varied services for your clients, 
Mr. Stone, are you still independent to report to the public? Can you 
look objectively at the outcome of a transaction you helped structure? 
Can you judge the fairness of data accumulated by a system you 
designed? 
Jolted out of my blissful state, I started to collect my thoughts in order to 
frame a response. The judge, Malcolm Devore, gave me a short respite as he 
leaned down from the bench to remonstrate my questioner: "One question at 
a time, Professor Briloff, one question at a time." As I heard my questioner's 
name, I suddenly remembered the name of the tune he was humming. It came 
from "The Mikado" by Gilbert and Sullivan and is called, "I Am the Lord 
High Executioner." 
Having regained my composure, I delivered the profession's traditional 
response: 
A. In consulting engagements, CPAs merely advise; decisions are made 
by the client. 
Judge Malcolm Devore listened with obvious sympathy to my reply, but 
Professor Briloff was so busy conferring with his co-counsel, Professor Schulte, 
that he didn't seem to be paying much attention to my answer. The moment I 
finished, Professor Briloff was back on his feet asking: 
Q. Shouldn't a CPA insure his independence, both in fact and in ap-
pearance, by refusing to perform consulting services for audit clients? 
I responded with the "party line": 
A. Any such policy would deprive the client of advice from the person 
best qualified to give it. Forcing the client to engage a multitude of 
advisors spreads responsibility and diminishes efficiency. 
In rebuttal, Professor Briloff commented, "Mr. Stone, your response sounds 
like an indictment of a separation-of-duties doctrine which is the very corner-
stone of every system of internal control." 
I was delighted that the judge relieved me of the obligation to reply by ruling 
Briloff's comments out of order. As the dream ended, the jury foreman (who also 
turned out to be Malcolm Devore) was applauding Judge Devore's decision. 
Dream No. 4—General Acceptance vs. Fairness 
I will recount just one more dream before getting to the subject of my talk. 
This dream opened in a courtroom where the bailiff was intoning the familiar, 
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"Hear ye, hear ye, this court is now in session in the case of General Acceptance 
vs. Fairness, Judge Henry J . Friendly presiding." Again, I found myself on the 
witness stand. After the usual preliminaries establishing my professional qualifica-
tions, the examining counsel, Wilma Soss, proceeded as follows: 
Q. Mr. Stone, the standard opinion rendered by CPAs contains the 
phrase, "generally accepted accounting principles." Could you tell 
the court by whom these accounting principles have been generally 
accepted? 
A. By preparers, users and auditors of financial statements. 
Q. How do CPAs learn of this "general acceptance"? Does some or-
ganization take a periodic poll? 
A. The Accounting Principles Board, an arm of the American Institute 
of CPAs, surveys accounting practices on a continuous basis. As a 
result of this surveillance and an extensive program of research, the 
APB issues opinions from time to time. Among other things, these 
opinions delineate which accounting principles are acceptable and 
which are not. 
Q. Has the APB issued opinions on all or substantially all of the prin-
ciples which underlie financial statements? 
A. No, the body of principles is large and continues to grow as condi-
tions change. Consequently, the APB, its predecessor, The Commit-
tee on Accounting Procedure, and the Financial Accounting Stand-
ards Board which will soon replace it could never hope to finish 
the task. The APB and its predecessor have tried to devote their 
resources to those areas most in need of attention. 
Q. I understand that alternative means have evolved to portray various 
segments of accounting data. When that occurs, Mr. Stone, which 
alternative gets the APB's blessing—the method with the most 
followers? 
A. Not necessarily. While the APB has attempted to narrow and reduce 
differences, you should understand that several alternative account-
ing methods may be considered generally accepted in a given situa-
tion, even though they may arrive at different results. 
Q. When several acceptable accounting methods are available, which 
method does the accountant use in a given situation? 
A. Hopefully, the one which results in the fairest presentation of the 
facts. 
Q. Aha! You said "fairest presentation." That's the first time that you 
have said anything about fairness. 
A. Fairness is the ultimate aim of all the APB's efforts. General accep-
tance is merely a means to that end. 
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that some of the accounting methods in gen-
eral use fall somewhat short of the fairness standard you describe? 
A. I suppose so. However, the APB is trying to weed out the inferior 
methods. 
Q. A moment ago, Mr. Stone, you said that "hopefully" an accountant 
will use the accounting method which results in the fairest presenta-
tion. Isn't the auditor required to insist on the fairest alternative 
before he expresses an opinion? 
A. No, there is no such requirement at present. However, CPAs often 
exert their influence in favor of the superior method. Perhaps some 
day the use not only of generally accepted accounting principles but 
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also of the most desirable GAAP will be required before an auditor 
renders an opinion on financial statements. 
Q. On the subject of the auditor's opinion, Mr. Stone, the standard lan-
guage somewhat confuses me. You CPAs say that statements "fairly 
present . . . in conformity with GAAP." That phrase could have 
several meanings. It could mean: 
a. The statements are both fair and in conformity with GAAP. 
b. The statements are fair because they are in conformity with GAAP. 
c. The statements are fair only to the extent that GAAP are fair. 
A. Your confusion is understandable. A special AICPA committee 
Which of these meanings does the CPA intend? 
urged some years ago that terms such as "present fairly" and "GAAP" 
be defined. A survey by Professor Briloff of selected members of 
the accounting profession and of the financial community showed 
support for each of the interpretations you mentioned and a few 
others as well. AICPA literature appears to take the second approach, 
i.e., "present fairly" is modified by the "conformity" portion of the 
full phrase. 
A fair presentation is to be understood within the framework 
of GAAP, much as the behavior of football players is to be under-
stood as "fair" within the framework of the rules of football. Just as 
what is fair in football may not be considered fair in other forms 
of social activity, meeting tests of fairness within the framework of 
GAAP does not guarantee meeting such tests from the standpoint 
of users of financial statements. This interpretation of the phrase 
might be called the "ground rules" theory.* 
Q. Does the "ground rules" approach have the widest support among 
the members of the accounting profession and the financial com-
munity? 
A. No, the Briloff survey showed a preference for the first interpreta-
tion. This is an understandable reaction from the financial commu-
nity, but a somewhat surprising reaction from CPAs since it is the 
least favorable from the legal liability standpoint. Incidentally, for 
some years, Arthur Andersen & Co. worded its opinions: "Present 
fairly . . . and were prepared in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles," which also infers a meaning similar to the 
first interpretation. 
Q. With so much disagreement among CPAs themselves as to the 
meaning of key words in the standard opinion, is it any wonder 
that people outside the accounting profession don't know what an 
auditor's opinion means? 
A. The accounting profession has worked long and hard to improve 
communication with the public. The profession unquestionably still 
has a long way to go. Since fair presentation of data is clearly the ac-
countant's major goal, it may well be that the term, GAAP, will 
prove to be a mere way-station in the evolution of the auditor's 
opinion. The term may well disappear in time, taking with it many 
questions of semantics which now bedevil writers and readers of 
CPA opinions. Should this come to pass, the issues raised in this 
dispute between "general acceptance" and "fairness" will become 
moot. 
* See " 'Present Fairly' and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles," Geraldine F. 
Dominiak and Joseph G. Louderback III, The CPA Journal, January, 1972, pp. 45-49. 
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I quickly learned how the judge felt about the matter when he instructed 
the jury that the critical test in determining if financial statements are false or 
misleading is whether they fairly present financial position, not whether they 
conform with GAAP. Before a decision was reached, the trial was interrupted 
by the clarion call of my alarm clock, arousing me to another day of toil in the 
vineyards of public enlightenment. 
Unfortunately, problems with auditing don't stop when I awaken. Here 
then are a few more of the problems with which auditors must wrestle, awake 
or asleep. 
Need for a Better Defined Philosophy of Auditing 
Some years ago, Mautz and Sharaf published an excellent monograph on 
the philosophy of auditing, a subject on which Bob Mautz will further expound 
tomorrow. While this work is a good start, I am certain that the authors did not 
intend their pioneering efforts as a final word on the subject. 
Neither auditors nor their clients seem to have a clearcut understanding of 
the auditor's role. In the area of fraud detection, for example, this uncertainty 
is evidenced by the fact that many audit procedures seem designed almost entirely 
to detect defalcations even though auditors continue to deny any responsibility 
for fraud detection. For many years, the public ascribed occult powers to auditors. 
Auditors were generally believed to possess near-magical powers to ferret out 
misdeeds merely by passing their hands over a set of books. Although auditors 
knew full well that no such magical powers existed, they somewhat enjoyed the 
effects of these widely held misconceptions and did little to dispel the mystique. 
Ony recently, have auditors—prompted by a rash of lawsuits—attempted to 
bring their public image into better focus. 
The trueblood Committee's findings (re: the objectives of financial state-
ments) could be a prelude to a similar study of audit objectives. Such a study 
might well provide a better exposition of just what an audit is, for whom it is 
performed, etc. 
Need to Recognize Auditing as a Discipline Separate from Accounting 
Since CPAs have traditionally audited financial statements, the line between 
accounting and auditing is not at all clear. This haziness is further enhanced 
by the fact that our reports are traditionally expressed in accounting terms. The 
need for a better delineation of auditing as a separate discipline is becoming more 
apparent as CPAs are called upon with greater frequency to audit non-financial 
data and management performance. 
The fuzziness of the line between accounting and auditing has been par-
ticularly evident in the protracted attempts to re-word the short form auditor's 
opinion. Part of the difficulty may, of course, be attributed to a natural reluctance 
to change. However, the main problem lies in the lack of a theoretical under-
pinning for the entire field of auditing. Without basic theory, it's no surprise 
that audit procedures are in a rudimentary stage of development. Drawing in-
ferences from a sample has long been a major technique of auditors. Yet the 
use of scientific sampling methods to insure validity and permit establishment 
of confidence levels is only recently making headway among auditors. Many 
CPAs still view statistical sampling as "organized superstition." 
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For auditing to come into its own, it must be severed from accounting and 
stand on its own theoretical feet. This move is particularly important if CPAs 
expect to be acknowledged as auditors of non-financial data, an important de-
velopment in my opinion. 
By way of example, the decennial census provides data upon which a great 
many people rely. The census, then, is an obvious candidate for independent 
audit. Were a CPA to undertake such an engagement, he would quickly find 
just how intertwined accounting and auditing really are. Few of his questions 
concerning theory, procedure, or form of report would be answered by any of 
the present auditing literature. 
Need for Current Value Reporting 
Without reiterating the current value arguments which were presented at 
the 1970 Kansas University symposium, historical cost creates problems for 
auditors, too. The auditor's function is to add credibility. No amount of auditing 
can make incredible statements credible. To most readers, I fear that the implica-
tions of historical cost statements are just that—incredible (and unintelligible, 
to boot). 
My firm audits a company which made a sizable investment in two parcels 
of land ten years ago. Last year, the value of one of these parcels dropped sub-
stantially below cost. The write-down converted the company's already meager 
earnings to a loss, causing a stockholder to dispose of his stock. 
The following year, the company sold its other parcel of ground at a gain 
which exceeded earnings for the last ten years combined. What do I tell the 
selling stockholder when he asks such questions as: 
Did the company really make all that money in one year? If not, how 
come the last nine years showed so little gain and even a loss last year 
when the other parcel was written down to market value? 
How credible did my audit make those financial statements? 
Financial Statements Give Erroneous Impression of Precision 
The language and dollar amounts which appear in financial statements con-
vey a much greater degree of precision than can be justified. In many respects, 
the accountant acts like the head linesman in a football game. After unpiling 
fifteen or twenty players, the referee places the ball approximately where he feels 
it belongs. Then the head linesman runs in with the chains to see whether the 
ball is one inch short or two inches beyond the first down line. So it is with 
accountants. After approximating the amount of receivables which will be col-
lected, the resulting estimate is shown as $614,319.23. Nowhere is the reader 
put on notice that the accountant is only 95% certain that the receivables total 
10% more or less than $614,319.23. If that is the degree of the accountant's cer-
tainty, shouldn't the financial statements say so? 
By stating earnings per share as an absolute amount of dollars and cents, 
that commonly used index is invested with a much greater degree of precision 
than any knowledgeable insider intends. Might not this aura of precision be 
laid to rest if earnings per share were stated as a range rather than as an 
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absolute amount? The use of a range might also lessen the impression of absolute 
accuracy which readers now obtain from financial statements. 
Need for Audit Research 
Until recently, there has been virtually no research as to the effectiveness of 
audit procedures, reflecting auditing's general position as the accounting pro-
fession's poor relation. While vast sums have been committed to accounting 
research and the work of the APB, only meager resources have been committed 
to auditing. Except for statistical sampling, audit procedures have largely been 
developed by doing rather than by empirical research. 
It's time to subject generally used audit procedures to critical examination. 
Just how effective are receivable confirmations, inventory observations, etc.? 
The accounting profession might well take a hard look at what went wrong 
when companies with robust statements, recently audited, suddenly go bankrupt. 
For example, if receivables turn out to be non-existent, perhaps CPAs should 
rethink the audit procedures which failed to uncover the problem. Perhaps 
research might uncover better audit procedures. 
None of these comments should be interpreted as criticism of the recent 
revival of the Committee on Auditing Procedure. That committee's present 
schedule could hardly be called "too little" even though it certainly came 
much "too late." 
Accountants' Financial Responsibility 
There seems to be a growing interest in the CPA's financial resources. Dur-
ing a recent meeting, a banker put it quite succinctly. He asked: "You say that 
CPAs are unlimitedly liable for their work. What assurance does that give a 
financial statement user? Are CPAs bonded? Is there any place we can deter-
mine the extent of a CPA's assets or insurance?" 
It is inevitable that the SEC will soon be asking similar questions. A sugges-
tion, heard infrequently in the past, that CPAs publish their own financial state-
ments, was recently repeated by John Burton, newly appointed Chief Accountant 
of the SEC. The size of an audit fee vis-a-vis the CPA's total income or resources 
could well bear on the question of the CPA's independence. 
Shortly after World War 1, so the story goes, the King of England sought 
advice concerning his country's perilous financial condition. A consultant sup-
posedly advised him to put India in his wife's name. The uncertainties of public 
accounting and the soaring cost of liability insurance have prompted many 
CPAs to take a similar route. Acceleration of this trend could serve to accentuate 
the public's concern over the CPA's financial responsibility. 
Perhaps the public's new-found concern over the accounting profession is 
a sign that we have arrived. At least now we are noticed. The CPA's increased 
prominence brings to mind the old story of a man who, having been tarred 
and feathered, was being ridden out of town on a rail. When he was asked 
how he felt about his predicament, he replied: "If it weren't for the honor, I'd 
rather walk." 
Reporting Requirements Burdensome to Small Business 
Although most reporting requirements are equally valid for both large and 
small companies, a few rules are obviously geared to the needs of publicly held 
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companies. At present, reporting requirements apply equally to companies of all 
sizes. Complying with certain of the reporting requirements (e.g., reporting 
earnings per share) can sometimes prove burdensome to a closely held company 
—a burden which produces meaningless data. It's time that each accounting 
and auditing pronouncement be scrutinized to determine whether or not it 
should apply equally to public and non-public companies. 
Promulgating Auditing Standards—A Problem of Coordination 
Inherent in many APB announcements are a number of practical auditing 
and reporting problems. Even though the Committee on Auditing Procedure 
and the APB are both arms of the AICPA, there appear to be some coordination 
problems. When the APB's functions are taken over by the new Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board, a completely independent entity, the problems of 
coordination are likely to increase. 
Here are a few examples of the hot potatoes with which the Committee on 
Auditing Procedure has dealt in recent months. At least in some cases, the prob-
lems have been magnified by the APB's unwillingness to expand its general 
pronouncements by including more specifics. 
1. APB Opinion 20 prevents a change to a less preferable accounting 
method. This first raises the question as to what accounting method 
is preferable in a given situation. Furthermore, it places the auditor 
in a somewhat awkward posture when one client changes to a pre-
ferable method of accounting while another client, in identical cir-
cumstances, continues to use a less preferable method. The CPA 
must give a clean opinion to both clients so long as consistency is 
maintained by each. In effect, the CPA is expressing an opinion that 
the second client is reporting in a manner which is "consistently 
unpreferable." 
2. APB Opinion 18 prescribes the equity method for subsidiaries in 
which the parent owns 50% or less where the parent exercises "sig-
nificant influence." Here the APB has attempted to suggest a rea-
sonable guideline by stating that 20% or more ownership will nor-
mally be considered "significant." Auditors may expect considerable 
client pressure against the equity method when a 25%-owned sub-
sidiary loses money. On the other hand, contrary pressures may be 
expected when an 18%-owned subsidiary shows excellent earnings. 
3. Similar problems arise when consolidating financial statements. 
Where the subsidiary reports on a different fiscal year than the parent, 
which statements of the subsidiary should be consolidated with the 
parent? The SEC permits consolidation with subsidiary statements 
prepared within 93 days of the parent's closing date. The APB, how-
ever, has not been that specific. This leaves the auditor with a serious 
problem. Should the parent consolidate with audited financial state-
ments for the subsidiary (which statements could be as much as 
eleven months old) or should more current unaudited financial 
statements be used? 
Comfort Letters 
I had intended to report to you on an interview with an investment banker 
concerning comfort letters. However, his teeth were chattering so from the "cold 
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comfort" he's been receiving from auditors' comfort letters that I couldn't under-
stand him. Consequently, let me close with a few unusual applications of 
statistical sampling. 
Statistical Sampling 
I am told that a major life insurance company, seeking to speed up payment 
of death claims, decided to use a computerized statistical model to forecast when 
policyholders' claims would come due. In this way, the company hoped to 
virtually eliminate the need for filing claims. Those policyholders who received 
payments of "death" claims were somewhat startled and began to wonder 
whether the insurance company knew something they didn't know. However, 
few complaints were received from these policyholders. Major complaints came 
from widows who upon filing claims on the death of their spouses received a 
computer-produced form letter stating that their husbands were not "statistically 
dead." 
A large department store, seeking to speed up its monthly billing procedure, 
devised a computerized model of its business. Feeding in historical data con-
cerning the buying habits of each customer, the computer could then produce 
monthly bills without becoming bogged down by the need for posting each in-
dividual charge slip. Customers were merely billed an amount equal to their 
historical purchases for a given month. The store was finally forced to abandon 
the system, not because it received many complaints, but primarily because 
charge business tripled when details of the new system leaked out. Describing 
the experiment to his superiors, the innovative controller who had devised the 
new system said that he had good news and bad news. The good news: just as 
predicted by the system designer, even a tripling of charge business put no 
strain on the billing system. With no increase in office personnel whatsoever, 
the same bills were mailed monthly to charge customers as before the volume 
increase. The bad news: the department store was experiencing difficulty in 
paying its suppliers. The controller suggested that even this deficiency could be 
resolved if all suppliers would adopt the same billing system. 
Despite the difficulties experienced by these two companies, my partners 
and I decided to experiment with statistical sampling in our accounting practice. 
Other practitioners assured us that statistical sampling prevented over-auditing 
and provided, at the same time, an acceptable confidence level. We reasoned 
that if statistical sampling can work on a client-by-client basis, why not for our 
entire practice? Consequently, we now audit a meticulously selected random 
sample of our clientele, before rendering an opinion on all of our clients. Na-
turally, we bill all clients—to avoid any charge of unethical conduct. Let me now 
recall, as best I can, one final dream—really just a catnap—that occurred shortly 
after we adopted this new modern approach to auditing. 
As this dream opens, my six partners and I are standing before Judge Walter 
Mansfield just before sentencing. I never did hear the charge, only the jury's 
verdict. Oddly enough, the judge was dressed in the ceremonial robes normally 
worn by the Emperor of Japan and was singing an excerpt from the Mikado, 
one of my favorite Gilbert and Sullivan operettas. Translated into English, his 
song went something like this: 
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"My object all sublime, 
I shall achieve in time, 
To let the punishment fit the crime, 
The punishment fit the crime." 
With this brief preamble, the judge announced the sentence: the seven of 
us were to be arranged in random number order (using the last three digits of 
our respective social security numbers) before a firing squad of 21 guns. [I 
remember thinking what a shame that my first 21-gun salute was also to be my 
last.] Each gun, though equipped with six chambers, would contain but one 
bullet. In this way, the judge stated that he was "95% sure that 82% of us 
would survive—give or take 10%." 
As we were remanded to the sheriff's custody, the judge said that he would 
have acquitted us had the case been tried before him without a jury—a statement 
which relieved all seven of us greatly. 
In closing, I say to our chairman, the arranger of this excellent symposium, 
that I am delighted that he asked me to talk about problems, not solutions. And 
to all of you . . . pleasant dreams! 
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